This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 LILONGWE 000913 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
USAID FOR DCHA/FFP LANDIS, ANDERSON, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN 
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA ISAACS, GOTTLIEB, MARX, PRATT 
USAID FOR AFR/SA LOKEN, COPSON 
DEPT FOR AF/S, INR/GGI, PM/ISP 
NCS FOR MELINE 
PRETORIA FOR DISKIN, HALE, SINK, AND USDA/REYNOLDS 
NAIROBI FOR ESTES, DEPREZ 
GABORONE FOR BROWN, KHUPE 
HARARE FOR PATTERSON, REED 
MAPUTO FOR POLAND 
ROME FOR FODAG NEWBERG, BROOKS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ECON EAGR MI
SUBJECT: MALAWI SITUATION REPORT AND FY 2006 DISASTER 
DECLARATION FOR GROWING FOOD SECURITY CRISIS 
 
REF: LILONGWE 000514 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  This cable re-declares a disaster for FY 2006 in 
Malawi due to food insecurity and provides an update on 
the situation.  Per reftel, it is estimated that over 
four million Malawians (more than one-third of the 
population) will be unable to meet their food needs over 
the next six months, until the next harvest arrives. 
This is due to a poor 2005 harvest, rising food prices, 
and reduced purchasing power combined with chronic issues 
of increasing poverty and high HIV/AIDS prevalence. 
Field visits by Mission and regional DCHA staff to two 
districts in the south have confirmed that food security 
is deteriorating.  People in affected areas have employed 
coping mechanisms such as gathering wild foods and 
selling firewood much earlier than usual in the hunger 
season.  Nutritional status is also deteriorating earlier 
than expected.  Additional emergency donor assistance 
will be required, particularly in the areas of food 
access, livelihoods/agricultural recovery, and 
health/nutrition. 
 
¶2.  The Chief of Mission has determined that there is a 
growing food security crisis in Malawi of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant a disaster declaration.  Per reftel, 
the crisis is beyond the Government of Malawi's (GOM) 
capacity to adequately respond, the GOM has requested 
international assistance, and it is within the US 
national interest to respond.  End summary. 
 
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ACUTE PHASE OF A CHRONIC CRISIS 
------------------------------- 
¶3.  The United Nations (UN) states that Southern Africa 
is entering "an acute phase of a chronic crisis".  Even 
more so than some other countries in the region, most 
rural households in Malawi, plagued by extreme poverty, 
high disease prevalence and limited livelihood 
opportunities, are extremely vulnerable to shocks.  Even 
in good years most smallholder households struggle to get 
by through a combination of own production, casual labor 
(ganyu) on wealthier farms or estates, informal trading 
and/or remittances.  Shocks such as erratic rainfall, 
rising food prices, or reduced ganyu opportunities can 
thus easily push these households over the edge and into 
a food security crisis. 
 
¶4.  This year Malawi is facing all three of these shocks. 
The 2005 main harvest was the worst since 1994, due to a 
combination of poor rainfall and, according to some 
sources, insufficient availability of fertilizer. 
Southern Region, the most densely populated part of the 
country, is the most affected area.  At present, nearly 
all smallholder rural households in the south have 
consumed their harvests and are relying on informal 
trading and casual labor for money to purchase food. 
Observations from the USAID team's field visit confirm 
that the hunger season in Malawi is progressing more 
rapidly than usual.  Households are already showing signs 
of stress, such as relying on the consumption of wild 
foods and mangoes, reducing the number of meals eaten per 
day, and selling assets.  While some households will 
benefit from winter crop production, the winter season 
was also adversely affected by low residual moisture. 
 
-------------------------------- 
MOVING TOWARDS MVAC SCENARIO TWO 
-------------------------------- 
¶5.  The Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) 
report released in June 2005 estimated "missing food 
entitlements" under two different scenarios.  In the 
first scenario, maize prices were assumed to rise at the 
current rate of inflation (peaking between 19-23 
kwacha/kg), and the population-at-risk was estimated at 
4.2 million people requiring 270,000 MT of food.  The 
second scenario assumed maize prices rising to South 
African import parity levels (between 31-40 kwacha/kg) 
with a population-at-risk of 4.6 million requiring 
434,000 MT of food. 
 
¶6.  Data provided by FEWSNET, as well as recent market 
visits by the USAID assessment team, indicate that market 
prices for maize (nearly all of which has come through 
informal trade channels from Mozambique) in southern 
Malawi are approaching "scenario two" levels, and are 
significantly higher than the same time last year.  This 
is an indication that supplies are more constrained than 
last year, even on the Mozambican side of the border. 
 
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RISING MALNUTRITION 
------------------------------- 
¶7.  Evidence indicates that nutritional status amongst 
affected populations is deteriorating in Malawi. 
According to UNICEF, admissions to Nutritional 
Rehabilitation Units (NRUs), which treat severe 
malnutrition, are 29 percent higher than at the same time 
in 2004.  Action Against Hunger's (AAH) latest 
nutritional surveillance report also indicates that 
children are "appreciably thinner" based on z-scores than 
at the same time last year. 
 
¶8.  The USAID team visited NRUs in Nsanje and Phalombe 
districts.  Numerous patients exhibited edema, an 
indicator of kwashiorkor and resulting from inadequate 
protein and other nutrients in the diet.  This raises 
concerns about the content of the household food rations 
being distributed by the WFP and DFID, which currently 
consist only of maize.  WFP's plan does call for 
distribution of cereals, pulses and vegetable oil, but 
this will not start until November due to pipeline 
constraints.  DFID initially did not plan to distribute 
commodities other than maize, but discussions are ongoing 
for DFID to purchase some pulses through WFP or to lend 
from WFP. The outcome of these discussions is not yet 
clear. 
 
