This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 007877 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR NEA AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MCAP EG
SUBJECT:  COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT ON THE POLITICAL RELEASE 
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT OF MK48 MOD 4M AND MOD 6AT 
HEAVYWEIGHT SUBMARINE TORPEDOES 
 
REF:  EGYPTIAN ARMAMENT AUTHORITY LETTER OF REQUEST 04-120 
FOR POLITICAL RELEASE OF MK48 MOD 4M AND 6AT TORPEDOES, EG- 
US MCC ACTION ITEM #04-02, AND DOD 5105.38-M (SAMM, CH 5) 
 
Sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Reason and justification for Egypt's request for 
political release of MK48 MOD 4M and 6AT Torpedoes: 
a.  As part of its ongoing effort to prioritize future 
military modernization programs, the Government of Egypt 
(GOE) has requested Pricing and Availability (P&A) for 
future purchases of advanced, heavyweight submarine 
torpedoes to replace the Egyptian Navy's (EN) current 
inventory of US manufactured NT-37E torpedoes.  Any further 
GOE defense planning for the acquisition of two variants of 
the MK48 series torpedoes (MOD 4M and MOD 6AT) require 
political release from the USG. 
b.  The EN inventory of NT-37E submarine torpedoes has 
become increasingly difficult to maintain.  Thirty-five (35) 
NT-37E torpedoes were transferred in the 1990s as part of an 
FMF-financed project to re-equip EN ROMEO submarines with US 
supplied torpedoes and HARPOON cruise missiles.  At the time 
of transfer, the NT-37 torpedo utilized dated torpedo 
technology; today, the maintenance and repair of these 
systems have become exceptionally time consuming and 
expensive.  Acquisition of newer technology MK48 MOD 4M 
and/or MOD 6AT torpedoes is viewed by the GOE as a possible 
solution to this dilemma. 
c.  Approval of the GOE request for political release will 
enable the GOE to receive the P&A data necessary to make 
informed budgetary and prioritization decisions with regard 
to replacement of the NT-37E torpedo inventory. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Effect of MK48 MOD 4M and MOD 6AT introduction on 
GOE naval force structure: 
a.  A GOE decision to acquire MK48 Series torpedoes would 
require modification of the existing ROMEO torpedo tubes and 
fire control systems (FCS).  The EN was recently told by the 
US defense company servicing the current FCS system that 
support costs over the next five (5) years are comparable to 
the cost of procuring and installing a newer FCS compatible 
with the MK48 Series torpedo.  Moreover, the new FCS could 
be transferred to any submarine the EN acquired in the 
future. 
b.  Introduction of MK48 Series torpedoes will require 
significant investment in new torpedo maintenance and 
testing facilities (including proper storage bunkers). 
c.  Compared to the NT-37E, all versions of the MK48 Series 
torpedo have greater capabilities in speed, depth, range, 
target acquisition, self-noise, and counter-counter measures 
(CCM).  The MK48 MOD 4 Torpedo has already been exported to 
some allies and a favorable Exception to National Disclosure 
Policy (ENDP) decision to release this system to the GOE was 
made in 1998.  (To date, the GOE has not requested purchase 
of MK48 MOD 4 torpedoes.)  The MK48 MOD 4M variant is 
identical to the MOD 4 in every respect except that it has 
reduced self-noise and is therefore quieter (reduces counter- 
detection).  In addition to sharing the self-noise reduction 
upgrade of the MOD 4M, the MOD 6AT variant (still in 
development) utilizes digital processing that significantly 
improves its capabilities in target acquisition range, 
shallow water employment, and CCM tactics. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Effect of MK48 MOD 4M and MOD 6AT introduction on 
GOE and USG security goals: 
a.  EN would acquire a more modern and capable weapon system 
that will strengthen its ability to conduct balanced fleet 
operations that guard maritime borders, defend vital coastal 
ports, and protect the seaward approaches to the Suez Canal. 
Any upgrade to submarine capability will enhance the EN 
capacity to complete these missions.  Moreover, acquisition 
of a system compatible with those used by the US and other 
world navies offers affordable maintenance and repair 
support into the foreseeable future. 
b.  The USG has long supported a balanced and cost-effective 
modernization program for Egyptian military forces in order 
to maintain the credible deterrent capability necessary for 
regional stability and peace.  Modernization of EN submarine 
torpedoes is consistent with this policy objective. 
Additionally, any improvement to Egypt's naval capability 
enhances the security of US and coalition vessels transiting 
Egyptian coastal waters and the Suez Canal. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Justification for the type and quantity of 
articles/services requested:  In OMC discussions with the EN 
subsequent to the LOR, the EN has consistently maintained 
its desire to utilize US-supplied heavyweight submarine 
torpedoes.  Currently, the only type of heavyweight 
submarine torpedo offered via US FMS is the MK48 Series. 
While the MK48 MOD 4 variant was previously released to the 
GOE, it will no longer be produced; instead, only the MK48 
