This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

031116Z Nov 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 001507 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DCHA/FFP FOR WELLER, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR GOTTLIEB, PRATT, MENGHETTI, MARX 
AFR/SA FOR LOKEN, COPSON, HIRSCH 
EGAT FOR HOBGOOD, THOMPSON, HESS, MCGAHUEY, 
GILL, RUSHIN-BELL, HURDUS 
STATE/AF FOR NEULING, MOZENA 
USUN FOR EMALY 
NAIROBI FOR ESTES, DNIRANGO, PUTNAM 
PRETORIA FOR SINK, DISKIN, HALE 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR NEWBERG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREL US ZI
SUBJECT: DECLINING FOOD SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE 
 
REF: (a)  Harare 710 
 
     (b)  Harare 1448 
(c)  Harare 1447 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  The Ambassador traveled to Bikita, a district in 
hard-hit Masvingo Province, in early October to observe 
the food security situation.  Although no overt signs 
of starvation were apparent, it was clear that 
deprivation had increased dramatically.  The country's 
severe economic contraction and high inflation have put 
even basic foods beyond the reach of ordinary 
Zimbabweans.  Millions of people are already in need of 
food assistance and the situation is likely to peak in 
December-January. 
 
¶2.  The GOZ has imported nearly half a million metric 
tons (MT) of grain since April, but it remains far from 
clear that it can import all of the 1.2 million MT 
needed.  Moreover food distribution has been hampered 
by the country's severe fuel shortage and there are 
credible reports that the GOZ is withholding food 
assistance in advance of the Senate elections in late 
November.  International food aid operations are 
increasing but the GOZ continues to limit their access, 
creating the potential for still greater hunger.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Visit to Bikita District Paints Picture of Increasing 
Deprivation 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3.   During the week of October 2, 2005, the Ambassador 
and members of the USAID Mission traveled to Bikita, a 
district in Masvingo Province, to talk with rural 
communities about their current food situation. 
Masvingo Province, along with sections of Manicaland 
Province and Matabeleland North Province, has the 
poorest cereal availability and highest prices.  CARE, 
the food partner that has distributed food and monitors 
food security in seven districts of Masvingo province, 
ranks Bikita fourth in terms of food insecurity this 
year. 
 
¶4.   The Ambassador's delegation spoke with residents 
of four communities in different wards of Bikita. 
Although we observed no overt signs of starvation, it 
is clear that deprivation is increasing dramatically. 
Residents reported that there had been no maize 
available from the local GMB since April 2005, i.e., 
since the last harvest.  (Note: A Food For Peace food 
monitor found a small quantity for sale from the GMB in 
August.  End note.)  For a few months immediately after 
the harvest, local residents bought or worked in 
exchange for maize and, more recently, wheat at 
irrigation schemes and a few remaining farms located in 
a narrow "green belt" that runs through the district. 
The supply of cereal from these sources has dropped 
significantly during recent weeks. 
 
¶5.   Maize (meal) was for sale in only one of three 
shops visited around the district, but the price was 
more than four times the official GMB price, putting it 
out of reach for most shoppers.  Seeds and fertilizer 
were also available in a commercial center, but were 
too expensive for the majority of local residents.  The 
little income they occasionally get is spent entirely 
on food. 
 
¶6.   Because it is difficult to access maize and other 
cereals, they have no stocks at home.  "Come see" said 
one woman.  "It's so bare that the rats have left." 
Hence, Bikita residents are eating less cereal.  They 
eat fewer and smaller meals, warding off hunger by 
eating wild fruits and seed pods.  When they have 
cereal, they prepare porridge more often than the more 
substantial sadza (stiff porridge) - because it 
requires less meal.  At one site, workers at a 
community garden that CARE helped develop last year 
revealed that many of them eat meals consisting only of 
vegetables from the garden (cabbage, onions, tomatoes, 
and rape, a green vegetable similar to collard greens). 
In other nearby locations, dams have dried up and even 
vegetables are difficult to access. 
 
------------------------ 
The National Food Crises 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.   The situation in Bikita is replicated in most 
other parts of the country.  In April 2005, Zimbabwean 
farmers harvested far less maize (4 - 600,000 MT) than 
is needed for the nation's human and animal consumption 
- approximately 1.6 to 1.8 million MT (reftel A).  In 
response, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) vowed to 
import 1.2 million MT of maize to assure that, until 
the next harvest, maize would be consistently available 
for purchase throughout the country at an affordable 
price. 
 
¶8.   As the staple food of Zimbabweans, the 
availability of maize is critical to food security. 
Regular monitoring by WFP, FEWSNET, USAID and C-SAFE 
(Consortium for Southern African Food Security 
Emergency, a USAID-supported NGO operation) has 
confirmed that most rural households have already 
exhausted the maize that they harvested.  As predicted, 
the vast majority now must purchase their cereals. 
However, September reports from the WFP Vulnerability 
Assessment Mapping Unit's monitoring indicate that, 
across the country, maize is not available to buy or is 
difficult to access due to distance and/or high price. 
 
