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Viewing cable 05BRASILIA3124, BRAZIL: IAEA/IRAN NOVEMBER 24 IAEA BOARD MEETING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BRASILIA3124 2005-11-29 18:31 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 003124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL AORC BR IR IAEA
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: IAEA/IRAN NOVEMBER 24 IAEA BOARD MEETING 
 
REF: STATE 213341 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Dennis Hearne, 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
1.  (C) Embassy presented reftel demarche November 28 to 
Santiago Mourao, director of the Foreign Ministry's 
Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies Division.  Mourao said 
the GOB had maintained frequent contact with the EU3 on the 
issue and had also had two recent discussions of the issue 
with the Iranians. 
 
2.  (C) Mourao said that the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, 
who visited Brazil in October, had thanked the Brazilians for 
their "support", referring to Brazil's abstention on the IAEA 
resolution concerning the Iranian nuclear program.  The 
Brazilians told him that the GOB vote in the IAEA BOG should 
not be interpreted as an endorsement of Iranian actions, but 
rather as a judgment that referral to the UNSC is not the 
most appropriate tactical course of action.  The GOB stressed 
that, while all countries have the right to develop nuclear 
energy, that right is conditioned on full compliance with 
international commitments such as the NPT and IAEA safeguards 
agreements.  In the case of Iran, Brazil sees a necessity to 
make particular efforts to repair the lack of confidence on 
the part of the international community regarding Iran's 
program.  The GOB told the Minister that it expects Iran to 
make particular efforts to cooperate with the IAEA in a more 
proactive and transparent manner. 
 
3.  (C) Mourao said he believes Iran is now being more 
forthcoming, but the pending issues have yet to be resolved. 
The GOB has told the GOI that it needs to suspend all 
enrichment activities and abide by the commitments it made 
concerning its program.  Iran should restart negotiations 
with the EU3.  Mourao added that Brazil supported the Russian 
initiative to transfer Iranian enrichment capabilities from 
Iran to Russia.  This could be a useful confidence-building 
measure, even if it is not an ideal long-term solution. 
 
4.  (C) The second discussion with Iran came after the new 
Iranian president made a speech in Tehran saying Iran was 
being treated in a discriminatory fashion when compared to 
the cases of South Korea and Brazil.  The Foreign Ministry 
called in the Iranian Ambassador and told him such comments 
were not proper.  The Iranian Ambassador blamed the problem 
on a translation error. 
 
5.  (C) Mourao noted that the regular Undersecretary-level 
talks that Brazil holds with Iran have been postponed for 
"technical reasons."  The real reason for the postponement is 
Brazilian displeasure with the Iranian president's public 
statements concerning Israel. 
 
LINEHAN