This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T BRASILIA 003116 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PARM BR VE
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON VENEZUELAN ARMS 
TRANSFER POLICY 
 
REF: A) BRASILIA 3074 B) STATE 207628 
 
Classified By: Charge Patrick Linehan, 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1.  (S) Foreign Ministry Undersecretary-General for 
Cooperation and Brazilian Communities Abroad Ruy Nunes Pinto 
Nogueira called the Charge to the Foreign Ministry November 
28 to respond to the demarche delivered by then Charge 
Chicola on November 22 concerning the new U.S. policy 
concerning arms transfers to Venezuela (Ref A).  Nogueira 
said FM Celso Amorim had read the report of the November 22 
meeeting when he returned from abroad, and because of the 
importance of the issue to Brazil, asked Nogueira to deliver 
the Brazilian response immediately, in place of the 
Secretary-General, who was out of town. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶2.  (S) Nogueira noted that President Lula had raised the 
issue of the sale of Super Tucano planes to Venezuela with 
President Bush during their November 6 meeting at Granja do 
Torto in Brasilia.  He said that President Bush had 
reportedly been quite positive to the presentation, and had 
promised to examine the subject sympathetically.  Nogueira, 
reading from the Brazilian Government report of the November 
6 session, said President Bush had expressed concern about 
the possible sale of the planes to Venezuela and said there 
could be opposition to the sale in Congress because of the 
high percentage of U.S. components in the planes, and in view 
of Chavez' actions.  However, President Bush had concluded 
that "We have to be prudent.  We don't need to take a 
decision right here at this table."  Nogueira said the last 
two sentences were a direct quote of President Bush's words. 
 
 
¶3.  (S) Nogueira added that, after the meeting with President 
Lula, FM Amorim had personally provided a non-paper to 
Secretary Rice.  Nogueira told the Charge that Secretary Rice 
 
SIPDIS 
had agreed to look into the matter and respond as soon as 
possible.  Nogueira gave the Charge a copy of the non-paper 
in English, the text of which is in paragraph six. 
 
¶4.  (S) Nogueira told the Charge that, aside from the 
financial concerns Brazil had about the possible cancellation 
of the Super Tucano sale, Brazil believes Chavez has the 
option to buy the same, or better aircraft from other buyers, 
mentioning Russia as an example.  Brazil would not like to 
see Venezuela procure a plane from outside the hemisphere, 
and is worried that the purchase of a more advanced plane 
from the Russians or others would cause an imbalance among 
the air forces of South America.  Finally, he claimed that if 
the sale were allowed to go forward, and the U.S. and/or 
Brazil later decided it to be no longer convenient to allow 
Chavez to deploy the aircraft, the U.S. or Brazil could 
ground the fleet by denying support and/or spare parts, just 
as the U.S. had done in the case of the Venezuelan F-16s. 
 
¶5.  (S) Nogueira concluded by saying that the Foreign 
Ministry would be tasking the Brazilian Embassy in Washington 
with obtaining a reply to the non-paper that FM Amorim gave 
to Secretary Rice on November 6.  He said instructions would 
be sent to the Embassy on November 29. 
 
¶6.  (S)  Text of the Non-Paper: 
 
Begin Text: 
 
Sale of Brazilian aircraft to Venezuela 
 
On Octoer 28, 2005, the Brazilian Aerospace Company (EMBRAER) 
signed a contract with the Venzuelan Air Force, which 
provides for the sale of 20 (twenty) Super Tucano airplanes, 
for US$169.7 million. 
 
The deal was conluded only after U.S. parts suppliers (which 
account for roughly 50 percent of the aircraft compnents) 
provided written assurances that the U.S. Government had 
nothing against the sale. 
 
According to unofficial information received by EMBRAER, 
Washington would be planning to review such decision. The 
cancellation of the deal wuld imply significant loss to 
EMBRAER.  The Brazilian government would highly appreciate 
that the U.S. Government maintained its positiion on the 
transaction, since all conditions were met at the time of the 
signing of the contract. 
 
It is worth recalling that the Supert-Tucano airplanes are 
designed to provide operational support in domestic law 
enforcement missions, such as air space surveillance, drug 
trafficking and guerrilla combat, objectives that this kind 
of aircraft is also expected to accomplished in Colombia. 
 
End Text. 
 
Linehan