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Viewing cable 05TAIPEI3313, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TAIPEI3313 2005-08-09 08:42 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary: Most Chinese-language Taipei dailies 
focused their coverage August 8 on local issues such as 
the water shortage in Taoyuan County, a junior high 
school student overpowering an armed bank robber, and a 
child abuse case.  The pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" 
was the only Chinese-language newspaper that spent its 
front page (as well as one third of its page three) 
reporting on Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi's decision to dissolve the lower house of 
Japan's parliament and call for elections after the 
upper house rejected a bill to privatize the country's 
postal service.  With regard to Taiwan's relationship 
with the United States, the pro-independence "Liberty 
Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, carried a news story on 
its page three that was topped with the headline: "[TSU 
Legislator] Lo Chih-ming: The United States may likely 
agree to allow President Chen Shui-bian to visit [the 
United States]."  The sub-headline added: "Based on 
Lo's information, Bian may even be able to deliver a 
public speech in the United States.  Lo meets with 
Japanese officials and hopes Tokyo would follow suit." 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, several 
newspapers editorialized on cross-Strait relations 
August 5 - 9.  An editorial in the pro-unification 
"United Daily News" August 9 suggested that Taiwan seek 
support from the people on the mainland when dealing 
with cross-Strait relations.  Former Taiwan National 
Security Council Deputy Secretary-General Antonio 
Chiang commented on the recently held U.S.-China 
strategic dialogue in the mass-circulation "Apple 
Daily," saying the dialogue indicates that the 
bilateral ties between the two countries will face new 
adjustments.  A separate August 5 "United Daily News" 
editorial urged the Taiwan government to implement a 
more proactive cross-Strait policy by liberalizing the 
three direct links as soon as possible.  An editorial 
in the limited-circulation, conservative, pro- 
unification, English-language "China Post" predicted 
that recent geopolitical changes among the United 
States, China, Japan and Russia are likely to 
complicate the already volatile relations across the 
Taiwan Strait.  End summary. 
 
A) "The 1.3 Billion Mainland Chinese: the Variable with 
the Highest Potential in Developing Cross-Strait 
Relations" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 
500,000] said in an editorial (8/9): 
 
". In short, in addition to the conditions that Taiwan 
can control by itself, the two external factors 
regarding cross-Strait relations, on which Taiwan must 
work, are the United States and China.  The U.S. cross- 
Strait policy is to realize the U.S. interest.  For 
Taiwan, the `development elasticity' in relation to 
this factor has already reached its utmost limit. As 
for the Chinese factor, one certainly can divide it 
into two concepts: the `Chinese authority' and the 
`mainland people.'  The `development elasticity' of the 
`Chinese authority' is smaller while that of the 
`mainland people' is much larger.  This means if Taiwan 
can influence the `mainland people' and enable a public 
atmosphere, in which the people of both sides across 
the Strait will encourage and appreciate each other. 
This is not only a `desirable' but also a `feasible' 
goal for Taiwan's cross-Strait strategy. . 
 
"When Taiwan's leaders in charge of political affairs 
are turning the island into a `Taiwan independence 
fortress,' the `mainland people' will be forced to back 
the `Chinese authority' on the nationalist `united 
front.'  In contrast, if the Taiwan authority can 
position Taiwan as a `beacon of democracy,' we may be 
able to separate the `Chinese authority' from the 
`mainland people' and build a consensus or tacit 
agreement of mutual-encouragement and mutual 
appreciation between the peoples of Taiwan and the 
mainland.  Whether we want to make the 1.3 billion 
people hostile to the `Taiwan independence fortress' or 
cherish the `beacon of democracy' should be a strategic 
choice that Taiwan must make on cross-Strait relations 
in the future. ." 
 
B) "Behind the [Strategic] Dialogue in Beijing" 
 
Former Taiwan National Security Council Deputy 
Secretary-General Antonio Chiang commented in the mass- 
 
SIPDIS 
circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 570,000] (8/5): 
 
"[Former] U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell once 
said two years ago that the relations between the 
United States and China had never been better.  Sadly, 
the honeymoon period [between the two countries] did 
not last very long, and dramatic changes have happened 
to their bilateral relations over the past year.  Even 
though Washington and Beijing have worked with each 
other over a number of issues, they have suspicions 
about each other's motives.  Two days ago, both the 
United States and China had a strategic dialogue in 
Beijing, and this move indicated that their bilateral 
ties would face new adjustments. . 
 
"Washington suspects that China's economic policy 
toward other countries is a political and a plunderer- 
like one.  [For Washington,] China's plan to purchase a 
U.S. oil company is not a business behavior but an 
economic strategic approach.  Washington also 
questioned China's blueprint for Asia, believing that 
China's aim is to replace the United States' position, 
and the purpose of China's military modernization has 
all the more manifested Beijing's strategic ambition. 
 
