This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

272109Z Oct 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 002466 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KJUS KCRM PTER ASEC PINS PGOV PHUM GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALAN LEGAL REFORM: CREATION OF A CIVILIAN 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Guatemalan Congress approved a law 
creating a civilian intelligence agency, including an 
initially controversial provision to permit wiretapping in 
restricted circumstances.  Inclusion of the wiretapping 
provision in the bill augurs well for passage of what the 
Embassy has been advocating:  expanded wiretapping 
authorities that will enable the GOG to pursue organized 
crime and narcotics trafficking.  With legal hurdles 
surmounted, the GOG now faces the challenge of creating a 
professional and apolitical corps of civilian intelligence 
officials.  End Summary. 
 
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Functions and Organization 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Guatemala's new civilian intelligence agency - the 
General Directorate of Civilian Intelligence (DIGICI) will be 
located in the Ministry of Government (Interior).  Its 
prescribed functions are: 
-- collecting and analyzing information to create 
intelligence; 
-- evaluating and disseminating intelligence in order to 
protect the Guatemalan state's political, economic, social, 
industrial, commercial, technological, and strategic 
interests from the threat of organized crime and delinquency. 
-- providing intelligence advice to the Ministry of 
Government; 
-- centralizing Ministry of Government information and 
distributing it to other GOG intelligence agencies as 
necessary; 
-- requesting the help of government officials and private 
citizens to obtain useful information; 
-- obtaining cooperation agreements with foreign intelligence 
agencies; 
-- handling information and files under its control in a 
manner that safeguards citizen security and the 
accomplishment of its mission; and, 
-- guaranteeing the security and protection of its human 
resources, material, and information. 
 
¶3.  (U)  A Director General and Vice Director General will 
head the new intelligence agency.  DIGICI divisions will 
include offices of Administration, Internal Affairs, 
Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Planning, Logistics, Legal 
and Technical Assistance, and Information Technology.  Active 
duty military officers are specifically prohibited from 
serving as Director General or Vice Director General.  One of 
the Vice Ministers of Government will monitor and supervise 
DIGICI activities, and the bill calls for creation of a 
Congressional committee to oversee intelligence activities. 
 
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The Wiretapping Provision 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) The final version of the wiretapping provision 
(Article 4) states:  "In cases where there are indications of 
organized crime activity, with emphasis on drug trafficking 
and common delinquency, in which there is a threat against 
the life, physical integrity, liberty, or property of certain 
persons, the Public Ministry (i.e. prosecutors) can request, 
as an urgent measure, the authorization of an Appellate Court 
for the temporary interception of telephone, radio, 
electronic and similar communications; the request will be 
evaluated on its merits, be decided within 24 hours, can not 
be admitted as evidence in a court of law, and be held in 
absolute confidence.  None of the obtained information, if 
unrelated to the purposes of the intervention, can be used as 
proof against any person.  Authorization is not necessary in 
cases where the account owner, or his legal representative, 
asks for intervention of his own telephone or communications 
system for reasons noted in this article." 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Per the recommendation of the Myrna Mack 
Foundation, a prominent local human rights group, the final 
bill shifted approving authority for wiretap requests from an 
investigative judge (First Instance Court) to an appellate 
court judge.  The final bill did not include an additional 
Mack Foundation recommendation of a long list of 
prerequisites in each wiretap request.  The Mack Foundation 
and other human rights groups did not oppose the wiretapping 
provision per se, but some in the NGO community have begun to 
express unease following passage of the bill. 
 
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Comment 
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¶6.  (SBU) Although two prominent Guatemalan Congressmen have 
told us that the addition of organized crime and drug 
trafficking language to the wiretapping provision in the 
DIGICI bill will provide sufficient authority to pursue 
investigations against drug trafficking and other organized 
crime groups, a Guatemalan judge may easily refuse to 
authorize wiretaps except in life-threatening situations 
(such as kidnapping).  Interior Minister Vielmann told the 
Ambassador that this wiretap authority would provide the GOG 
a huge operational advantage.  Chief Prosecutor Florido, 
however, told the Ambassador he was disappointed that this 
legislation made the wiretap intelligence inadmissible in 
court. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) An organized crime bill currently under 
consideration by Congress has much less restrictive language 
on wiretapping and also includes provisions for undercover 
operations and controlled deliveries.  We will report on the 
organized crime bill via septel; the bill sponsor is 
predicting its passage in mid-November but that is unlikely, 
given that the Congress must approve a government budget and 
take care of other matters before going into recess November 
¶30.  The lack of strong opposition to the wiretapping 
provision in the DIGICI bill does bode well for passage of 
broader wiretapping authority in the organized crime bill. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The DIGICI bill provides the legal basis for the 
GOG to create a civilian operational intelligence capability, 
a long-standing deficiency in the Guatemalan national 
security architecture.  However, the GOG faces some 
significant challenges in achieving this capability.  The 
senior levels of the Ministry of Government are staffed by 
well-meaning but inexperienced political appointees who have 
been recruited from the private sector.  None of these 
officials appear to have any experience in intelligence 
issues.  Furthermore, there has been a history of extremely 
high personnel turnover and politicization in the Strategic 
Analysis Secretariat (SAE), the only existing civilian 
intelligence agency (an analysis, not collection, agency). 
Although improving in the Berger Administration, personnel 
turbulence has been a characteristic of the SAE dating back 
to the SAE's unofficial creation during the De Leon 
Administration in 1994.  This history illustrates the 
challenges that face the new DIGICI agency. 
DERHAM