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Viewing cable 05HARARE1447, ANOTHER POOR HARVEST LIKELY IN ZIMBABWE IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HARARE1447 2005-10-21 05:43 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001447 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DCHA/FFP FOR LANDIS, WELLER, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR GOTTLIEB, PRATT, MENGHETTI, MARX 
AFR/SA FOR LOKEN, COPSON, HIRSCH 
EGAT FOR HOBGOOD, THOMPSON, HESS, MCGAHUEY, 
GILL, RUSHIN-BELL, HURDUS 
STATE/AF FOR NEULING, MOZENA 
USUN FOR EMALY 
NAIROBI FOR ESTES, DNIRANGO, PUTNAM 
PRETORIA FOR SINK, DISKIN, HALE 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR NEWBERG 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREL US ZI
SUBJECT:  ANOTHER POOR HARVEST LIKELY IN ZIMBABWE IN 
2006 
 
REF: Harare 1356 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.    (SBU) The outlook for the upcoming agricultural 
season in Zimbabwe is poor.  Climate forecasts indicate 
an increased chance of normal to above-normal rainfall 
in Zimbabwe during the 2005-2006 growing season.  In 
addition, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) reports that maize seed is readily available in 
country.  However, the Government of Zimbabwe's (GOZ) 
mismanagement of the economy has led to high seed 
prices, rendering their availability largely moot.  In 
addition, also a result of government policies, 
fertilizer and fuel are largely unavailable and there 
are strong incentives for farmers who have access to 
these commodities to resell them rather than use them 
for agricultural purposes.  We believe that on balance 
another failed planting season is likely and with it 
continuing high levels of food insecurity.  End 
summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
Improved precipitation likely 
----------------------------- 
 
2.    (U) Zimbabwe's growing season starts with the 
arrival of the rainy season, usually at the end of 
October.  According to the Southern Africa Regional 
Climate Outlook Forum (SARCOF), there is an increased 
chance of above normal rainfall in Zimbabwe from 
October to December 2005.  During the period January- 
March 2006, the outlook indicates normal to above- 
normal precipitation. 
 
--------------------- 
Maize seed sufficient 
--------------------- 
 
3.    (U) FAO estimates that there are 27,000 MT of 
maize seed currently available in country, which is 
near normal given the range of 30,000-35,000 MT of 
maize seed planted each season during the 1990s.  The 
government says that it plans to import another 20,000 
MT in an effort to ensure a bumper crop, but it is 
unclear whether it has sufficient foreign exchange to 
pay for the imports, estimated in the range of $20 - 
$30 million, because we understand that the GOZ still 
has not paid the seed companies for seed it imported 
last year.  (Note:  A recent FEWSNET report indicates 
that 26,000 MT of maize seed is available, but FEWSNET 
assumes that Zimbabwe's total need for maize seed is 
the normal demand of 30-35,000 MT plus the extra 20,000 
MT the GOZ would like to import.  Based on this 
assumption, FEWSNET concludes that a significant seed 
shortage exists.  End note.)  In addition, at this 
point it is doubtful that any additional maize seed the 
GOZ is able to purchase will arrive in country in time 
for planting. 
 
4.    (U) In terms of other cereals, sorghum seed stock 
is sufficient in country, but there is a major shortage 
of millet seed.  Millet, however has a very small 
market. Soy bean seed is also in plentiful supply but 
production has fallen from a peak of 150-160,000 tons 
to 50-55,000 tons this year; its share in the provision 
of cooking oil has fallen from 50 percent to 25-30 
percent.  Production of cottonseed oil has been 
inadequate to close the cooking oil gap, thus causing 
shortages and pressure to import. 
 
------------------------------ 
Farmers prepare, but for what? 
------------------------------ 
 
5.    (U) Despite the positive climate outlook and 
availability of maize seed, the 2006 harvest is likely 
to be poor.  Based on field visits by USAID staff and 
discussions with FAO, it is clear that farmers have 
begun to prepare their fields for the upcoming growing 
season, but many lack the necessary inputs.  During a 
recent field visit by the Ambassador to Bikita District 
in Masvingo Province (septel), villagers consistently 
reported that they intend to prepare their fields for 
planting, although they admitted they could not afford 
seed, fertilizer, or the cost of tillage.  They 
indicated that they would till their fields and wait to 
see if the government would provide the necessary 
inputs. 
 
