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Viewing cable 05BAGHDAD4218, PRELIMINARY IRAQI THINKING ON FALL JCRED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BAGHDAD4218 2005-10-13 16:34 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 004218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EFIN EAGR PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY IRAQI THINKING ON FALL JCRED 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 4084 
 
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified; not for internet 
distribution. 
 
2. (SBU) In a meeting with EconOffs and Treasury 
Attache on October 12, the Minister of Finance's chief 
of staff shared some of FINMIN Allawi's thinking on the 
next US/Iraq Joint Commission on Reconstruction and 
Economic Development (JCRED), currently scheduled for 
November.  He told us that Allawi envisioned that the Iraqi 
delegation would include the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Industry and Minerals, Minister of Planning, 
Central Bank of Iraq, the Trade Bank of Iraq and the 
Ministry of Trade. 
 
3. (SBU) Our contact said that an agenda could be built 
around the priorities of the respective Ministries, as 
well as economic reform, private sector development, 
and various banking and trade issues.  Both sides also 
could use the JCRED to have smaller discussions 
on more sensitive topics.  We suggested that the Arab 
League Boycott might be usefully addressed at a more 
restricted meeting.  Our contact confirmed that Allawi 
has not yet thought what kind of deliverables 
could be prepared for the meeting and is open to 
suggestions.  Allawi, however, does not want to 
travel to the US but rather wants a meeting close by 
and suggested Istanbul or Dubai as alternatives. Our 
interlocutor opined that, as much as the GOI would 
like to host the JCRED in Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq, 
this would be difficult under current conditions. 
 
4.  (SBU) We urged that Allawi help push forward 
the three US/Iraq agreements -- the US/Iraq Investment 
Incentive Agreement, US/Iraq Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement (TIFA), and the US/Iraq Agreement for 
Economic and Technical Cooperation (Bilateral Assistance 
Agreement) -- from the July JCRED meeting that currently 
are hung up in the Presidency Council. Our concern is 
that the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) still 
has to ratify these and, due to the domestic political 
season, would be going on break for 2 weeks starting 
Sunday, October 16. He agreed to raise our concerns to 
Allawi to see what might be done to expedite 
ratification of these agreements. 
 
5. (SBU) COMMENT: The attention of the Iraqi political 
class to the Constitutional Referendum and local security 
concerns have made it difficult to raise pending JCRED 
issues with suitable interlocutors.  Given the pending 
legislative recess, Embassy believes that a late November 
or early December JCRED would make more sense than an 
event in mid-November.  Please advise.  END COMMENT. 
Khalilzad