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UNCLAS  ALMATY 004171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ROUNDUP, 
NOVEMBER 25, 2005 
 
REF: Almaty 3919 
 
¶1. (U)  This is the ninth in a series of weekly election 
roundups in advance of Kazakhstan's December 4, 2005 
presidential elections.  Items were drawn primarily from 
local media reporting. 
 
Live TV debate 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) On the night of November 17 live TV debates were 
held in Almaty and broadcast on national television.  The 
participants included presidential candidates Zharmakhan 
Tuyakbay, Alikhan Baymenov, Mels Yeleusizov and Yerasyl 
Abylkasymov.  President Nazarbayev was out of the country, 
but had previously declined to participate in the debates. 
During the debate, the candidates described their 
programs, posed questions to one another, and gave short 
addresses to the electorate. 
 
¶3.  (U) Tuyakbay declared that he wanted to address his 
questions to Nursultan Nazarbayev, but since Nazarbayev 
was absent he would ask Baymenov, instead, for his opinion 
about "Kazakhgate." (Note: "Kazakhgate" refers to the case 
of American citizen James Giffen, a former advisor to 
Nazarbayev, who allegedly violated the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act by channeling millions of dollars from U.S. 
and other Western oil companies to top Kazakhstan 
officials in order to secure lucrative contracts.  The 
trial is expected to begin in federal court in April 2006. 
End Note.)  Baymenov replied that the details of the case 
should be made public in Kazakhstan, and the stolen money 
returned to the country.  However, Baymenov added, it was 
premature to accuse anybody before the court had passed 
its ruling.  For his part, Tuyakbay commented that "there 
is no hope that the facts and details of the Giffen case 
will ever be made public as long as this political regime 
is in place." 
 
¶4.  (U) Following the debate, a spokesperson from 
Tuyakbay's headquarters said that the event was a positive 
step and a good opportunity for the candidates to talk 
about their programs, but that the debate format had 
satisfied none of the candidates -- except for Nazarbayev, 
who had refused to participate.  "For Just Kazakhstan" 
(FJK) publicly called for the interested parties to 
arrange another debate with Nazarbayev's participation. 
 
Nurkadilov's Death 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (U) The investigation into former, senior GOK official 
and most-recently opposition critic Zamanbek Nurkadilov's 
death continues.  On November 16 police questioned 
Nurkadilov's wife, the well-known folk singer Makpal 
Zhunusova, for 4 hours.  In a subsequent press interview 
Zhunusova said that her husband could not have committed 
suicide, as there had been no reason for him to take his 
own life.  "He loved me very much, and I respected him. 
We were a good family.  Throughout Kazakhstan everyone 
knew about it.  And there is no point in talking about 
it." 
 
¶6.  (U) On November 15, Dariga Nazarbayeva made the 
following comment on Nurkadilov's death:  "This tragedy 
will be exploited as much as possible by political 
figures.  This tragedy suits the radical opposition, but 
not the authorities." 
 
GOK Warnings Against "Destabilization" Attempts 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7.  (U) On November 16 the head of the National Security 
Committee (KNB), Nartay Dutbayev, warned that GOK security 
agencies would put a stop to any attempt to foment a 
"colored revolution" during Kazakhstan's upcoming 
elections.  "I do not exclude the possibility that certain 
'hot-heads,' who are participating in the election for the 
presidency, may provoke incidents aimed at destabilizing 
the country," he said.  "We have information to that 
effect." 
 
¶8.  (U) In response to Dutbayev's statement, Tuyakbay's 
headquarters addressed a rhetorical question to the KNB 
 
 
chief and the CEC chairman: "Where did you get information 
that some individuals are trying to destabilize the 
situation in the country?  Who are the 'hot-heads' 
mentioned in the statement?  And how do security agencies 
interpret the idea of 'colored revolution?'  Do you mean 
new, honest people coming to power after a long period of 
authoritarian rule; or popular, non-violent campaigns 
against fraud and the betrayal of the peoples' will?" 
 
¶9. (U) During a November 17 briefing, Interior Minister 
Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov also warned that the opposition 
was trying to "heat up" the situation, accusing the 
opposition of lending a political interpretation to non- 
political events.  As examples, Mukhamedzhanov cited FJK's 
mid-October "fuss" over a Zhuma Times journalist who 
"disappeared" in Southern Kazakhstan (the disappearance 
was later discovered to be due to the journalist's memory 
lapse), and the opposition's outcry over Tuyakbay campaign 
materials that went missing (the bus carrying the 
materials was later  found to have broken down.)  Finally, 
Mukhamedzhanov defended law enforcement efforts to find 
FJK activist Elena Nikitina's missing daughter and said 
the opposition was trying to  "politicize" the case. 
(Note: Per reftel, on October 13 Nikitina's 14 year-old 
daughter disappeared.  FJK claims that, following the 
girl's disappearance, law enforcement officials tried to 
recruit Nikitina to provide information about FJK 
activities. It is not clear whether foul play was actually 
involved.  End Note.) 
 
