This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: TWO ENVOYS MAKE LITTLE PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND CEASE-FIRE 
 
REF: COLOMBO 1830 
 
This cable replaces Colombo 1837. 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Former Amnesty International 
head Ian Martin found the GSL eager to inject a 
human rights component into the peace process, but 
the LTTE rejected any discussion of human rights 
until after talks on the cease-fire had resumed. 
Former Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission head General 
(ret.) Trond Furuhovde got much the same: the GSL 
is ready to have talks on the cease-fire 
agreement, but the LTTE won't do anything until 
after the Presidential elections. 
 
Human Rights Later 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (U) Ian Martin, former head of Amnesty 
International and now working for the United 
Nations in Nepal, visited Sri Lanka October 12-16 
to follow up on the human rights aspects of the 
peace process on which he had been involved during 
the peace talks between the GSL and the LTTE. 
(Martin had worked on a draft joint memorandum on 
human rights after both parties expressed interest 
in the idea at the last round of peace talks in 
Hakone, Japan in April 2003.  The memorandum was 
to have been presented to both parties at the next 
round of talks that never took place.)  Martin's 
return to Sri Lanka stemmed from a joint 
invitation from the LTTE and the GSL Peace 
Secretariat (brokered by the Norwegians). 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶3. (SBU) In two briefings with diplomats during 
the week attended by DCM, Martin said he had found 
the GSL, in particular Peace Secretariat chief 
Jayantha Dhanapala, very enthusiastic about 
dusting off the document Martin had prepared for 
the peace talks ("sort of a human rights road 
map," Martin said).  Beyond a joint declaration on 
human rights, Dhanapala told Martin the GSL 
continued to support human rights training for 
both sides and was receptive to the idea of 
strengthening the human rights element of cease- 
fire monitoring (perhaps by adding a human rights 
component to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission - 
SLMM). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Not surprisingly, Martin found a 
different atmosphere in Kilinochchi when he met 
with LTTE political chief Tamilchelvan (Martin saw 
him right after Tamilchelvan meet with Norwegian 
envoy Trond Furuhovde with whom Martin traveled to 
and from Kilinochchi).  Tamilchelvan said the LTTE 
a joint human rights declaration was "possible and 
feasible" but that it could not happen in advance 
of talks with the GSL on improving cease-fire 
implementation (Tamilchelvan said the LTTE was 
"anxious" to participate in such talks if the 
venue issue could be resolved).  Tamilchelvan was 
receptive to the idea of human rights training (a 
UN human rights official who attended one of the 
briefings said the UN has conducted seventeen 
human rights training sessions for the LTTE since 
the CFA came into effect).  Martin commented that 
Tamilchelvan's anger over the EU travel ban was 
"palpable." 
 
¶5. (SBU) In terms of human rights monitoring, 
Martin said the LTTE was adamant that only an 
international body could do the job in Sri Lanka 
since the Human Rights Commission (HRC) was not to 
be trusted, nor was any other entity in Sri Lanka. 
(Comment: The LTTE murdered the last head of the 
HRC, Neelan Tiruchelvam, and hates his successor, 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, herself a Tamil, considering 
her a traitor to the Tamil cause.)  Tamilchelvan 
complained that whenever there is an incident in 
GSL-controlled territory, the government blames 
the LTTE but does not conduct any sort of serious 
investigation (Martin said the GSL, on the same 
subject, complained that they cannot conduct 
investigations since the perpetrators and key 
witnesses always disappear into LTTE-controlled 
areas).  Martin said the LTTE was very angry about 
an attack on senior LTTE cadres in the East the 
day before he went to Kilinochchi, but tightlipped 
about the murder of two school principals in 
Jaffna the same day.  Martin said he pushed hard 
on the general issue of political killings but 
"got nowhere" with Tamilchelvan. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Martin held meetings in Kilinochchi with 
the North East Secretariat of Human Rights 
(NESOHR), the LTTE-created human rights 
organization and attended a ceremony in which 
NESOHR "released" twenty-five child "volunteers" 
who had been handed over to them by the LTTE 
(Martin said he insisted that the SLMM and UNICEF 
also be present).  Martin said the relationship 
between the LTTE and UNICEF seemed to perhaps be 
rebounding after a recent visit to Kilinocchi by 
the new UNICEF country representative.  There had 
been sixty-five child soldier releases over the 
past month, the highest figure is quite some time, 
according to Martin. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Asked whether, in his view, NESOHR was an 
LTTE front organization or a genuine human rights 
group, Martin said it is somewhere in between. 
Obviously, Father Karunaratnam, the head of 
NESOHR, could not publicly challenge the LTTE on 
human rights issues.  But, behind the scenes he 
has presented a number of cases to LTTE 
intelligence about missing persons, etc., Martin 
said, and has been trying to effect positive 
change on human rights issues for years within the 
"straitjacket" of having to live with the LTTE. 
Martin said he had brokered a meeting between 
Karunaratnam and Human Rights Commission head 
Radhika Coomaraswamy during his visit and that it 
had gone well.  "They really hit it off."   Martin 
thought it would lead to quiet sharing of cases, 
etc. between the two groups although no formal 
link would or could occur. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Martin said he would prepare a paper for 
both sides after his visit, laying out possible 
areas for progress on human rights issues but that 
he did not have any expectation of movement in 
light of the impending Presidential elections and 
LTTE insistence that nothing was possible until 
CFA talks were held.  Martin said it is unlikely 
he'll be back anytime soon. 
 
