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Viewing cable 05BAGHDAD3689, DAILY IRAQI WEBSITE MONITORING - September 7, 2005

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BAGHDAD3689 2005-09-08 10:36 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003689 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR/R/MR, NEA/PPD, NEA/PPA, NEA/AGS, INR/IZ, INR/P 
 
E.0. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO IZ
SUBJECT: DAILY IRAQI WEBSITE MONITORING - September 7, 2005 
 
SUMMARY: Discussion on the Constitution was the major 
editorial theme of Iraqi, Arabic language websites on 
September 7, 2005. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
------------------------------ 
 
A. "The Pending Constitution" (Iraq4all News, 9/7) 
B. "The Arab League and the Iraqi Constitution" (Al-Jeeran, 
9/7) 
C. "Leave Iraqis Alone" (Makany, 9/7) 
D. "Iraq after Constitutional Ratification" (Al-Bayan, 9/7) 
 
--------------------------------------- 
SELECTED COMMENTARIES 
--------------------------------------- 
 
A. "The Pending Constitution" 
 (Editorial by Abdul Zahra Al-Rikabi - Iraq4all News - 
http://iraq4all.org) 
 
"President Bush hailed the `merits' of the Iraqi 
constitution saying it included many guarantees to protect 
basic human rights including religious rights, the right of 
assembly, and the right to freedom of expression, but the 
American president didn't point out the dangerous and 
destructive implications within the constitution that would 
divide and eliminate Iraq--and president Bush's praises were 
considered a blessing for the American coalition's efforts 
serving the U.S. occupation. There's no doubt that America's 
local allies played an obvious role in many scenarios in 
Iraq including that of the constitution after its draft 
revealed items representing an attempt to divide the country 
into two states with full economic autonomy based on 
strategic oil resources; where the draft constitution states 
that one or more provinces have the right to form a federal 
region with diplomatic missions in embassies to follow up on 
cultural, social, and development issues. As for oil 
revenues, the lion's share will be for the southern region 
including: nine provinces receiving no less than 60%, with 
the northern Kurdish region receiving 20% with a chance to 
seize no less than 30% if they takeover Kirkuk, while only 
leftovers will go to the central region including Baghdad 
and three other Sunni provinces with a scant 10% or 20% of 
revenues. That's in addition to granting these regions the 
right to invest in unexplored oil fields including the 
southern (Majnoon) field which represents a huge strategic 
oil resource and the northern fields already being explored 
by international oil companies who've signed contracts with 
the Kurds. We can say that more than one dimension will 
prevent the draft constitution from passage during the 
referendum. That includes the sectarian component, where the 
three Sunni provinces of Mosul, Tikrit, and Ramadi can 
reject the draft, and the same thing can be said about 
Shiite provinces where the Sadr movement is the strongest 
Shiite faction opposing the constitution (from an early 
stage due to its trend towards division and separation), in 
addition to other Shiite secular movements with an active 
presence in left wing and liberal movements. All of which 
means the political process adopted by the U.S. occupation 
will return to square one, which serves the occupation's 
interests in drawing the attention of Iraqis towards their 
usual political drama beginning with the governing council, 
elections, and finally the constitution pending a referendum 
which will not be the final chapter of the American play." 
 