6.    (U) While maize seed is available and some seed 
companies say that they have already distributed seed 
around the country, farmers' lack of access to 
fertilizer and fuel will also limit crop production. 
Fuel is needed to further distribute available seeds 
and till larger fields (reftel).  The GOZ plans to 
import some 100,000 MT of fertilizer from South Africa, 
but this may not materialize because of the lack of 
foreign exchange.  Even if successful, 100,000 MT will 
fall short of their own stated goal of 450,000 MT. 
(Note: The GOZ's solution to the fertilizer shortage is 
to recommend that manufacturers "stretch" the 
fertilizer compound by using less nitrogen, which would 
lead to a weaker basic fertilizer.  The GOZ is also 
advising farmers to plant now and apply fertilizer 
"later." End Note.) 
 
7.    (U) The GOZ's command and control economic 
policies, e.g., price controls and restrictions on 
private trading in grain and seeds, also mean that 
systems to distribute agricultural inputs across the 
country are inefficient, with the possible exception of 
maize seed distribution.  Thus, even if fuel were not a 
constraint, the GOZ likely lacks the capacity to 
effectively distribute inputs to farmers. 
 
------------------------------ 
International response efforts 
------------------------------ 
 
8.    (U) With funding from the European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), FAO plans to assist about 
300,000 families of communal farms with seed packs. 
This number comprises approximately 30% of communal 
farms, and is slightly smaller than the number of 
households assisted last year.  Several donors have 
funded NGOs to distribute seeds to the most vulnerable 
populations. This year, it seems clear that the GOZ 
will allow NGOs to import seeds, unlike prior years, 
but there is again confusion over import procedures, 
inspections, and the seed varieties that will be 
permitted - hybrid varieties or open pollinating 
varieties.  (Note:  There were similar problems during 
the previous planting season.  End note.)  NGOs 
currently plan to provide approximately 2000 MT of 
seeds. 
 
9.    (U) USAID continues to provide humanitarian 
assistance in Zimbabwe.  In FY 2005, USAID provided 
some $200,000 to FAO to coordinate agricultural 
recovery efforts.  In addition, USAID has funded three 
NGOs for livelihood/agricultural support to affected 
households.  Activities are primarily in the form of 
nutrition/household vegetable gardens and drip 
irrigation. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.   (SBU) The Mission concurs with the FAO assessment 
that, despite some positive signs, the declining 
economy will virtually guarantee another poor harvest 
in 2006.  Notwithstanding good predictions of rain and 
generally good seed availability, the economic decline 
and acute foreign exchange shortage will be overriding 
factors.  During a trip to Bikita in the Midlands, we 
also found good supplies of maize seed and fertilizer 
available on the commercial market.  However, the 
prices, reflecting the precipitous exchange rate 
decline of the Zim dollar, put the supplies beyond the 
reach of most farmers.  Their meager incomes have not 
grown apace with the prices of inputs, which are 
largely imported, and thus on average ten times more 
expensive than (in Zim dollars) than last year. 
 
11.  (SBU) The insufficient income of poor households 
and the inefficient government-controlled distribution 
systems mean that the 2006 harvest may be even worse 
than the disastrous 2005 season.  Moreover, the largest 
farmers, the politically-connected A2 farmers, who 
should be the backbone of production are reliably 
reported to be reselling their subsidized allocations 
of fuel and fertilizer on the black market at great 
profit rather than using them for agricultural 
purposes.  Under such circumstances, food insecurity 
and the need for humanitarian support will continue in 
Zimbabwe for some time.  Until the GOZ turns around its 
economic mismanagement, enabling agricultural inputs to 
be distributed efficiently, timely, and affordably, 
Zimbabwe will be vulnerable to food insecurity for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
Dell