This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

221334Z Sep 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005501 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR R, ECA, EUR, NEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OVIP PGOV PREL KPAO TU
SUBJECT: VISIT TO TURKEY OF UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS KAREN P. HUGHES. 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  Your visit to Turkey comes at a time when 
bilateral relations are gradually but perceptibly improving. 
While the Turks highly value U.S. support for Turkey,s EU 
membership and our active work on behalf of a Cyprus 
settlement, the perceptions that we have done nothing to 
counter the PKK in northern Iraq remain irritants in the 
relationship.  Turkey demonstrates that democracy and Islam 
are not incompatible, yet there are dangers in postulating 
that Turkey should be considered an example for other 
countries.  The point of departure for our public diplomacy 
initiatives with pious and secular Turks alike is issues, 
interests, and values, rather than religion.  During this 
listening tour, your demonstration of respect for the diverse 
perspectives you encounter will be greatly valued.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Shared Policy Goals, Yet Concerns on Iraq and PKK 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2.  The U.S.,s steadfast support for Turkey,s EU 
aspirations, and specifically our activism, even when behind 
the scenes, in promoting an October 3 starting date for EU 
accession negotiations is welcomed by Turkey.  Long-standing, 
active U.S. support for a just settlement in Cyprus under the 
Annan Plan and our steps, including trade delegations and 
Congressional visits, to ease the isolation of northern 
Cyprus, is another area of convergence of U.S. and Turkish 
interests. 
 
¶3.  Iraq is a major preoccupation for Turks and it will lead 
the agenda of many of your interlocutors.  Turkey and the 
U.S. now share common goals for Iraq: a secure, stable, 
democratic country that is united and territorially whole. 
Turkey has provided valuable assistance and cooperation in 
the global war on terrorism.  The GOT offered to send 
peacekeeping troops to Iraq in October 2003 (an offer refused 
by Iraq), approved the use of Incirlik airbase for tankers to 
refuel aircraft on support missions for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, authorized the 
transit of troops on rotation from Iraq, and permits the 
transit of fuel, coalition supplies, and humanitarian goods. 
This April, the GOT granted the U.S. permission to establish 
a cargo hub at Incirlik, which has significantly increased 
our efficiency in delivering supplies to Iraq. 
 
¶4.  However, our actions in Iraq have been highly unpopular 
with the Turkish public, 95 percent of which opposed the war. 
 Many in government share the public,s perceptions. 
Concerns about our lack of action against terrorist PKK camps 
in northern Iraq, Kurdish desires for independence, the 
ethnic balance and future of Kirkuk, and perceived 
discrimination against Turkmen in northern Iraq fueled the 
public,s strong disagreement with U.S. efforts in Iraq. 
Last year, irresponsible statements by Turkish political 
leaders solidified negative public opinion, and 
anti-Americanism grew as a result of highly distorted media 
reporting on the Iraq war, against which the Mission pushed 
back hard in an effort to hold the press to a standard of 
fact. 
 
¶5.  A series of high-level exchanges, beginning with the 
President,s visit in June 2004, followed by Secretary,s 
Rice,s visit to Ankara in February, and continuing with the 
early June 2005 visits of Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign 
Minster Gul to Washington and the Secretary,s meeting with 
FM Gul in New York this week on the margins of the UNGA, has 
contributed to a closer relationship and much improved 
atmospherics.  The major irritant in the relationship remains 
the perception that the U.S., despite its global campaign 
against terrorism, is doing nothing to counteract the 
approximately 2000 PKK militia who take refuge in northern 
Iraq, providing them a base of operation for terrorist 
attacks in Turkey. 
 
Turkey,s Many Faces 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  As you visit Ankara and Istanbul, it is important to 
remember that there are, in fact, many Turkeys and that there 
is much more to the country than its capital and the world 
renowned city on the Bosphorus.  Turkey is a relatively poor 
country, with an average per capita monthly income of just 
$340.  Approximately 30 percent of the population lives below 
the poverty line.  Nineteen percent of Turkish women are 
illiterate.  It is a young country, with more than 60 percent 
of its population under 30 years of age.  And it is a highly 
complex country in terms of religious self-identity and the 
place of religion in society and government.  Elite 
supporters of Turkey,s secular state downplay the role of 
religion, yet there exists a strong element of Islam in the 
social and cultural traditions of Anatolia, as well as within 
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). 
 
