This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

130033Z Sep 05

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 WELLINGTON 000702 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR D (FRITZ), EAP/ANP, EAP/RSP, EAP/EP, INR/EAP 
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA AND MICHAEL GREEN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA LIZ PHU 
PACOM FOR J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NZ
SUBJECT: NZ ELECTIONS: WHAT'S IN IT FOR US? 
 
REF: A. WELLINGTON 696 
 
     ¶B. WELLINGTON 695 
     ¶C. WELLINGTON 682 
     ¶D. WELLINGTON 635 
     ¶E. WELLINGTON 594 
     ¶F. WELLINGTON 566 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires David R. Burnett, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  No matter who wins New Zealand's general 
elections this Saturday, the stage is set for a comprehensive 
U.S.-New Zealand dialogue should Washington desire one.  Well 
before the election, Labour officials indicated they would 
welcome such an exchange, and even in coalition with the 
Greens that position will not change.  National would also 
welcome a dialogue as a way to improve ties, although 
ironically they would be less able to engage us publicly. 
Labour, which would gain from close ties with us if in 
Government, would in opposition win more by opposing 
National's efforts to engage us. Embassy has had several 
preparatory discussions with senior Foreign Affairs and 
Defense officials to prepare for a dialogue should Washington 
decide to move forward.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Dialogue with Labour Is Possible 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) New Zealand's closest general election campaign in a 
decade is winding down.  The stakes are high for the Kiwi 
voter in this very close race: Labour and National represent 
truly different policy choices.  But the consequences for 
U.S.-New Zealand relations may be less extreme: either party 
should be open to new, comprehensive US-New Zealand talks if 
Washington decides such a dialogue is in order.  Either party 
would also have to work around obstacles to pursue such 
talks. 
 
¶3.  (C) As noted refs E and F, Labour has not been shy about 
playing the anti-American card during this campaign.  A 
Labour-Green victory would not, however, preclude a 
productive, comprehensive US-NZ dialogue as called for by 
former Ambassador Swindells.  Well before the campaign, 
Labour officials had been quietly leaving themselves room for 
such an exchange. 
 
¶4.  (C) There are many reasons for this.  For all the Labour 
Government's annoying tendencies to declare unilaterally that 
the nuclear ban no longer matters to the United States, Prime 
Minister Clark, Foreign Minister Goff and others recognize 
the ban is an impediment to better relations with us and has 
adverse effects on regional security. Obviously, their desire 
for a free trade agreement is a motivating factor in 
maintaining ties.  But these leaders also recognize that 
without a good relationship with the United States, the 
Government is vulnerable to opposition charges that Labour is 
too close to China and too far apart from New Zealand's 
second largest trading partner.  The opposition will only be 
stronger in such attacks against a left-leaning, Labour-Green 
alliance.  Senior Government leaders also know -- more than 
the Party caucus or backbenchers do -- that New Zealand 
benefits from its remaining military and intelligence ties 
with the United States. The country's engagements in 
Afghanistan and in peacekeeping operations in which we 
cooperate help keep their increasingly limited military 
forces trained and ready.  Without us, the defense force 
would be almost totally reliant on Australia, and that 
country makes no secret of its views that New Zealand is 
shirking on defense.  Labour's decision to sizably increase 
defense spending was at least in part meant to demonstrate 
that they intend to meet their obligations to us and other 
partners. 
 
¶5.  (S) New Zealand also gains access to U.S. intelligence 
concerning any country in which it has troops.  As noted in 
our "Two Worlds" cable, Prime Minister Clark continues to 
guard this information jealously, the surest sign of its 
value to her.  The Greens have gone on record this campaign 
as being opposed to our intelligence cooperation.  But by 
declaring they will automatically join Labour in a coalition, 
they have lost their negotiating leverage to determine a role 
in Government should Labour win.  Clark will ensure that the 
Greens are kept well away from foreign affairs, defense, and 
intelligence matters should the Labour-Green coalition form 
the government. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ambassador Swindells observed in his July 4 speech 
that U.S. and New Zealand are drifting apart and that the 
"status quo" of our relationship is meaningless in a changing 
world.  The Government was initially furious at his message, 
but it also clearly touched a nerve, especially after a 
surprising percentage of the public is still responding 
positively to the speech months later.  FM Goff, in his final 
meeting with Ambassador Swindells (ref D) for the first time 
did not rule out discussion of the anti-nuclear issue in a 
comprehensive dialogue.  He also told journalists waiting 
outside the meeting room that the Government could support a 
broad exchange with the United States: the first time a 
Labour Government official had said this publicly.  We have 
noticed how, even in the midst of their anti-American 
campaign rhetoric, senior Labour officials have checked in 
with us to make sure we were not taking the language too 
seriously.  On the campaign trail, they also now talk of the 
importance of maintaining New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy, 
rather than using the word "legislation." 
 
