This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 002798 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP BR IN
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE 
CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR 
SUPPLIER'S GROUP 
 
REF: STATE 190856 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne for Reasons 
1.4. (B) a 
nd (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche October 18 to Acting 
Director Jandyr Santos of the Foreign Ministry's Disarmament 
Division.  Calling the briefing very timely given the ongoing 
Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG) meeting in Vienna -- where 
Division Director Santiago Mourao is heading the Brazilian 
delegation -- Santos said he appreciated the new details of 
the U.S.-India accord and said he would forward them 
immediately to the Brazilian delegation in Vienna.  He also 
noted that the Brazilian side would raise the issue with its 
American counterparts during the ongoning JSNEC meetings in 
Brasilia. 
 
¶2.  (C) Santos noted that, given Brazil's history, this issue 
is a particularly sensitive one and Brazil has serious 
concerns that India may be profiting from its decision to 
pursue a nuclear weapons program -- a path Brazil decided to 
forego.  He told Poloff that the GOB had held discussions 
with the GOI recently in Delhi on the issue and he expected 
there would be further contacts in the future, but said it is 
still too early to have a clear idea of how Brazil will deal 
with the new situation. 
 
¶3.  (C) Santos said Brazil was most interested in the 
proposed timetable for moving forward.  He was pleased to 
note the points Poloff made that any provision of trigger 
list items to India would come only after India has 
implemented its commitments under the Joint Statement, and 
that we did not advocate a making changes to the essential 
substance of the NSG guidelines, a step which Santos said 
constituted a red line for Brazil.  He also said he was 
pleased that the IAEA would be responsible for concluding a 
safeguard agreement with India and for concluding and 
overseeing the Additional Protocol with respect to civilian 
nuclear facilities. 
 
¶4.  (C) In response to his question as to how the U.S. could 
claim that the Joint Statement would not constitute a 
precedent for other nuclear states, Poloff provided Santos 
with the points concerning Israel and Pakistan, as well as 
those concerning Iran and North Korea, stressing that the 
U.S. did not believe any other countries were comparable to 
India and therefore, the Joint Statement would not set a 
precedent. 
 
¶5.  (C) Although he said he understood the U.S. position that 
the Joint Statement would provide for a safer world and 
acknowledged that in a world of tough choices, this one could 
be seen as a practical way forward, he still insisted it was 
hard to see how the Joint Statement upheld the NPT.  In 
closing, he said he would carefully review the materials 
provided and looked forward to continuing discussion on this 
important issue. 
 
DANILOVICH