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Viewing cable 05ATHENS2841, RESPONSE TO BLUE LANTERN CHECK ON UNAUTHORIZED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ATHENS2841 2005-11-04 14:30 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Athens
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS ATHENS 002841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO PETER DADE PM/DTCC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC RS GR
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO BLUE LANTERN CHECK ON UNAUTHORIZED 
MODIFICATIONS TO U.S. ARMORED VEHICLES IN GREECE 
 
REF: STATE 154415 
 
1. (SBU) Post and ODC have completed the above referenced 
investigation into the modification of A.M. General HMMWV's 
with the Russian Kornet E ATGM missle system.  The 
information collected has indicated that in 2001, AM General 
Corporation signed contract No 2001-173 with the Greek State 
owned Hellenic Vehicle Industry S.A. (ELBO) for the 
procurement of 98 incomplete vehicles, HMMWV, M1113. Said 
contract is titled M1113 Incomplete Vehicles for KORNET-E 
phase-1 Co-production program. An option to this contract was 
exercised in 2003 for an additional 98 each, total number 
procured being 196 ea. 
 
2. (SBU) Articles 7.2 and 7.3 of the contract clearly 
indicate that the seller (AM General) will obtain all 
necessary USG licenses, permits and authorizations and/or 
clearances and is subject to all US laws and regulations 
relating to exports. The contract specifies the Buyer (ELBO) 
provide and sign the end-user certification and Form BXA-711 
required by the US Department of Commerce. Consequently, all 
pertinent licenses, to include Export License No D311979 and 
a US Department of State export license for the KORNET 
ancillary parts contract were secured and the 196 each 
incomplete vehicles were shipped to Greece. 
 
3. (SBU) It should be noted that Article 7.5 indicates that 
the defense articles procured with this contract will not be 
transferred to a person in a third country unless the prior 
written approval of the Seller and the US Department of 
Commerce has been obtained. 
 
4. (SBU) In the meantime, the Hellenic MOD had signed a 
contract with the Israeli firm PLASAN SASA to procure 196 
each HMMWV heavy armor protection kits of level 2, Stanag 
4569 and a separate contract with the Russian MOD for the 
procurement of an equal number of KORNET-E anti-tank systems. 
At ELBO facility, the HMMWV vehicles were heavily armored 
with the PLASAN SASA kit and the KORNET-E system was mounted 
on a pedestal on the roof of the vehicle. Storage for 
additional missiles has been accommodated within the vehicle. 
 
5. (SBU) It appears that no major modifications were made to 
the armored HMMWV vehicles since the KORNET-E missile 
launcher has been mounted on an ordinary and existing roof 
pedestal. The three extra KORNET containerized missiles are 
stored in the vehicle,s rear storage compartment. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment. This Blue Lantern investigation was 
conducted with sensitivity, particularly in view of the 
ongoing contract negotiations between GOG and AM General for 
the procurement of 691 each HMMWV vehicles (301 Grenade 
Machine Gun Carriers and 390 Light Armored Recon). 
Competition from major European countries (Germany, France, 
and Spain) is fierce on this project and any negative comment 
on the HMMWV program might jeopardize the efforts of the US 
firm to win the contract. It took many years of hard and 
persistent efforts to establish the HMMWV family of vehicles 
in the Greek military and the future looks very promising for 
increased requirements. End Comment. 
 
RIES