This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

221432Z Sep 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001318 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DCHA/FFP FOR LANDIS, WELLER, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR GOTTLIEB, PRATT, MENGHETTI, MARX 
AFR/SA FOR LOKEN, COPSON, HIRSCH 
EGAT FOR HOBGOOD, THOMPSON, HESS, MCGAHUEY, GILL, 
RUSHIN-BELL, HURDUS 
STATE/AF FOR NEULING, MOZENA 
USUN FOR EMALY 
NAIROBI FOR ESTES, DNIRANGO, PUTNAM 
PRETORIA FOR SINK, DISKIN, HALE 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR NEWBERG 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREL US ZI
SUBJECT:  Subject:  Food Import and Distribution 
Problems Continue Hopeful Signs 
 
REF: STATE 99848 
 
¶1.  Summary:  Since April 2004, the import and 
distribution of food aid in Zimbabwe have been 
constrained by ambiguous GOZ requirements and 
unresolved issues concerning the quality of US- 
donated food. Currently there are no large 
amounts of food waiting for distribution or 
import, but it will be important to resolve 
remaining obstacles before large-scale food 
distribution through the World Food Program (WFP) 
is scheduled to begin in October.  In light of a 
recent statement President Mugabe made against 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), it will 
also be important to ensure that NGOs have 
sufficient leeway to distribute food on a 
nonpartisan basis.  Fortunately, NGOs have seen 
recent signs of progress in being able to import 
and distribute food aid, and post will continue 
to work with WFP and major NGOs on these issues. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2.  Background:  Since the start of Zimbabwe's 
food crisis in 2002, USAID has been distributing 
food to vulnerable Zimbabweans through WFP and a 
consortium of NGOs called the Consortium for the 
Southern Africa Food Security Emergency (C-SAFE). 
The consortium is composed of CARE, World Vision 
(WV) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS).  Since 
April 2004, various problems have impeded the 
import and distribution of food despite several 
donor attempts, including by post, to intervene 
with the GOZ on behalf of NGOs.  These problems, 
which have gained increasing media attention, 
include delays in issuing import permits, 
requirements that NGOs enter into Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) with line ministries, and 
food quality tests. 
 
¶3.  Import Permits Procedures: From the beginning 
of the food crisis in early 2002 until April 
2004, the Ministry of Agriculture, with a support 
letter from the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW), 
issued import permits for food aid commodities on 
behalf of the GOZ.  The process for obtaining a 
permit was well defined and, generally, ran 
smoothly. In April 2004, the GOZ declared an end 
to the food emergency and abruptly changed import 
permit procedures.  Instead of the MSW taking the 
lead, the new procedures required the line 
ministry most closely aligned with a food 
distribution activity (e.g., the Ministry of 
Health for health and HIV-related feeding, and 
the Ministry of Education for school feeding) to 
issue support letters.  With the different 
ministries taking different approaches, the exact 
requirements for food importation became 
ambiguous overnight.  Between May 2004 and 
September 2005, C-SAFE was unsuccessful in 
obtaining any import permit, although WFP did 
import food with support from the Ministry of 
Health.  Only in September 2005 did C-SAFE 
finally obtain a permit from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, despite repeated interventions on 
its behalf by WFP officials, the USAID Director, 
and the Ambassador.  C-SAFE now has approval to 
import oil, pinto beans, and 1700 MT of bulgur 
wheat and it has applied for approval for an 
additional 2000 MT of bulgur wheat.  Some of 
these commodities are already in Durban while 
others are en route. 
 
¶4.  Memoranda of Understanding: The GOZ has 
consistently required that an organization 
distributing food aid have an MOU with a 
government ministry.  The GOZ's rationale is that 
a relevant line ministry must exercise technical 
oversight for NGO activities (e.g., the Ministry 
of Education for school feeding programs).  From 
the beginning of the food crisis in 2002, both 
WFP and C-SAFE NGOs distributed food under an 
umbrella MOU between WFP and MSW until that 
agreement expired in June 2004. Since then, WFP 
and the individual C-SAFE NGOs have been trying 
to negotiate new agreements with line ministries. 
WFP has succeeded in entering into an MOU with 
the Ministry of Health, to cover feeding programs 
in support of HIV, and has an MOU pending with 
the Ministry of Education for school feeding. 
Unable to conclude any MOU, to date C-SAFE has 
not been able to expand any of its targeted food 
distribution activities.  Just in the last few 
weeks, however, the GOZ informally notified WFP 
that it will again allow NGOs to operate under a 
WFP umbrella MOU for the coming food insecure 
season, starting in October. 
 
