This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007230 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM USMISSION UNESCO PARIS 
STATE PASS USTR C.BLISS, S. MCCOY 
NSC B. WILLIAMS 
ROME FOR C.BERNINI, PLEASE PASS TO A/S SILVERBERG'S 
PARTY 
 
E.O. 12958:     N/A 
TAGS: ETRD PREL SCUL FR UNESCO
SUBJECT:  USUNESCO:  UNESCO VOTES TO ADOPT CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY CONVENTION:  U.S. VOTES NO 
 
Refs: A) Paris 7109, B) Paris 7128 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  On October 20, by a vote of 148 in 
favor, 2 (U.S. and Israel) opposed, and 4 (Australia, 
Honduras, Liberia, and Nicaragua) abstentions, the 
UNESCO General Conference, meeting in plenary session, 
adopted the highly controversial Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions ("the Convention").   Apart from the U.S. 
explanation of vote (EOV), 10 other EOVs also 
underscored in various ways that the Convention must be 
applied in a manner consistent with rights and 
obligations under other international instruments.  The 
need to protect human rights in implementing the 
Convention, however, was given less stress in those 
interventions.  The tone and substance of EU dealings 
with the U.S. on this issue remained hard-edged and 
unyielding down to the bitter end, as reflected in the 
UK's plenary EOV (on behalf of the EU), "This is a 
great day for UNESCO.  With one country, we have agreed 
to disagree on this issue."  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) The vote took place in a room filled with 
delegation representatives, NGOs and press in an air of 
high anticipation.  There were no catcalls or other 
undignified acts of which we are aware, after the 
results were announced. The States whose EOVs 
underscored the importance of respecting rights and 
obligations under other international agreements 
included Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Iraq, Japan, 
Korea, New Zealand, Oman, Philippines, and Thailand. 
Only Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, and Thailand 
made explicit references in their EOVs to the need to 
protect trade rules, WTO agreements, and/or 
intellectual property obligations.  Notably, the out- 
going president of the Executive Board (a German) made 
an impassioned intervention appealing to the room not 
to speak of victories and defeats and calling for a 
Convention text that could eventually be accepted by 
all Member States, "otherwise it won't be credible." 
He went on to say that we "owe respect to different 
opinions" about the Convention, that the supporters of 
the Convention should take seriously the concerns that 
have been expressed, and noted his hope that the 
convention would be applied "in good faith." 
 
¶3. (U) Before closing the plenary session on this item, 
Kadr Asmal, the South African who chaired the 
negotiating sessions of inter-governmental experts, was 
invited to the podium to make a final statement 
(Comment: many elements of which were clearly 
disingenuous).  For instance, he said that the 
Convention should not be seen as a "French, or EU, or 
Canadian" convention and that it was "not part of a 
power play."  He stated that the Convention was about 
more than radio and TV control and access, and also 
about "respect."  He asserted that the Convention was 
"not adopted light-heartedly, frivolously, or rapidly." 
He said the Convention does not supercede other 
conventions, but rather is complementary to them.  He 
thanked the Director General "for his steadfastness" 
during the negotiations of the Convention.  He urged 
quick ratification of the Convention for its entry into 
force. 
¶4.  (U) Prior to the plenary session vote on the 
Convention's text, Commission IV met to review and 
approve a written report of its proceedings and to hear 
an oral report on its proceedings from the rapporteur. 
At that meeting, the U.S. delegation sought to add 
either a footnote or an additional paragraph to the 
written report to reflect the discussion and vote 
relating to a key U.S.-proposed amendment to improve an 
unhelpful Japanese Draft Resolution that provided an 
ambiguous interpretation of the Convention.  The U.S. 
effort to have the record reflect this part of the 
Commission's proceedings was roundly opposed on the 
ground that it was inconsistent with UNESCO's practice 
regarding defeated draft amendments. 
 
¶5. (U) For contextual background, the U.S. amendment 
had sought to include in the final paragraph of the 
Japanese resolution the verbatim wording of two 
principles enshrined in the UNESCO Constitution, 
namely, "the free flow of ideas by word and image" and 
the "free exchange of ideas and knowledge."  As 
amended, the amended paragraph would have read: 
"Expresses its confidence that the Convention shall be 
implemented in a manner consistent with the principles 
and objectives of the Constitution of UNESCO, in 
particular the free flow of ideas by word and image" 
and the "free exchange of ideas and knowledge." 
However, our proposed amendment was defeated by a vote 
of 116 (opposed), 3 (Afghanistan, Israel, U.S.) in 
favor and 3 abstentions, and the written report of 
Commission IV remained silent regarding that telling 
vote.  For the record, it is worth noting that 
Afghanistan, Australia, and Israel were also among 
those States (in addition to Kiribati, Korea, 
Philippines, Rwanda, Thailand) that had voted to 
support, or to abstain on, a number of the U.S.'s 28 
proposed (but rejected) amendments to the Convention 
text (see reftels). 
 
¶6. (U) However, at the plenary session, taking 
advantage of the fact that all plenary intervention are 
fully recorded, the U.S. delegation made an 
intervention that recalled the U.S. proposed amendment 
to the Japanese resolution and that verbatim wording 
taken from UNESCO's Constitution had been rejected by a 
vote for inclusion in the Japanese resolution. 
 
¶7. (U) Comment. The full import of this convention on 
"culture" has, from its inception, too often been 
underestimated, misrepresented, and widely 
misunderstood by many.  Despite an assiduous if 
unsuccessful U.S. Government effort to prevent this 
result, the Convention's adoption is now a fait 
accompli and its potential entry into force only 30 
ratifications away from becoming a juridical reality. 
In many important respects, this Convention can be seen 
and exploited as a clarion call to take serious note of 
indicative diplomatic developments that have critical 
implications for U.S. multilateral diplomacy, for trans- 
Atlantic policy, and for U.S. outreach to the 
developing world. 
 
¶8. (U) Comment continued. A key observation about the 
process that led to adoption of this instrument is the 
disturbing trend within UNESCO towards regional-group 
block voting that is either aimed at, or has the 
practical effect of, completely shutting out U.S. 
capacity to influence group decisions before they are 
reached.  The adroit European Union maneuvering to land 
this Convention, tinged with complete disregard for its 
impact on the U.S., cannot be ignored.  Nor can this 
victory's potential for emboldening the EU to pursue 
further such victories in multilateral forums, where it 
can once again count on surrogate supporters such as 
Canada, Brazil, India, and the G-77. 
 
 
OLIVER