B. "The Arab League and the Iraqi Constitution" 
(Editorial by Jaber Habib Jaber - Al-Jeeran - 
http://www.aljeeran.net) 
 
"No constitution has aroused interest in the way that the 
Iraqi constitution has, and not only on a local level but an 
international one symbolized by worldwide congratulations 
from the U.N., U.S., U.K., and the European Union in what 
all described as the cornerstone of the political process. 
As for the regional and Arab level, the most peculiar 
position was that of the Arab League's Secretary General. 
For his interference came at a time when political parties 
were negotiating the draft constitution and his position 
sided with one of the negotiating parties leading to a 
further entrenchment in their position. 
This position might be justified by an affinity over the 
identity of Iraq, but perhaps this role could have been more 
effectively promoted through envoys sent by the League to 
mediate between negotiating parties and provide advice, 
which is the same role played by the U.N.'s envoy, Ashraf 
Qadhi, who encouraged participation in the constitutional 
process. So the Secretary General of the Arab League might 
have had a better chance today if he or those before him had 
addressed the concerns and crises of the Iraqi people, 
whether during the Ba'athist era or after. Iraqis have a 
great deal of bitter memories regarding the role of the Arab 
League towards Iraq. Where was the League when Kurds were 
killed by chemicals in Halabja and had their villages wiped 
out? Where were they when marshes were destroyed after seven 
thousand years of existence?  The League might have 
justified its position by saying it didn't want to clash 
with regimes, but did it attempt to urge member countries to 
take notice of the suffering of Iraqis fleeing the regime's 
brutality, did it call upon countries to grant access to 
those refugees instead of drowning in deep oceans or ending 
up exiled in distant lands? Before the elections, the 
League's Secretary General met with representatives calling 
to boycott the elections, so did he make use of his 
political experience and advise them to take part in the 
process that would finally lead to a constitution? Did he 
inform them about how their absence would affect the balance 
of powers, and weaken the Arabs' side in front of the Kurds? 
Or did he, like everyone else, bet on the failure of the 
Iraqi elections? The Secretary General expressed concern 
over the Arab nature of Iraq as if it were a piece of 
clothing to be taken off at any time, or as if Iraqis were 
in need of advice over how to maintain their Arab origin; 
but these same concerns weren't expressed over the peace 
agreement in Sudan which granted the southern region of the 
country the right to self determination, nor did he oppose 
Libya withdrawing from the League, nor did he condemn Arab 
nations normalizing relations with Israel, nor did he call 
for a special session despite hundreds of Iraqis being 
killed on daily basis. But he didn't hesitate to call for a 
meeting in the resort of Sharm Al-Sheikh to encourage 
tourism in the area. So neither the history of the Arab 
League nor its charter allows it to interfere in the 
decisions of Iraqis, especially after abandoning them to 
terrorists and murderers." 
 
C. "Leave Iraqis Alone" 
(Uncited Editorial - Makany - 
http://www.makany.com/go2news.php?url=8824108 ) 
 
"Despite some of the constitution's articles imposed through 
power sharing, the Iraqi constitution is considered a 
quantum leap relative to the constitutions prevalent in the 
Arab world. The most important thing in the nascent Iraqi 
constitution is that it includes several guarantees to avoid 
returning to the tyranny that Iraq suffered for 1,400 years. 
Federalism will ensure no repeats of the `great leader' or 
`God's gift on earth' which Arab countries in general and 
Iraqis in particular are afflicted with. Let Amr Musa, the 
Arab flag bearer, allow us to disagree with him in his 
reservations about us not specifying the Arab nature of Iraq 
in the constitution by saying he interfered in a matter that 
should not concern him because this is the Iraqi people's 
choice and he should respect this choice. Second, he should 
remember that Iraqis didn't receive anything but 
destruction, killings, and deportation from the Arab nature 
of Iraq. One of the advantages of the new Iraqi constitution 
is it includes many guarantees for human rights and 
freedoms. Those who cry about the Arab nature of Iraq and 
fear its division actually want to reinstate tyranny on our 
people, and that won't happen. A piece of advice to those 
who whine and mourn about Iraq's identity: Let Iraqis take 
care of themselves." 
 
D. "Iraq after Constitutional Ratification" 
(Editorial by Abdul Zahra Al-Rikabi - Al Bayan - 
http://www.albayan.ae/servlet/Satellite?cid=1 125289812001&pa 
gename=Albayan%2FArticle%2FFullDetail&c=Artic le) 
 
"Iraqi's parliament settled its talks over the Iraqi 
constitution without making any changes to the draft. Five 
million copies will be published and distributed to voters 
in an obvious challenge to Sunnis and a rejection of various 
political party and partisan group demands which will lead 
Iraq to an unpredictable future. The third article of the 
draft constitution states, `Iraq is multi-ethnic and multi- 
religious, it is part of the Islamic world, and the Arab 
people in it are part of the Arab nation.' This article, in 
addition to federalism, will constitute a gloomy image of 
Iraqi unity and identity scattered among political 
movements, narrow-minded interests, and sectarian entities. 
The Iraqi constitutional project needs a review, a review 
that guarantees Iraq's unity and maintains its independence 
and the unity of its land. A public rejection of the draft 
constitution won't end in rejection and denouncement of the 
document but will go beyond and stoke what Iraqis most fear- 
-civil war. Salih Al-Mutlag, one of the top Sunni Arab 
negotiators expressed his fears by showing his resentment 
over the current constitution. He said if it is approved in 
the referendum Iraqis will say the results were faked which 
would be very bad. The political and security situation 
could spiral out of control if the constitution is rejected 
by a two-thirds majority in three provinces and that will 
increase the sectarian tension. The American administration 
must establish a policy of not letting Iraq drown in 
sectarian quagmire and civil war--especially with plans for 
an American military withdrawal after the approval of the 
draft constitution. The Americans must take on their 
historic responsibility for creating a national consensus to 
rebuild post-occupation Iraq and prevent a `Katrina 
constitution' which threatens Iraqi unity on one side and 
Arab/Islamic identity on the other." 
 
SATTERFIELD