¶5.  GOZ concerns with NGOs: Earlier this week, 
President Mugabe reportedly told Secretary 
General Annan in New York that the GOZ does not 
want to give a role to NGOs so they can 
politicize food distribution.  WFP, however, 
informs us that it does not anticipate any 
negative impact on its food distribution program. 
WFP already has written GOZ approval to 
distribute food through NGOs.  Moreover, WFP 
tells us that when they have asked the GOZ if it 
has concerns about any of WFP's implementing 
partners, they have received assurances that the 
NGOs operating under the WFP umbrella are all 
acceptable. 
 
¶6.  C-SAFE Food Stocks: At the end of June 2004, 
C-SAFE had about 31,000 MT of food in Zimbabwe. 
Since that time, it distributed about 20,000 MT 
through targeted feeding in schools, hospitals, 
and food-for-work programs and was able to import 
only about 3,000 MT. Currently C-SAFE has 
approximately 14,000 MT remaining in stock, of 
which about half (7,500 MT) is sorghum. C-SAFE 
uses the sorghum in its Market Assistance Program 
(MAP) that sells subsidized sorghum to the urban 
poor at a nominal price. The MAP currently 
operates in Bulawayo, Gweru, and Hwange, but C- 
SAFE has been unable to expand the MAP to other 
urban centers primarily because local offices of 
the Zimbabwean Revenue Authority have insisted 
that the sale of sorghum must be subject to tax. 
Post will continue to support C-SAFE in trying to 
resolve the issue. 
 
¶7.  Food quality tests:  In late 2004 and early 
2005, it became apparent that some of the corn- 
soy-blend (CSB) that both WFP and C-SAFE used in 
school feeding was over-fortified (i.e., the 
content of iron and zinc exceeded maximum 
allowable levels) REFTEL.  In response to this 
over-fortification, the MOH increased the range 
and rigor of its routine laboratory testing to 
certify food aid as acceptable for human 
consumption in Zimbabwe. In May 2005, before a 
resolution was reached, the GOZ prohibited the 
use of any CSB in Zimbabwe, regardless of 
manufacturer or country of origin.  As a result, 
school feeding activities in Zimbabwe came to a 
virtual halt. In August 2005, after continued 
lobbying by WFP, the GOZ allowed non-U.S. CSB to 
be distributed in targeted programs, but school 
feeding has not yet reopened due to delays in 
acquiring approval from the Ministry of 
Education. 
 
¶8.  Food quality tests continued:  The GOZ's more 
rigorous inspection of food stocks, following 
disclosure of over-fortified CSB, has led to 
other food quality issues that have delayed 
importation.  Specifically, the GOZ's tests have 
found "unacceptable" levels of zinc and/or lead 
in large amounts of US-donated food stocks that 
were imported through Durban.  Although 
independent tests confirmed that most of the food 
was fine, the GOZ never granted health 
certificates for 8,000 MT of food that was stored 
in Durban.  As a result, this food was diverted 
to other programs in the region.  Also, the 
increased rigor of the GOZ's food testing 
highlighted that its maximum allowable levels of 
mineral fortification for zinc and iron are below 
that of US standards.  USDA and Food for Peace 
technical staff are in Harare this week to 
investigate possible causes of these 
discrepancies in food quality tests. 
 
¶9.  Comment:  GOZ bureaucratic processes have 
hindered the importation and distribution of food 
aid to vulnerable Zimbabweans for more than a 
year. Although there is a rationality to the 
GOZ's procedures in the sense that they attempt 
to provide technical oversight of NGO activities, 
their cumbersome nature and the lack of 
transparency ensure interminable delays in the 
import and distribution of food.  Mugabe's recent 
public lambasting of NGOs raises additional 
worries.  Although WFP is confident that it can 
distribute food through NGOs as planned, the 
GOZ's history of harassing NGOs highlights the 
need to monitor this closely. 
 
¶10.  Comment continued:  C-SAFE's recent success 
in obtaining preliminary import permits for food 
en route, and GOZ statements that it will "waive" 
MOU requirements for the coming year for NGOs 
working under WFP, hold out some hope that the 
welfare of hungry Zimbabweans will prevail over 
bureaucratic obstinacy.  However, food inspection 
issues still remain unresolved so food 
commodities en route to Durban may yet be held up 
in this morass.  With the GOZ's financial 
capacity to purchase imported food still 
uncertain, any such delays will only harm the 
most vulnerable. 
DELL