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Viewing cable 05BAGHDAD4105, DAILY IRAQI WEBSITE MONITORING - October 4, 2005

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BAGHDAD4105 2005-10-04 17:00 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR/R/MR, NEA/PPD, NEA/PPA, NEA/AGS, INR/IZ, INR/P 
 
E.0. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO IZ
SUBJECT: DAILY IRAQI WEBSITE MONITORING - October 4, 2005 
 
SUMMARY: Discussion of violence in Iraq, out-of-country 
voting, coalition withdrawal, and the Talabani-Ja'fari 
dispute were the major editorial themes of Iraqi, Arabic 
language websites on October 4, 2005. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------- 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
------------------------------- 
 
A.   "Iraq . An Open Field for Violence" (Iraq 4 All News, 
  10/4) 
B. "Beware, Fareed Ayar" (Sawt Al-Iraq, 10/4) 
C. "Occupation Forces' Withdrawal from Iraq Is Near" (Sawt 
Al-Iraq, 10/4) 
D. "Storm-Swept Power-Sharing Alliances" (Al-Rafidayn, 10/4) 
 
SELECTED COMMENTARIES 
---------------------------------------- 
 
A. "Iraq . An Open Field for Violence" 
(Editorial by "Oman" - Iraq 4 All News - 
http://iraq4all.org/viewnews.php?id=10185 ) 
 
"It seems that what is taking place in Iraq is an endless 
tide of violence that could develop into civil war if 
differences among political parties are not resolved. 
Recently, disputes between President Al-Talabani and Prime 
Minister Al-Ja'fari have surfaced; the President criticized 
the Prime Minister for his unilateral decision-making and 
his failure to commit to agreements between Shiite and 
Kurdish parties, which formed the basis for the transitional 
government. Taking into consideration that security 
continues to deteriorate, the situation appears to be quite 
serious-to the extent that many U.S. military officials have 
explicitly pointed out the difficulty of the situation in 
Iraq. 
 
"Based on Arab and international indifference towards Iraq, 
and the inability of U.S. forces to provide security to 
Iraqis, anything seems possible, including civil war. No one 
can predict what the consequences would mean for the unity 
of Iraq. 
 
"The sectarian model continues to create many problems among 
Iraqis. Iraq needs all of its citizens to unite and look 
beyond temporary benefits. Iraq is going through a serious 
political phase; it will be threatened by division if 
politicians, clerics, and other effective powers do not deal 
with the situation that has developed since the fall of the 
former regime. 
 
"The situation in Iraq is difficult. Iraqis are exposed to 
death from violence and instability. The situation does not 
provide any chance for a stable government, nor does it 
allow for reconstruction to commence. 
 
"Against such a tragic scene, a serious stand is required, 
first by the Iraqi people, and second by occupation forces, 
by announcing an official timetable for withdrawal that 
could create an air of optimism among Iraqis. But if this 
situation continues, then the unity and independence of Iraq 
is in danger." 
 
B. "Beware, Fareed Ayar" 
(Editorial by Tahseen Al-Munthiri - Sawt Al-Iraq - "Voice of 
Iraq" - http://www.sotaliraq.com/articles- 
iraq/nieuws.php?id=16718 ) 
 
"No one knows the standards that the U.N. used to choose 
seven electoral commissioners from among 1,500 candidates to 
make decisions in the most critical sector of the current 
Iraqi scene. They have the right to approve political 
entities, election results, appeals, monitors, etc . etc. 
 
"The commission's law of formation, No. 92, is simple. It 
does not suffer from the complications of the commission 
itself. The commission is simply an entity similar to the 
council of ministers, with the same authority to manipulate 
the political process. Two names have emerged since the 
formation of the commission; they are the head of the 
commission, Abdul Hussein Al-Hindawi, and the commission's 
media spokesman, Fareed Ayar. Mr. Ayar has established 
relationships with the media; created a dispute with the 
head of the commission; demanded this man's resignation; 
refuted his own [Ayar's] statements; announced that he is 
stepping down from the post of media spokesman; returned as 
the media expert; and is currently working to oppose Iraqi 
expatriates' participation in the elections. He achieved 
great success in ruling out their participation in the 
referendum and is now leading a campaign to prevent Iraqis 
abroad from voting in the elections late this year. 
"It seems that significant changes have taken place at the 
commission lately. Adil Al-Lami has emerged as the 
commission's director general. He told the Al-A'lam channel 
that the commission is nothing more than an executive body 
that executes the National Assembly's decisions. This 
statement encouraged Iraqis abroad to address the Assembly 
to regain their right to participate in next December's 
election. They were quite optimistic about the results 
before Mr. Ayar returned to declare the difficulty of 
holding elections abroad. He offered four options for 
including Iraqi expatriates; the first, second, and fourth 
options included financial, security, and other difficulties 
that Ayar was happy to point out, while the third option was 
simply to postpone their participation until further notice, 
which only God Almighty and Mr. Ayar know about. 
 