MOD 4M and MOD 6AT variants will be offered for sale to 
foreign governments.  Absent a formal determination for 
political release of these systems, the USG cannot provide 
the pricing and availability data needed by the EN to 
develop its long-range budgetary plan for a submarine 
torpedo replacement program.  Therefore, the GOE requested 
political release of both MK48 torpedo variants. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the 
introduction of a new war fighting capability to the nation 
or region:  Combatant Commander's assessment to follow 
separately. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Anticipated reaction of neighboring nations/ 
regional impact:  Israeli opposition to the release of 
either MK48 MOD 4M or MOD 6AT Torpedoes to Egypt is 
expected.  As best we can remember, Israel has never 
supported a US weapons sale to Egypt.  However, Israel's 
recent acquisition of newly constructed diesel submarines 
equipped with advanced wire-guided heavyweight torpedoes 
(from Germany) substantially raised its qualitative military 
advantage over Egypt in undersea warfare.  This release will 
not significantly alter the balance between these countries. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Assessment of GOE accounting, safeguards, 
operation, maintenance, and support: 
a.  Egypt has signed a general security of information 
agreement with the US and the GOE has demonstrated its 
willingness and capability to protect sensitive military 
technology and information that have been released to its 
military in the past.  To date, Egypt has been provided 
other sensitive/classified US military technology to include 
advanced aircraft (F-16, Apache), the M1A1 Tank, MLRS, and 
TOW-2A missiles and launchers.  The USG has conducted 
security audits and verification inspections of these 
programs that have validated Egypt's capability to safeguard 
sensitive technology/material and classified military 
information. 
b.  The EN satisfactorily maintains (with US assistance) its 
current inventory of submarine torpedoes.  To date, no 
incidence of accidents, misuse, or mishandling of this 
ordnance has been reported.  The EN is committed to 
improving its maintenance self-sufficiency. 
c.  The deteriorating support available for the EN's 
inventory of NT-37s and the rising cost for this support are 
the primary reasons for the GOE's request for political 
release of newer submarine torpedoes. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Training requirements:  If acquired, a sustained 
CONUS training program on MK48 Torpedoes with the US Navy 
and defense industry is expected.  The EN has sustained a 
similar training on the NT-37E torpedoes since the 1990s. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Possible impact of any in-country US presence that 
might be required as a result of providing the article:  If 
acquired, a regular training program in Egypt is expected. 
However, this additional presence will likely be 
insignificant when compared to the ongoing work done by 
hundreds of US military and defense industry personnel 
throughout Egypt.  To date, no negative reactions from 
either the Egyptian military or population have been 
reported. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Source of financing and economic impact:  This 
sale would be financed from Egyptian FMF-D funding and would 
not have a significant impact on Egypt's private economy. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Relevant human rights considerations:  The 
Egyptian military has no history of human rights abuses and 
supports civilian control of the military.  There are no 
human rights considerations precluding the release of 
additional MK48 torpedo capability to the Egyptian military. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Plan for end-use monitoring:  If acquired, OMC- 
Egypt would conduct routine monitoring of EN end-use for 
submarine torpedoes to ensure compliance with legal 
provisions of foreign military sales and assistance. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Country team recommendation: 
a.  Post supports the request to grant an ENDP for political 
release of the MK48 MOD 4M Series torpedo to the GOE.  Since 
the GOE is already approved for release of the MK48 MOD 4, 
approval of an ENDP for the MK48 MOD 4M Series would provide 
the GOE, Ministry of Defense, and EN the necessary 
information to allow an informed decision regarding 
replacement of their heavyweight submarine torpedoes. 
b.  Post recommends against the release of the more advanced 
capability MK48 MOD 6AT Series torpedo.  While the GOE has a 
clear requirement to replace its aged and increasingly 
expensive inventory of NT 37 Series torpedoes, it has not 
fully articulated a valid need for the latest generation, 
digital, advanced capability heavyweight torpedo available 
via FMS (with as much as ten times the cost of the MOD 4M). 
If acquired, the MK48 MOD 4M Series torpedo would represent 
a clear improvement in capability over the Egyptian Navy's 
existing NT-37 inventory; the further improvement in 
capability offered by the MK48 MOD 6AT Series torpedo would 
be redundant in any expected Egyptian Navy operational 
environment. 
c.  This is a coordinated Mission position. 
 
RICCIARDONE