¶10. (U) In conclusion, the Minister suggested that "there 
are some forces in the country trying to destabilize the 
situation."  He continued: "According to our sources, 
certain political figures plan provocations to disrupt the 
normal life of our citizens.  Some opposition leaders have 
even attempted to bribe law enforcement officials. 
Radical forces are getting ready to take actions in order 
to create disorder in the country.  We will put a stop to 
any destabilization attempts and the organizers will be 
held responsible for the consequences of their illegal 
actions." 
 
¶11. (U) On November 16, CEC Chairman Onalsyn Zhumabekov 
said that the CEC had learned that attempts would be made 
to destabilize public order on December 4.  Zhumabekov did 
not give any names, but said that "certain people" 
intended to stage protests under the pretext that their 
names were missing from voters' lists.  Zhumabekov noted 
that voters' lists would be posted at all voting stations 
from November 18 until December 3, and warned that it was 
the voters' responsibility to verify that their names were 
listed correctly. 
 
Reported Attacks on Opposition Figures and Families 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶12.  (U) On November 15 Tuyakbay's campaign chief in 
Mangistau Oblast, Zhanibek Kozhyk, was driving home when 
his car was stopped by four young men.  When Kozhyk got 
out of the car the men beat him severely, and left him in 
an unpopulated area.  Kozhyk's car and the driver, 
Zhetybay Sansyzbayev, disappeared.  On November 17, 
Mukhamedzhanov announced that the police had detained two 
individuals suspected of the assault. 
 
¶13.  (U) On the night of November 16, three Almaty City 
police officers and a civilian beat up two of opposition 
leader Altynbek Sarsenbayuly's nephews. According to press 
reports, the violence occurred in a club, where the 
policemen insulted Sarsenbayuly's nephews and then beat 
them with billiard balls.  The men were subsequently 
treated for serious neurosurgical injuries.  The police 
are investigating the case, which Sarsenbayuly 
characterized as a "political incident." 
 
CEC Withdrawing Observers' Accreditation 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (U) On November 18, the CEC withdrew accreditation of 
the CIS-EMO, arguing that its status as an international 
NGO disqualified it for accreditation.  CEC Chairman 
Zhumabekov later explained that, pursuant to the election 
law, representatives of foreign states, international 
governmental organizations, and foreign media could be 
 
 
accredited for elections, but not private citizens or 
NGOs. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The CEC used the same criterion to challenge 
the observer status of several ENEMO observers and an NDI 
representative.  Embassy intervention with high-level GOK 
contacts prevented the expulsion of six ENEMO personnel 
and the Amcit NDI employee over the weekend of November 19- 
¶20.  The observers were subsequently able to regularize 
their immigration status.  With the GOK's approval, 
efforts are underway to register NDI observers under the 
auspices of ENEMO. 
 
CEC Moves to Lift Ban on Public Rallies 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (U) The CEC initiated a new draft law canceling the 
ban on public rallies during the vote-counting process. 
The government approved the draft and the Ministry of 
Justice announced that it would be sent to Parliament in 
the near future; however, no timelines were set. 
 
GOK Efforts to Balance Criticism 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (U) The government continued its campaign to counter 
negative election publicity.  On November 16, official 
media publicized the Caspian Information Center's (a 
London-based observation group) appraisal of recent 
amendments to Kazakhstan's electoral law.  The CIC report 
disagrees with the OSCE criticism of the ban on public 
rallies during the vote-counting, and calls on 
international observers to show more responsibility 
regarding the potential political consequences of their 
recommendations. 
 
¶18.  (U) On November 15, the Eurasian Rating Agency and 
Channel 31 announced plans to conduct exit-polls in all 
regional centers of Almaty and Astana on December 4, 
ostensibly to balance potentially negative exit polls 
conducted by the "Fair Elections" group of human rights 
activists. 
 
Zhakiyanov Update 
----------------- 
 
¶19. (U) On November 2, the administration of the 
"settlement colony" where Zhakiyanov is being held 
recommended his release.  On November 17, the Ministry of 
Justice announced that the MOJ "sees no barriers 
preventing the release of Galymzhan Zhakiyanov," and on 
November 18 the settlement colony's recommendation was 
passed to the Yekibastyz City court for action. 
 
¶20. (U) Minimize for Dushanbe Considered. 
 
ORDWAY 
 
 
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