¶9.  The MOH, UNICEF, and its partners plan to conduct 
nutritional surveys in November in the worst-affected 
districts.  While the surveys will provide better 
information on the situation, improved outreach to 
identify malnourished children, particularly in the 
immediate term, is a concern.  According to staff at the 
NRUs, most patients are referred to the NRU from health 
clinics, or self-reported by parents.  Although MOH 
Health Surveillance Staff also refer cases, capacity is 
extremely limited.  Given the likely deterioration in 
nutritional status over the next few months, outreach 
activities and referral systems should be strengthened to 
ensure that cases are identified and treated as early as 
possible. 
 
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UPCOMING PLANTING SEASON 
------------------------------- 
¶10.  Although access to sufficient inputs is a chronic 
problem in Malawi, this year's bad harvest further 
depleted farmer's resources (seeds, cash, etc.), making 
it difficult for them to recover.  Although nearly all 
farmers have prepared their fields in anticipation of 
planting in November, many of them do not yet have seeds 
or fertilizer.  Unfortunately, most farmers are counting 
on accessing fertilizer through a government-sponsored 
fertilizer subsidy scheme (see para 13). 
¶11.  While UNDP is seeking some USD 34 million for maize 
seed and fertilizer for 2 million farmers as part of the 
Flash Appeal, many people do not feel this approach is 
either sustainable or appropriate.  What may be more 
appropriate at this point is support to short-cycle 
crops, small-scale irrigation, and the 2006 winter 
cropping season.  In addition, better coordination of 
ongoing agricultural support activities is needed. 
Information on the relief community's plans to assist 
farmers in the agricultural/livelihoods sector is 
currently lacking (who is doing what, where, etc.). 
 
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO DATE 
------------------------------- 
¶12.  Apart from the GOM, a number of donors have 
contributed to the humanitarian response.  Major 
contributors are USAID, EU, United Kingdom-DFID, World 
Bank, Norway and Japan.  The USG through the Office of 
Food for Peace is planning to provide at least 30,000 MT 
of food of which 20,000 MT has arrived or is not its way 
to Malawi.  A five year USAID development assistance 
program through a consortium of 9 NGOs is providing a 
further 12,000 MT of food.  Late September, the GOM 
purchased an option on the South African exchange market 
(SAFEX) to import an additional 60,000 MT of maize.  As 
of October 1, total contribution to the humanitarian 
effort is close to 255,000 MT.  Now that scenario 
2(424,000 MT) is likely, this leaves an unmet 
humanitarian gap of some 169,000 MT.  Further urgent food 
assistance is required. 
 
The government parastatal, ADMARC, continues to supply 
maize to people at the subsidized price of MK 17/kg. 
However, maize availability at ADMARC depots has been 
sporadic and insufficient, and their national stocks are 
reportedly nearly exhausted.  In addition, monitoring is 
insufficient to ensure that the subsidized maize reaches 
the most vulnerable households.  The USAID team heard of 
traders re-selling maize from ADMARC depots at the higher 
prices found in the markets in southern Malawi. 
 
¶13.  The GOM also plans to assist smallholder farmers 
through a voucher scheme to subsidize the cost of 
fertilizer.  However, sufficient stocks of fertilizer 
have reportedly not yet arrived in-country, resulting in 
concern that farmers will not receive the fertilizer in 
time for planting, as happened in the 2004/2005 season. 
In Phalombe District, the MOA stated that only 8,200 bags 
of fertilizer had been received to date out of some 
79,000 MT expected for the district. 
 
¶14.  The UN issued a Flash Appeal on August 30 for some 
USD 88 million.  The appeal was revised last week to 
include an additional request of USD 10 million for 
nutrition activities, USD 1.7 million for water and 
sanitation, and USD 300,000 for additional protection 
activities.  According to the UN, contributions toward 
the appeal total some USD 50.9 million to date. 
(Comment:  The UN appeal was a surprise and involved 
little consultation with stakeholders.  The overall 
impression is that, despite previous discussions 
regarding the upcoming hunger season and recovery needs, 
little planning was done by the UN or implementing 
partners to assess or respond to anticipated needs in 
sectors other than food aid.  The international community 
is now forced to play catch-up given the rapid 
deterioration of the situation in recent weeks.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶15.  In the food sector, however, response capacity is 
much improved over the crisis in 2001-2002.  The World 
Food Program (WFP) and its NGO partners have an emergency 
distribution capacity already in place.  DFID is also 
supporting the GOM's voucher scheme to provide food to 
vulnerable households in districts not targeted by WFP. 
However, the level of resources provided thus far, for 
both food aid and other responses, has not been adequate, 
and more support is needed to ensure that we avoid a 
repeat of the 2002 crisis. 
 
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USAID RESPONSE TO DATE 
------------------------------- 
¶16.  In FY 2005, USAID provided close to 35,000 MT in 
food aid through its pipelines with WFP (24,360 MT)and 
the PVO consortium, I-LIFE (10,530 MT). In addition, I- 
LIFE is carrying out demand-driven food for work 
activities aimed at creating productive assets and 
infrastructure (e.g. roads and community small-scale 
irrigation- ponds, dams and canals). I-LIFE is also doing 
healthy and nutrition interventions in the 8 districts. 
USAID has also provided USD 400,000 to UNICEF for 
nutritional surveillance and rehabilitation activities in 
response to the Flash Appeal. 
 
¶17.  Staff from USAID/Malawi and USAID/DCHA traveled to 
Southern Region from August 28 to September 4, 2005 and 
October 3-6 to assess the situation and discuss response 
plans with potential partners.  The Mission will continue 
to closely monitor the situation and consider additional 
response activities as appropriate. 
 
EASTHAM