Muslims and Democracy Do Not a Model Make 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  As the region,s only secular democratic Muslim nation 
with a majority Muslim population and a key U.S. ally, Turkey 
plays a critical role in the formulation of strategies to 
address the Muslim world.  Turkey bridges Europe and Asia, 
both physically and culturally.  It provides proof that 
democratic values can thrive in a predominantly Muslim nation. 
 
¶8.  Yet there is danger in this truth.  Turks object 
vigorously to their country being referred to as a &model8 
or &example8 for other nations of how Islam and democracy 
can co-exist.  Part of their objection goes back to the 
founding of Turkey as a self-consciously secular state. 
Others object because, for most Turks, religion is an 
intensely private and personal issue.  Still others interpret 
the use of &model8 or &example8 of an endorsement of the 
status quo, when, in fact, there remains much more to be done 
in protecting human rights and freedom of expression and 
promoting democratic reform.  An even more dangerous trap is 
the use of the formulation &moderate Islam,8 which implies 
to many Turks that Islam is in the first instance violent and 
dangerous.  If pushed to label our Turkish ally, we 
characterize it as a country with a democratic, secular 
government and a Muslim majority population. 
 
Public Diplomacy in Turkey 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  Ninety-nine percent of Turkey,s population is Muslim, 
and in a very real sense every public diplomacy initiative we 
conduct in support the MPP constitutes outreach to Muslim 
audiences.  Yet, our interaction with Turks takes as its 
starting point our shared goals and interests ) or the 
differences that we seek to bridge ) rather than the fact 
that Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country. 
 
¶10.  Turkey is set apart from other Muslim countries by 
Ataturk,s powerful and lasting vision of a secular state of 
Muslims.  The continuing debate over the ban on women wearing 
headscarves in government buildings and universities is a 
constant reminder, if one were needed, that American concepts 
of freedom of religious expression cannot simply be overlaid 
onto Turkey. 
 
¶11.  The complexities associated with the role of religion in 
secular Turkey underscore the importance of adopting an 
approach to communicating with Muslim audiences based on the 
premise that there is no monolithic Islamic culture.  What 
works in Riyadh may not play well in Cairo, and will almost 
certainly not work in Istanbul or Ankara.  The Mission has 
made a concerted effort to reach out to AKP constituents, 
Islamist-oriented NGOs, and self-identified pious Turks.  At 
the same time, we continue to closely engage the country,s 
traditional Kemalist power structure.  Turkey,s population 
is younger and faster growing that that of any other European 
country and we need to extend our efforts to more 
successfully engage the country,s youth.  In a word, our 
outreach is directed at Turks. 
 
¶12.  Due to strong opposition to the Iraq War, public support 
for U.S. foreign policy has, on the other hand, eroded 
dramatically in Turkey, not unlike in many countries around 
the world.  With Iraq on its doorstep, Turks are deeply 
concerned about the continuing violence there and the 
country,s uncertain political future.  The PKK is an issue 
of fundamental importance for the Turks.  The opposition the 
U.S. encounters in Turkey is far less related to religious 
faith than it is a question of policy and geography.  There 
remains, on the other hand, on the part of many secular and 
pious Turks alike, an admiration for American values, 
freedoms, and technology and a desire to study in, visit, and 
do business with the United States. 
 
¶13.  We applaud your emphasis on listening during this visit. 
 The fact that you are visiting Turkey following stops in two 
Middle Eastern countries may leave some Turks to conclude 
that the U.S. views Turkey as part of the Middle East. It is 
important that during your discussions you reaffirm our view 
that Turkey is firmly rooted in Europe and the West.  The 
civil society and religious leaders and the youth and women 
with whom you meet will have no shortage of opinions and 
views to share.  They will value the respect you demonstrate 
for their perspectives.  Despite the differences of opinion 
your interlocutors will voice with our policies, they will 
find that we share a common belief in the importance of 
democracy, liberty and family. 
MCELDOWNEY