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Viewing cable 05WELLINGTON738, SUGGESTED STRATEGY FOR ALIEN (BUI) REQUEST TO GNZ

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05WELLINGTON738 2005-09-23 02:32 2011-04-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Wellington
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

230232Z Sep 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR DRL/MLA, CA, CA/VO/L/A, EAP/FO, AND EAP/ANP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2015 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV NZ
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED STRATEGY FOR ALIEN (BUI) REQUEST TO GNZ 
 
REF: SECSTATE 171981 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires David Burnett, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (SBU) This message contains an action request, at 
paragraph 6. 
 
2.  (C) Post believes that reftel demarche would be a very 
hard sell to GNZ officials.  New Zealand prides itself as a 
strong player in supporting human rights.  The Government has 
also been strongly criticized in the recent past for "lax" 
immigration standards: for example three members of Saddam's 
regime were somehow able to make their way here.  "Lax" 
immigration was also an issue in the recent general elections 
campaign, and may be responsible for a good part of the 
Government's loss of support at the polls.  GNZ is therefore 
almost certain not, rpt not, to accept Mr. Bui if the request 
is presented as it. 
 
3.  (C) However, we may have negotiating leverage with GNZ if 
we are willing to help them resolve another consular matter 
that has caused a bit of a strain in our bilateral relations. 
 The USG has declined to readmit LPR Sam Lam, who served time 
in New Zealand for drug charges and has now been released. 
Apparently, Mr. Lam's LPR status expired while he was in New 
Zealand, and his drug charges make him inadmissible to the US 
absent a waiver.  GNZ has been unsuccessful in attempts to 
ask Vietnam, where Lam was born, to admit him.  Lam left 
Vietnam as a child, and presumably the same GOV policy that 
bars Mr. Bui's admission to Vietnam is at work here as well. 
GNZ has raised this case with us several times, including via 
an approach by Foreign Minister Goff to May Warlow, Director 
of the Department of Justice's Office of International 
Affairs. 
 
4.  (C) We of course cannot guarantee that GNZ would be 
willing to accept Mr. Bui even if we were willing to 
reconsider the Lam case.  But without this offer it is almost 
certain that New Zealand officials will not accept Bui, 
especially given their conundrum vis a vis  Lam. 
 
5.  (C)  FYI: GNZ could in any case not seriously consider a 
USG request on the Bui case at this time.  The results of the 
September 17 election were so close that the final outcome 
will only be announced on October 1, after a recount.  Until 
that time, the former Government remains in place under 
caretaker status, and by convention will not take 
policy-making decisions except in an emergency. 
 
6.  (C) Post requests Washington guidance whether we should 
present reftel demarche as written after October 1, or rather 
suggest to GNZ they discuss both the Lam and Bui cases with 
USG officials after that time. 
Burnett