This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 001897 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ASEC MASS PHUM EAID KJUS GT
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM GUATEMALA (9) 
 
REF: GUATEMALA 1204 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Merger of Defense and Government Ministries - Not Likely 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Late June and early July saw a spate of media 
reports of GOG interest in merging the Defense and Government 
(Interior) Ministries.  According to media and GOG sources, 
Minister of Government Vielmann generated the proposal, 
presumably as part of his continuing efforts to get control 
of Guatemala's public security crisis.  At first glance, a 
merger would appear to solve the Civilian National Police 
(PNC) lack of manpower, as a National Guard would presumably 
have an end strength of 35,500 personnel (15,500 military and 
20,000 police).  The budget would similarly grow to 2,570 
million quetzales (approximately 340 million dollars) by 
combining the 780 million quetzal Defense Ministry and 1,790 
million quetzal Government Ministry budgets.  Another 
unspoken but likely consideration among some GOG officials 
was that a merger would resolve the issue of dealing with a 
military institution that engenders ambivalence and 
indifference in the private sector-oriented Berger 
Administration. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Not surprisingly, the Guatemalan military is 
opposed to a merger for various professional, ideological, 
and emotional reasons.  Burned badly in its last (1960-1996) 
involvement in internal security, the military prefers to 
focus on international peacekeeping, combating transnational 
threats such as drug trafficking, and disaster relief.  After 
almost a decade in its "temporary" mission of supporting the 
police with joint patrols, the military remains ambivalent 
about working with a police force that it views as corrupt 
and incompetent, and is preoccupied with being accused of 
human rights abuses should any of its personnel resort to 
deadly force.  And, the military is dismayed by the use of 
its scarce Operations and Maintenance (O & M) funds to 
support joint patrols at the expense of other military 
priorities such as counternarcotics interdiction or unit 
training. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Human rights groups have generally not made up 
their minds about a National Guard.  Some opposed the idea, 
arguing that a merger would lead to a militarization of the 
public security force since the military members of the force 
would dominate the police members.  Other human rights groups 
have been less critical.  While PNC officials have avoided 
comment on the issue, some may fear being sidelined by the 
military given the police force's weak institutional history 
and lack of strong leadership.  A couple of pundits falsely 
traced the proposal's origins to Washington.  Other 
commentators have noted that such a merger would require 
extensive constitutional changes, a dubious prospect as the 
last attempt to amend the constitution on military issues (to 
allow, among other things, a civilian Defense Minister) went 
down to defeat in a 1999 referendum. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) President Berger and MOD Aldana responded to the 
media interest by noting that the merger proposal was worthy 
of analysis but was not actively being studied.  The 
president's chief of strategic analysis told us privately -- 
and flatly -- that the proposal was not being studied.  With 
only thirty months left in its term, it is highly unlikely 
that the Berger Administration would take any action on such 
a controversial issue.  Given the almost decade-long track 
record of failure in creating a professional police force, 
the GOG should have reservations about attempting to create a 
new security force. 
 
The Justice System Wanders into Kafka Territory 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In a justice system that enjoys only a 2 to 5 
percent indictment rate for reported crimes, and where 
prosecutors face a huge backlog of cases pending 
investigation, a recent court decision showed a rare example 
of perseverance by the justice system.  Unfortunately, this 
particular case only demonstrates the absurd nature of 
justice in Guatemala.  In this July 15 decision, a court 
sentenced former Defense Minister Major General Mario Barrios 
Celada to two and one half years in prison for defamation of 
character.  The aggrieved party in this case was Javier 
Cacacho, a former Army Captain who was expelled from the 
military by then-Defense Minister Barrios (1997-99) after 
being caught in possession of a kilo of cocaine in his 
personal vehicle.  For reasons that remain unclear, Cacacho 
was not prosecuted after his discharge.  Acting on a 
complaint from Cacacho, prosecutors obtained a conviction of 
General Barrios for defamation of character.  After the 
conviction was overturned on appeal, prosecutors again 
brought charges against Barrios, resulting in the latest 
conviction.  Ironically, Cacacho, who reportedly continued to 
engage in criminal activities, was murdered in early 2005 
under suspicious circumstances. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Guatemalan law does not provide liability 
protection to officials acting under the cover of official 
duties, hence the lawsuit against Barrios.  Late last year, 
then-Defense Minister Mendez Pinelo refused to release 
Defense Ministry documents to a judge until he had obtained a 
legal ruling from the Attorney General.  Human rights groups 
cried foul and accused the military of obstruction; military 
sources cited the Barrios case and claimed that Mendez Pinelo 
was worried about being sued by retired military officers who 
were defendants in an embezzlement case.  The Barrios 
precedent will serve as a disincentive to transparency and 
strengthen caution and evasion of responsibility by 
government officials. 
WHARTON