¶7.  (C) This is of course not to say that Labour would be 
willing to change either the anti-nuclear legislation or the 
policy.  Nor that the Greens won't affect the contour of our 
dialogue in any way, or slow things down at times.  But it 
does seem that for the first time the Government appears to 
want to keep the window open for a frank discussion of all 
issues, including the ban and its implications for us in the 
region.  At a minimum, such a discussion would allow both 
sides to explore other ways to work through some of the 
problems that Labour's policies cause for us.  Labour MPs on 
the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and senior bureaucrats 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade have also 
responded positively, albeit quietly, to our calls for a 
dialogue, and have said they wish to discuss things farther 
after elections. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
National: The Spirit is Willing, but... 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) With National, the desire for good relations is 
there, but the impediments to seeing things through are 
possibly greater than for Labour.  Well before the election 
campaign kicked off, National's Foreign Affairs spokesman 
Lockwood Smith and other senior National leaders told us that 
it would be very difficult for National to convince New 
Zealanders to consider amending the county's nuclear ban, 
even though National believes that the propulsion ban should 
go.  During the campaign, Labour's claims that under Brash 
the nuclear policy would be "gone by lunchtime" have caused 
problems for National and proved Smith correct.  Brash was 
forced to say -- repeatedly -- that a National Government 
would only change the policy following a referendum or having 
been elected on a platform of making the change.  Neither 
possibility is in the offing, and National clearly could not 
do anything on this issue in the near term.  There is no 
"Nixon goes to China" possibility for Brash to talk with us 
openly about the ban's implications, the way there in theory 
is for Clark, one of the legislation's authors. 
 
¶8.  (C) In fact, National's entire foreign policy has come 
under scrutiny this election, and Labour has succeeded in 
raising concerns in the minds of the electorate that National 
has a "secret agenda" to once again make New Zealand what FM 
Goff calls "a junior sheriff" to the United States and 
others.  Many National officials are committed to New 
Zealand's multilateralist policies even as they wish for 
closer relations with the United States.  Because of this, 
and because National is now vulnerable on all foreign policy 
issues, the party's recently released foreign policy is very 
conservative -- with a small "c."  Indeed, it's hard to 
differentiate it from Labour's current policies, a fact 
trumpeted by the Government as proof of National's perfidy. 
The policy paper signals to us just how hard it would be for 
a National Government to engage in a high-profile dialogue 
with the United States, at least over the shorter term. 
Similarly, National's defense policy only commits to keeping 
Labour's current plans and reviewing the country's overall 
military needs.  The Nats recognize that New Zealand's 
defense forces have been drawn down so much over the past 
decade that the Ministry of Defence will be unable, over the 
shorter term, to absorb more that the extra NZD 4.3 billion 
that Labour has already allocated for recruitment and 
retention. 
 
¶9.  (C) The real difference between working with a National 
Government and Labour would be  the issue of trust.  Even if 
National could not change the nation's policies or openly 
admit to talking about the nuclear ban and other security 
issues with us, we very likely could quietly work on a "road 
map" of sorts to try and align our policies more closely. 
Over time, we could then build on that process to work 
through many of the issues that divide our countries. 
 
---------------------- 
The Role of Parliament 
---------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) No matter who wins Saturday's election, we will need 
to work with both the Government and opposition if we decide 
to pursue a comprehensive dialogue with New Zealand.  We have 
already had several preparatory discussions with senior 
Foreign Affairs and Defense officials, as well as key MPs, to 
prepare for a dialogue should Washington decide to move 
forward. A Labour government could probably count on an 
opposition National to support such an initiative, but 
engaging National would still be key to helping keep Labour 
on track.  Conversely, a National Government would be far 
less likely to be able to count on an opposition Labour 
party's support, as Labour's goals for closer relations with 
us would be mooted outside Government.  Nevertheless, Labour 
foreign policy stalwarts are generally well disposed to us 
and would likely respond to direct outreach on our part.  We 
will need to help all parties work around the likely 
skepticism of their constituents, many of whom  have 
knee-jerk anti-American views.  This includes maintaining the 
Embassy's active public relations campaign to raise the case 
for better U.S.-New Zealand relations.  We've had surprising 
success with this over the past years, but we need to keep up 
the fight. 
Burnett