This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 003521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
FROM THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UN AGENCIES IN ROME 
 
STATE FOR IO TERRY MILLER, IO/EDA BEHREND AND KOTOK 
USDA FOR OSEC JBPENN, FAS REICH AND HUGHES 
USAID FOR DCHA MMERTENS; OFDA KISAACS AND GGOTTLIEB; FFP 
JDWORKEN AND DSKORIC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC EAGR EAID FAO
SUBJECT: FAO DG'S UPCOMING MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary:  FAO Director General (DG) Jacques 
Diouf will be in Washington October 26-27 for senior- 
level meetings at State, USDA and USAID.  U.S. Mission 
Rome believes it is important that all three agencies 
convey a clear signal to the DG regarding USG 
dissatisfaction with his leadership and management of 
FAO, as evidenced in recent months.  In particular, we 
need to offset the apparent momentum of the DG's "reform 
proposals," conceived hastily with little or no 
discussion or input from key FAO staff or member 
governments.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  After twelve years in office, FAO Director 
General Diouf is headed for election to his third six- 
year term, with the possibility of four more years beyond 
that.  Although most major donor members -- as well as 
many G-77 countries -- would prefer to see a change of 
leadership, no alternative candidates were nominated, 
leaving Diouf unopposed in the election that will take 
place at the FAO Conference November 19-26. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Dissatisfaction with Diouf's weak leadership 
and lack of management skills has been evident for some 
time.  The initial mishandling of the African desert 
locust crisis, a pattern of misallocation of resources, 
including inadequate funding for priority standard- 
setting activities, and declining employee morale are 
just a few examples.  The DG's gross mishandling of the 
organization's 60th anniversary celebration on October 17 
led to a major embarrassment to the organization as 
Zimbabwe's Mugabe and Venezuela's Chavez took the floor 
to slander the U.S. and Great Britain. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  In recent months the ineptness of Diouf's 
leadership has been brought into even sharper focus 
through his "reform proposals."  The DG presented them as 
a "back-of-the-envelope exercise" at the last minute, 
without adequate time to develop detailed ideas and run 
them by senior management, staff, and -- not least -- 
member countries.  At the September 2005 sittings of the 
Finance and Joint Finance/Program Committees, member 
states called on Diouf to establish a mechanism to 
consult with members to provide details and open a 
dialogue on the proposals well in advance of the November 
Council and Conference discussions on the reform. 
Although he orally agreed to do so, he has made no effort 
to proceed with such discussions, seemingly preferring to 
ramrod the proposals through the November meetings, 
probably via last minute, late-night Friends-of-the-Chair 
discussions. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Members have been struggling to respond to the 
proposal in the face of inadequate information about the 
substance and impact of the reforms and a lack of clarity 
about the rationale and objectives.  To date, member 
reaction has been equivocal, amounting to "there may be 
some good stuff in here, but we need more time to study 
it."  It appears that many or most G-77 members may 
support the proposals simply because the Director General 
tabled them.  If this remains the response at the Council 
and Conference next month, Diouf will take it as a 
mandate to proceed. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  Reform of FAO is sorely needed, but it should 
proceed in a deliberate fashion and in full consultation 
with the membership.  To this end, the Council in 
November 2004 approved an Independent External Evaluation 
(IEE) of FAO.  Diouf initially opposed the IEE, but 
eventually relented when a consensus of support developed 
among members from the North and the South, and when it 
was agreed the evaluation would not be launched until 
after the election in November 2005.  The terms of 
reference for the IEE have been negotiated and are 
expected to be approved by the Council next month.  The 
final results of the evaluation are to be presented to 
the Conference in November 2007.  The evaluation should 
pave the way for reform based on a thorough, systematic 
evaluation of the organization's strengths, weaknesses, 
and comparative advantages, not on a haphazard plan 
assembled without meaningful internal or external input. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  If Diouf proceeds with his current approach to 
the reform plan we face three serious dangers: 
 
-- First, the programs of greatest interest to the United 
States could continue to be under-funded despite the lip 
service FAO pays to their "priority" status. 
 
-- Second, the IEE will be undermined by a lack of 
enthusiasm and support, particularly from developing 
countries, and we will lose the opportunity to reform FAO 
in a way that more closely aligns it with U.S. interests. 
 
-- Third, the DG's reforms are projected in the context 
of a 2.5 percent real growth (RG) budget, and it could 
become difficult, in already complex budget discussions, 
to break momentum toward this RG scenario at the upcoming 
FAO Council and Conference. 
¶8. (SBU)  U.S. Mission encourages Washington agencies to 
consider the following strategies for securing meaningful 
reform of FAO: 
 
-- Use high-level State, USDA, and AID meetings with DG 
Diouf next week to express U.S. displeasure with the 
current state of FAO leadership and apparent efforts to 
ram through an ill-considered reform plan. 
 
-- Use the DG election in November to signal our 
dissatisfaction with FAO leadership by vocally abstaining 
or voting against Diouf.  We should encourage a critical 
mass of other members to participate in such a protest 
vote. 
 
-- Block all components of Diouf's personal reform plan 
submitted to the Council and/or Conference next month for 
review and approval.  Some components might be 
reconsidered if adequate information and opportunities 
for consultation are forthcoming, but only if they do not 
undermine the broader reform effort based on the IEE. 
 
-- Prepare a U.S. reform plan that identifies U.S. 
priorities for FAO and links U.S. funding to performance. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  We offer the following points for the meetings 
with DG Diouf next week in Washington: 
 
-- Express U.S. dissatisfaction with what we see as his 
wanting management of the UN's largest independent agency, 
especially as seen at the organization's recent 60th 
anniversary celebration as well as through his last-minute, 
poorly formulated reform proposals. 
 
-- Tell DG Diouf that we will not support the current reform 
proposals without full consultations and discussion between 
the Secretariat and the member states. 
 
-- Communicate dissatisfaction that Diouf chose to run for a 
third term. 
 
-- Express U.S. commitment to FAO reform based on the IEE 
assessment of the organization's strengths, weaknesses, and 
comparative advantages. 
 
-- Reiterate USG support for the highly qualified candidates 
we have identified for senior positions in the FAO, and 
emphasize that we expect him to fill these soon-to-be vacant 
positions with little or no delay. 
 
HALL