This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

071429Z Oct 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002676 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS ETRD PHUM BR US
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH FOREIGN 
MINISTER AMORIM 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Philip Chicola.  Reasons 
1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Deputy Secretary Zoellick told FM Amorim 
October 6 that the international community needs to engage 
strongly in Bolivia during the elections to guarantee 
transparency, and must remain engaged following elections to 
guarantee some degree of governability. Amorim urged U.S. 
flexibility in dealing with Evo Morales, something the Deputy 
Secretary said would be difficult to do given Morales' ties 
 
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to the drug trade.  FM Amorim said he would look at using 
President Lula's PT Party's ties with leftists to urge the 
Sandinistas and others in Nicaragua to engage with Lewites 
and put pressure on Ortega.  He urged that Valdez's 
replacement in Haiti be from South America.  The Deputy 
Secretary agreed that Amorim's proposals for broadening 
 
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U.S.-Brazilian dialogue to the areas of science, technology, 
education and fighting racism were worth looking into, but he 
also proposed deepening the bilateral dialogue on democracy 
and development by identifying areas where democracy and 
development intersect.  FM Amorim pledged to take action on 
that proposal.  End Summary 
 
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BOLIVIA 
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¶2.  (C) Foreign Minister Amorim noted that there had been 
much concern expressed about the situation in Bolivia during 
the September 29-30 Summit of the Community of South American 
Nations (CASA).  He said that all of the leaders attending 
the summit agreed that postponing the Bolivian elections 
would be a bad idea.  Amorim said he believed that Quiroga is 
currently in the lead, but there remained the possibility 
that the vote would end up in a virtual draw, leaving Bolivia 
in a German-like situation, but without the strong 
institutions that Germany has.  The Foreign Minister asserted 
that if Morales wins a plurality, it would be almost 
impossible to deny him the presidency. 
 
¶3.  (C) Regarding Morales, FM Amorim said that through 
Brazilian engagement with Morales, he appears to be changing 
a little and is tending toward moderation except when there 
occur instances of street mobilization or other popular 
unrest.  Opining that Morales and his party are not as far 
left as radicals such as Quispe, Amorim said that when there 
is popular mobilization on any issue, Morales has to 
radicalize to prevent the more radical parties from 
outflanking him. The Foreign Minister added that President 
Lula has had a positive influence on Morales during times of 
crisis. 
 
¶4.  (C) Amorim suggested that the U.S. might need to think 
about being more flexible with Morales, to which the Deputy 
Secretary replied that it would be hard to be more flexible 
 
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with someone that has the kind of ties to "Cocaleros" that 
Morales maintains, and given uncertainties about Morales' 
commitment to democracy.  Noting that much of the coca grown 
in Bolivia passes through Brazil, and that it has fomented a 
drug problem for Brazil, he said Morales' ties to the 
cocaleros should be of concern in Brasilia.  Amorim responded 
that "There are cocaleros and then there are cocaleros," and 
added that Brazil was addressing the coca problem by looking 
for ways to buy more from Bolivia as part of the crop 
substitution process. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Deputy Secretary told Amorim that in the short 
term, Bolivia needs a strong international presence during 
the election to guarantee a degree of transparency.  In 
addition, the international community needs to work with 
Bolivia after the election to guarantee some degree of 
governability.  He said it would be useful for the U.S. and 
Brazil, among others, to work with the OAS to figure out how 
to create a political compact to run the country.  At the 
same time, Bolivians need to address the same kinds of 
issues, including, for example, what the role of a 
constitutional assembly should be. 
 
¶6.  (C) FM Amorim said he believed that kind of discussion 
could be useful, but added that the international community 
had to act very carefully in Bolivia because there is growing 
radicalization on all sides.  In addition, there is some 
sensitivity in Bolivia regarding the OAS because the head of 
the OAS is a Chilean.  He noted that Brazil is moving 
cautiously and that he had personally worked to ensure that 
Petrobras' investment disputes are not pressed for the moment. 
 
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NICARAGUA 
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¶7.  (C) Much of the Deputy Secretary's presentation on 
Nicaragua was new to FM Amorim, who appeared not to be aware 
of the extent of Ortega and the PLC's effort to undermine the 
legitimate government of the country.  However, he did note 
that President Lula's Workers' Party (PT) had good relations 
with the Sandinistas and other leftist parties and he could 
ask prominent PT members to talk with the leftists in 
Nicaragua and thereby engage with Lewites and put additional 
pressure on Ortega. 
 
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POTUS VISIT 
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¶8.  (C)  The Foreign Minister said he wanted to make sure 
something valuable could be extracted from the upcoming visit 
of the President to Brazil.  He suggested creating additional 
bilateral working groups on science, technology, education 
and fighting racism.  He also suggested looking for ways to 
increase bilateral cooperation on Africa, adding his hope 
that cooperation would go beyond Guinea Bissau.  He then 
noted the creation of the IBSA (India, Brazil and South 
Africa) fund that promotes cooperation on development 
programs in different parts of the world.  Amorim said it 
might be useful if the U.S. could find a way to cooperate 
with the IBSA fund, and so diminish the South-South aspect of 
its work and make the effort look more like that of large 
multi-racial democracies cooperating on development. 
 
¶9.  (C) The Deputy Secretary said he believed the FM's ideas 
were interesting and worth looking at.  Noting that he had 
earlier planted some seeds on bilateral issues with Finance 
Minister Palocci and President Lula's International Affairs 
Advisor Garcia, the Deputy Secretary said he wanted to share 
them with FM Amorim.  He noted that the U.S. had started 
strategic talks with China and India, and it struck him as 
odd that the U.S. strategic dialogue with Brazil lagged 
behind that with India and China.  Given that the U.S. and 
Brazil are democracies that share common political values, 
the two countries should be able to do more. 
 
¶10.  (C) One way to enhance dialogue is to broaden 
discussions as the FM had suggested.  Another way, the Deputy 
Secretary pointed out, is to deepen dialogue around several 
 
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specific topics centered on democracy and development in the 
Americas.  With new leadership at the OAS and IDB, and with 
the Summit of the Americas approaching, this might be a good 
time to start deepening our dialogue. 
 
¶11.  (C) Specifically, the Foreign and Finance Ministries of 
the two countries could meet to discuss how democracy and 
development issues intersect and use the intersections as a 
point of departure.  FM Amorim said that was a good idea and 
said he would work to identify appropriate interlocutors and 
determine when such discussions could take place. 
 
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HAITI 
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¶12.  (C) FM Amorim told the Deputy Secretary that the 
replacement for Juan Gabriel Valdez should be someone from 
South America in order to maintain the link between the 
political and military side of UN engagement in Haiti. 
 
¶13.  (U) Participants: 
 
Brazil Side: 
 
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim 
 
U.S. Side: 
 
The Deputy Secretary 
Ambassador Danilovich 
NSC Senior Director Shannon 
D Chief of Staff Padilla 
 
¶14.  (U)  The Deputy Secretary's party has cleared this 
message. 
 
DANILOVICH