This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006375 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM USMISSION UNESCO PARIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE PASS USTR BLISS, BALASSA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SCUL ETRD EU UNESCO
SUBJECT:  USUNESCO:  MEETING WITH UK LAWYER ON CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY CONVENTION; CANADA TRIES TO HURRY THE PROCESS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  USTR and Department lawyers met Monday 
with British and Japanese lawyers at UNESCO to discuss the 
preliminary draft convention on cultural diversity.  The UK 
indicated that they do not share our concerns and are 
prepared to bring the convention to a vote over US 
opposition.  The Japanese indicated that they share our 
concerns about deep legal flaws in the convention but may be 
willing to let it go forward with band aid fixes.  Meanwhile 
Canada is actively seeking support among executive board 
members for a draft resolution that will recommend that the 
general conference consider the convention a draft 
convention rather than a preliminary draft.  End summary. 
 
Meeting with UK Lawyer 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) USTR associate general counsel Stanford McCoy and 
USMission Geneva lawyer Mike Peay met September 19 with 
Nicola Piccan a UK "cultural" lawyer.  (She did not come 
with name cards.)  UK Ambassador Tim Craddock led off by 
explaining that this meeting was motivated by the UK's 
concern over the bad impact that adoption of the convention 
could have on the US position in UNESCO.  He noted in that 
regard rumors circulating in Paris that the US would pull 
out of UNESCO if the convention were adopted. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The UK lawyer explained that they do not share US 
concerns about the convention.  According to Piccan the 
convention gives states wide discretion to adopt certain 
cultural measures, but does not mandate any particular 
actions that would be inconsistent with WTO or other 
agreements.  In this context, the UK takes comfort from 
Article 20 of the convention, governing the relationship to 
other instruments, paragraph 2 of which the UK views as 
expressly recognizing other agreements. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In response to US concerns, the UK del noted that 
the definitions in the convention, though broadly expressed, 
could not usefully be narrowed.  UK had decided that it 
could live with the definitions, particularly since they 
would be read in the context of other existing international 
agreements. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Regarding paragraph 1 of Article 20, UK felt that 
it expressed a desire to seek interpretations of the various 
obligations that do not clash with other international 
agreements.  UK del said the convention was not intended to, 
nor in its view did it conflict with trade agreements.  US 
del asked why US proposals to clarify this were not 
accepted.  The UK responded that they that article 20, para. 
2 made this sufficiently clear. 
 
¶6. (SBU) When asked about statements by French officials 
that France intends to use the convention to undermine WTO 
obligations, UK Ambassador Tim Craddock said that French 
motives are primarily limited to promoting French culture, 
especially within the Francophonie.  He indicated that trade 
and Doha were not central to French considerations. 
 
JAPAN 
----- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In an earlier meeting with Yasushi Masaki, Director 
of the Economic and Social Treaties Division of the Foreign 
Ministry, Masaki stated that Japan had difficulties in 
accepting the convention in its current form.  He emphasized 
the need for effective crisis management to reduce the harm 
done by the convention. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Japan, like the United States, is concerned about a 
"basket" of issues with the convention.  When asked to 
elaborate they identified Articles 6 and 20 (the Articles on 
which Japan made reservations) as the key problem areas on 
which Japan would concentrate its efforts.  They expressed 
concern to a lesser degree about vague definitions.  In 
response to questions from US del, they said they have many 
other issues with the convention that they would like to see 
addressed if the text were reopened, but for the time being 
they had decided to focus on their concerns regarding 
Articles 6 and 20. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Japan understands U.S. unhappiness with the current 
text and does not believe the United States will ratify the 
convention in its current form. Japan will support the U.S. 
"as much as possible" in seeking to continue the discussion. 
The dynamic in UNESCO has been to impose a draft text. 
Japan does not understand the rush, and thinks it is 
important to have a fair and complete discussion of their 
and our concerns about the text.  In addition, the 
unwillingness of supporters of the convention to have a 
dialogue with the WTO over obvious trade issues caused Japan 
to question the supporters' motives. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Japan also questioned whether there was true 
consensus on the current draft within the EC, and whether 
all EC members would actually ratify the convention.  Japan 
speculated that the real intentions behind the convention 
were political. 
 
"Pearls on a Pig" 
----------------- 
 
¶11. )SBU) Japan raised two possible ways of diminishing the 
negative effect of the convention if, despite all our joint 
efforts, it moves to final adoption.  The first was the 
possibility of a joint interpretive declaration by a number 
of countries stating that the convention is not intended to 
restrict trade but rather to promote cultural diversity 
within the UNESCO context.  The second was a review process 
through which the convention's flaws could be revisited. 
 
¶12. (SBU) US del jested that this brought to mind an old 
American adage about putting lipstick on a pig. 
Acknowledging that this approach was not ideal, Japan noted 
that the Japanese expression is "putting pearls on a pig." 
 
¶13. (SBU)  US del noted possible problems with Japan's 
suggested approach, such as the difficulty of obtaining wide 
enough agreement on a statement for it to have weight under 
customary international law of treaty interpretation. 
Nonetheless, US del said it would report back Japan's 
constructive thoughts on possible solutions. 
 
¶14. ()SBU) This discussion suggested that Japan might be 
actively looking for a way out for itself and the Japanese 
DG through "solutions" that seek to minimize damage from the 
convention, but do not address its basic flaws.  When US del 
urged Japan not to be "fatalistic," Japan agreed that it 
would be "better" to delay adoption, but this view was 
"heresy" and not likely to carry the day given the character 
of discussions in UNESCO. 
 
Canada launches a preemptive strike 
 
¶15. (SBU) Meanwhile, Canada has been circulating a draft 
resolution to executive board members that contains operant 
language that the executive board, "Recommends that the 
general conference at its 33rd session consider the said 
preliminary draft as a draft convention and adopt it as a 
UNESCO convention."  We know that Ukraine, Tanzania and 
Senegal have already signed (as well as the 8 EU members on 
the board) and we expect that many other executive board 
members have also co-signed.  (Note the board has 
 
¶16. (SBU) Comment.  The UK's concern about a possible US 
pull-out from UNESCO does not seem to extend to allowing the 
convention to be reopened to get it right.  Continued 
pressure needs to applied on London to get the UK to back 
away from its absolutist position.  When the US left UNESCO 
in 1984 the British left shortly after to protest the "new 
world information order."  The cultural diversity convention 
is the new world information order all over again. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Comment continued.  We are also concerned that 
Japan will not stick with the US and will seek to give the 
director general a face saving way out. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Comment continued.  The Canadian draft resolution 
may indicate a concern that the June convention draft does 
not meet the general conference rule that conventions must 
be finished seven months before the general conference. 
While a different draft was finished in March, it could be 
argued that the June version does not meet the deadline. 
Pressure will need to be applied in capitals of executive 
board members to get their delegation to either not co- 
sponsor or remove their sponsorship. 
 
Oliver