"Beijing, on the other hand, criticized Washington for 
containing it diplomatically and suppress it 
economically.  [Beijing said Washington] launched the 
China threat theory in an attempt to isolate China. 
The purpose of the U.S.-Japan security pact, [in 
Beijing's eyes], is to stop China from reaching out to 
the Pacific Ocean and to stop China from handling the 
Taiwan issue. . 
 
"A giant gap exists between the United States and China 
in terms of their values and strategic interests.  The 
Chinese Communist Party is a superpower rising 
suddenly, and China is a totalitarian country currently 
undergoing transition.  It is not essentially necessary 
to find a common language for the first-ever dialogue 
[between the United States and China].  This dialogue 
is just meant to be the beginning of increased mutual 
understanding, and there is a long way ahead for both 
sides to walk on." 
 
C) "`Loud Thunder Overriding Firecrackers': a 
Macroscopic Way of Thinking for Cross-Strait Policy" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 
500,000] editorialized (8/5): 
 
". First, the policy goals [of the Taiwan government] 
should be elevated to the level of the `three direct 
links.'  For example, the transitional period for 
weekend chartered flights should not be too long.  The 
goal should be moving toward `regular flights' as soon 
as possible.  Also, the idea for Penghu to be a 
transfer point is nothing but a `partial' viewpoint. 
If the three direct links will be implemented sooner or 
later, then there is no need to waste Penghu's time. 
Furthermore, one has learned from Kinmen and Matsu's 
`mini three links' that, with its economic and social 
conditions, Penghu's opening as a transfer point may 
not be beneficial to the country as a whole.  Instead, 
this will quickly increase Penghu's dependence on the 
mainland, just as what has happened to Kinmen and 
Matsu.  This definitely cannot be considered a good 
strategy.  As a result, we should give up the 
`maintaining partial and harming the whole' way of 
thinking and adopt the `stabilizing the whole to save 
the partial' strategy. 
 
"The so-called `stabilizing the whole to save the 
partial' strategy is to implement the `three direct 
links' as soon as possible and try our best to pursue 
the goal of developing Taiwan into an `Asian-Pacific 
platform.'  Only then can we build a so-called `cross- 
Strait peaceful and stable interactive development 
framework.'  Regarding the political dimensions, we 
should realize that there is no possibility for `name 
rectification and a new constitution' or `de jure 
Taiwan independence.'  Taiwan should play the role of 
`a beacon for democracy and freedom' and maintain a 
relationship of mutual encouragement and mutual 
appreciation with the 1.3 billion people on the 
mainland.  It is really not appropriate for those in 
charge of political affairs to face the 1.3 billion 
mainlanders as `Taiwan independence activists.'  This 
will only intensify cross-Strait hatred.  Only by doing 
this can cross-Strait economic and political 
interactions gradually bring about mutually beneficial 
results.  Taiwan can thereby avoid the predication of 
continual marginalization of its economy and the 
increasing political hostility toward the other side 
across the Strait. ." 
 
D) "Geopolitical Antagonisms Snarl Cross-Strait Issue" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language 
"China Post" [circulation: 30,000] wrote in an 
editorial (8/5): 
 
"The dynamics of recent geopolitical changes among the 
Asia-Pacific region's four big powers - China, Japan, 
Russia and the United States - are likely to complicate 
the already volatile relations across the Taiwan 
Strait, raising the potential of this island as a major 
flash-point in this part of the world. . 
 
"For all his [i.e. President Chen Shui-bian] 
independence rhetoric, however, the fate of Taiwan will 
not be determined by Chen.  Rather, it is in the hands 
of Beijing and Washington.  Beijing does not really 
want to use force to solve the Taiwan issue and 
Washington fully recognizes that.  This Chinese 
position is obvious: It must maintain a stable 
environment, both domestically and externally, so as to 
continue to pursue economic growth and other reforms. 
Surely, the U.S. does not want to go to war with China 
over Taiwan either.  But increasingly, Washington's 
Taiwan policy goes beyond its original legal obligation 
to help defend this island.  Beyond that commitment, 
the U.S. government, as with Tokyo, wants to get Taiwan 
to their side to counter China's rise as the superpower 
in the region, eclipsing their longstanding dominant 
position. 
 
"As such, Taipei's pro-independence government now is 
not the only factor that poses a potential threat to 
the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.  The 
issue of cross-strait security is now complicated by 
the rise of new geopolitical antagonisms between the 
existing U.S.-Japan alliance and an emerging political 
coalition of China and Russia." 
 
PAAL