¶9.   The annual Vulnerability Assessment (VA) showed 
that, even if maize were available at a low price, not 
all households would be able to afford to buy what they 
need.  Consequently, the GOZ agreed that the World Food 
Programme (WFP) may import 300,000 MT of food for free 
distribution to up to 2.9 million vulnerable people in 
rural households.  This 2.9 million figure was based on 
assumptions that incomes would keep pace with the price 
of maize, and that 100% of household income could be 
spent to buy maize, two erroneous assumptions. 
Considering only the rural area, the number of people 
who cannot meet their needs will certainly be much 
higher - probably double the estimated 2.9 million. 
 
¶10.  No attempts have been made to quantify the urban 
population's needs, but on the heels of Operation 
Murambatsvina, which destroyed the livelihoods of the 
majority of informal traders, and left some 700,000 
people homeless, a significant portion of the urban 
population is, no doubt, also food insecure. 
Furthermore, in urban areas, the more affordable (price- 
controlled) roller meal has disappeared from grocers' 
shelves, forcing customers to buy the more expensive 
(uncontrolled) super-refined meal.  In the past week, 
even super-refined meal has become scarce in Harare 
 
------------------------------- 
GOZ Efforts Fall Short of Needs 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  Reports of exports from the South African grain 
sales floor indicate that since April 30, 2005, a large 
quantity of maize (total 473,000 MT by September 30, 
2005) has been purchased for delivery to Zimbabwe.  If 
true, this would mean that the GOZ is on track to meet 
its goal of 1.2 MTs by next April.  However, the GOZ 
regards grain import statistics as a state secret and 
there is no way to verify that all of this grain was 
actually delivered.  There is also considerable 
skepticism within the international donor community 
that the GOZ can sustain the current pace of 100,000 
MTs a month given the country's accelerating economic 
problems, especially the shortage of foreign exchange. 
In addition, grain deliveries to the depots through out 
the country have been erratic.  As the Ambassador saw 
in Bikita, supplies are often unavailable at the GMB's 
subsidized price and when available sell out quickly. 
 
¶12.  Zimbabwe's fuel crisis is certainly a major 
explanation for why the imported grain is not making it 
to rural areas.  However there are probably other 
factors as well.  There are credible reports that the 
GOZ is withholding food in order to use it politically 
in the late November Senate elections.  Corruption is 
another likely explanation.  Recently, for example, Leo 
Mugabe, businessman and Robert Mugabe's nephew, was 
arrested for allegedly illegally exporting food 
purchased at the subsidized price to Mozambique and 
Zambia at a substantial mark-up.  There is also 
evidence that part of the purchased maize has not even 
reached Zimbabwe, including some held in ships anchored 
off the port of Beira, Mozambique for later resale. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Comparisons to past drought years 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  Compared to last year, one man in Bikita summed it 
up: "We've gone from the frying pan to the fire." 
Household Livelihood Surveys conducted by CARE in 
Bikita in each of the past three years estimated that 
this year and in 2003, on average, farmers produced 
enough cereal to meet only one month of their 
households' cereal needs, while in 2004, they produced 
enough to last about six months. 
 
¶14.  Bikita residents said that their current food 
situation is even worse than during Zimbabwe's worst 
drought of 1992-1993.  Their explanation was not that 
the harvest was poorer, but instead they blamed 
economic factors, largely attributable to poor GOZ 
policy (reftel).  In 1992-3 the GMB worked efficiently, 
and, thus, prices were affordable, and access to maize 
was good.  To support food purchases, they worked at 
commercial farms, or sold livestock at favorable 
prices. Currently, the GMB's performance is poor and 
riddled with corruption.  Zimbabwe's economy is 
contracting, and high inflation has made food and other 
essential necessities unaffordable.  Casual farm work 
opportunities are scarcer because of the break up of 
many commercial farms.  Livestock sales yield very 
little return.  Operation Murambatsvina drove many 
people from the urban areas back to the rural areas, 
resulting in a significant drop in remittances and more 
competition for work and food. 
 
¶15.  In 1992, Zimbabwe had reserve stocks and the GOZ 
imported an additional 2.4 MT of maize before May 1993. 
Even so, Zimbabwe faced a humanitarian crisis and the 
USG provided Zimbabwe 590,939 MT of maize, which 
represented 27% of Zimbabwe's total maize consumption 
over the period of January 1992 through May 1993. 
 
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Comment: 
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¶16.  Zimbabwe's food crisis is getting worse.  Food is 
either unavailable or unaffordable for much of the 
country and hunger is rising.  That said, given the 
level of imports and international assistance our best 
guess, as we have said before, is that Zimbabwe may get 
through this year without widespread starvation 
provided it can be distributed to where needed.  This 
outcome will doubtless be trumpeted by the GOZ but in 
fact its refusal to acknowledge the need for assistance 
and to agree to a WFP appeal has put people lives at 
risk. 
 
¶17.  Moreover, next year promises to be even worse as 
the GOZ has been slow to distribute inputs and planting 
is well behind schedule (reftel C).  Even good rains 
will not lead to a good harvest at this point.  In 
addition, barring an epiphany, government policies will 
leave the country with even fewer resources next year 
to import food.  Finally, because of the GOZ's 
arbitrary limit on the number of people who can receive 
food assistance, poor Zimbabweans will continue to 
deplete their coping mechanisms and will move deeper 
into poverty, foregoing meals, medical care, school 
fees and other essentials and leaving them more 
vulnerable in the future. 
DELL