No Cease-Fire Talks Either 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) Retired Norwegian General and former head 
of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission Trond 
Furuhovde visited Sri Lanka at roughly the same 
time specifically to see if he could make progress 
on convening talks on better implementation of the 
cease-fire agreement.  (GSL and LTTE have agreed 
in principle, but have been unable to agree on a 
venue, with the Tigers insisting on a "neutral," 
i.e., outside of Sri Lanka, site.)  Furuhovde 
briefed Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission, including 
Ambassador, on Oct. 18. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Furuhovde said that he had come back to 
Sri Lanka knowing there was little chance of 
movement, because Norway wanted to "keep the 
conversation going" and to fill the perceived gap 
that nothing is happening on the peace process. 
Furuhovde said that both sides stated their 
interest in keeping the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) 
going, and they both said they wanted to 
strengthen it.  GSL Peace Secretariat head 
Jayantha Dhanapala said the GSL wanted to add some 
type of enforcement or policing element to the 
CFA, instead of the current system where all 
responsibility lies with the two parties.  The 
LTTE's Tamilchelvan, by contrast, wanted to stick 
to the current concept of self-enforcement.  The 
Tigers continued to insist on a "neutral" venue 
outside of Sri Lanka for any talks, but anyway 
were not prepared for any talks before the 
November 17 Presidential election. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Giving his more general impressions, 
Furuhovde said that he believed that the LTTE 
shock at the EU travel ban had now worn off, but 
that the Tigers understood that the international 
community was now watching them closely. 
Furuhovde had the impression that the LTTE had 
discussed the current situation in its Central 
Committee and decided on a strategy.  The first 
point is that they would wait for the outcome of 
the Presidential election before any major 
decisions.  The Tigers understand the differences 
between Ranil and Mahinda, and have drawn up two 
scenarios, depending on the election outcome. 
Furuhovde noted that Prabhakaran's annual Heroes' 
Day Speech will be delivered on Nov. 27, just ten 
days after the election, and would no doubt give 
an indication where the LTTE was heading. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Furuhovde said the nature of the war had 
changed, with both sides now engaged in what he 
called a "subversive war."  While the GSL was 
using paramilitary groups such as the Karuna 
faction, the LTTE was also using a type of 
paramilitaries--lightly-trained irregulars, not 
controlled by combat headquarters who would be 
given a weapon and a specific task.  The spate of 
grenade attacks in Trincomalee (reftel) was a 
perfect example of this type of action.  Furuhovde 
said the lack of clear control over these elements 
was disturbing. He speculated that this type of 
LTTE attack might soon spread from Trinco to 
Jaffna. 
 
¶13. (SBU) COMMENT: We can draw several conclusions 
from these discussions: 
--Not surprisingly, there will be no breakthroughs 
before the Presidential election. 
--No matter who wins, restarting the negotiating 
process will be difficult. 
LUNSTEAD