"The statements of the media expert were full of 
contradictions. On one hand he complained of the small 
numbers that turned out for elections compared to the total 
number of Iraqis residing abroad, while on the other hand he 
said no surveys were available on the number of Iraqi 
expatriates. Then he said elections could be held at Iraqi 
embassies but that it would be hard to provide for their 
security, as if these embassies were located in Fallujah, 
Latifiya, or Tal-Afar. 
 
"Mr. Ayar said the commission had sent out memoranda to the 
National Assembly, president, and prime minister explaining 
the difficulties of holding elections abroad, but he did not 
mention whether a request was made to cancel the process, 
which I believe was the only content of these memoranda. 
 
"I wonder about the motivation behind Mr. Ayar's grudge 
against Iraqis abroad and why he insists on depriving them 
of the opportunity to participate in the political process. 
Is it to please a particular side, or is it a personal 
thing? Only God knows." 
 
C. "Occupation Forces' Withdrawal from Iraq Is Near" 
(Editorial by Hussein Ali Ghalib - Sawt Al-Iraq - "Voice of 
Iraq" - http://www.sotaliraq.com/articles- 
iraq/nieuws.php?id=16719 ) 
 
"The departure of U.S. and British military forces is 
undoubtedly very near. Political analysts, parties, clerics, 
and British and American media do not have anything to talk 
about except Iraq-the huge losses and the cost of this war. 
In America, demonstrations were bigger than anticipated; the 
organizers did not expect them to spread to several states. 
In Britain, the same thing happened. 
 
"U.S. congressmen opposed [President] George Bush's policy. 
Some of them are trying to amass their efforts to force the 
U.S. army to return home and to put President Bush in a 
difficult situation. He would have to prove his decision 
regarding the war [the decision to go to war] was successful 
from one perspective, but unsuccessful from other 
perspectives. He successfully toppled Saddam Hussein's 
regime; on the other hand, the U.S. army suffered many 
casualties. 
 
"The plans and agendas regarding Iraqi policy failed. This 
was recognized by all American officials, decision makers in 
the White House, and think tanks. The British stance is 
represented by the public's outrage, which the British 
government cannot ignore.  British officials will announce a 
specific timetable for the withdrawal of British troops from 
Iraq. We only need to wait and follow the news to discover 
the date of American and British withdrawal from Iraq, and 
note it as one of the key events in contemporary Iraqi 
history." 
 
D. "Storm-Swept Power-Sharing Alliances" 
(Editorial by Majid Lafta Al `Abaidi - Al-Rafidayn - "The 
Two Rivers" - 
http://www.alrafidayn.com/Story/News/N03_10_1 9.html ) 
 
"Iraqi President Jalal Al-Talabani's statements were not new 
to the Iraqi political audience, which was already aware of 
the contents of the Kurdistan Coalition's two memos 
submitted to Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Ja'fari and the 
United Iraqi Alliance. Both memos criticized the head of the 
government for unilateral, dictatorial actions and for 
failing to achieve any progress regarding the Kirkuk issue; 
they also criticized him for failing to implement a 
sectarian power-sharing agreement. This will allow him to 
control 100% of the system instead of 50%; it allows the 
prime minister and his ministers to fire their political 
opponents-from deputy ministers to basic laborers-and to 
replace them with members of the prime minister's party. 
 
"On the other hand, the president turned his honorific post 
into an executive one. This angered the prime minister, who 
goes behind [the president's] back to prevent him from 
controlling his job. An observer of the two leaders (the 
prime minister and the president) when they attended the 
funeral of Saudi King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz and the U.N. 
General Assembly meetings could see that Iraq has two heads 
competing with one another to monopolize leadership. 
 
"Mr. Talabani's statements criticizing Dr. Al-Ja'fari and 
his government are `mercy bullets.' He seeks to form 
political alliances in preparation for the parliamentary 
elections, which will sort out new groups in the Iraqi 
political arena." 
 
KHALILZAD