This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2025 
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAIR MARR CH BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN 
 
REF: A. STATE 138041 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 2295 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Bisola Ojikutu for reasons 1.4 
(B) and 
 (D). 
 
¶1. (C) In response to reftel request, post provides the 
following information regarding Chinese activities in Brazil. 
 Economic, trade, investment, and science and technology 
information will be provided septel.  Ref B outlines recent 
developments on environmental cooperation between China and 
Brazil. 
 
WHAT, IF ANY, ASSISTANCE IS CHINA PROVIDING TO HOST COUNTRY? 
WHAT IS THE BREAKDOWN BETWEEN GRANTS AND LOANS?  DOES THE 
CHINESE GOVERNMENT TYPICALLY PROPOSE AID OR DOES THE HOST 
COUNTRY REQUEST IT?  WHO PROPOSES SPECIFIC PROJECTS? DO THE 
CHINESE PUSH CERTAIN TYPES OF PROJECTS AND SHY AWAY FROM 
OTHERS EVEN IF THE HOST COUNTRY HAS REQUESTED 
THEM? 
 
¶2. Post could not find substantive information on the amount 
of assistance that China is providing or has provided to 
Brazil. 
 
WHAT IS THE FREQUENCY OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACT BETWEEN 
HOST-COUNTRY OFFICIALS AND CHINESE OFFICIALS?  IS THERE 
EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION ON GLOBAL POLICY ISSUES OR 
CHINESE PRESSURE TO SUPPORT CHINA'S VIEW ON HOT BUTTON ISSUES? 
 
¶3. (C) High level political contact between GOB and PRC 
officials has been moderate in recent years.  Brazilian 
President Lula da Silva visited China May 22-27, 2004 to 
discuss trade, investment, defense, and other regional and 
international issues of common concern (Post will provide 
trade and investment discussions septel).  The GOB and the 
PRC also agreed to create a China-Brazil Committee on 
High-level Coordination and Cooperation between the Chinese 
Vice Premier and the Brazilian Vice President. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In China, President Lula's Workers' Party (PT) 
developed political ties with the Chinese Communist party. 
On April 23, 2004 in Beijing, former PT President Jose 
Genoino signed an agreement of collaboration between the 
Chinese Communist Party and the PT.  According to press 
reports, Genoino affirmed that the GOB sought to construct a 
"diplomatic, political, and economic axis" among India, South 
Africa, Brazil, and China.  Genoino praised China's 
integrated public administration and said it was important 
for the PT to study what has occurred in China over the last 
twenty years. 
 
¶5. (SBU) President Hu visited Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and 
Brasilia, November 11-15, 2004.  In Rio de Janeiro, Hu met 
with Rio State Governor Rosinha Garotinho and underscored the 
"friendly" cooperation between China and Brazil that has 
produced "satisfactory results." Hu hoped that the government 
of Rio de Janeiro State and Chinese local governments could 
enhance mutual understanding, jointly discuss new approaches 
and trade developments, and expand cooperation.  Hu also 
mentioned that the recently signed Tourism Cooperation 
Agreement between Brazil and China could increase exchanges. 
 
¶6. (U) During a speech to Brazilian legislators at Brazil's 
National Congress in Brasilia on November 12, 2004, Hu 
announced China's new Latin American policy, and hoped to 
begin "a new era of friendship" with Latin American and 
Caribbean countries.  Hu proposed launching cultural centers 
in each other's countries, encouraging tourism, improving 
mass media and student exchanges, and organizing Sino-Latin 
American youth festivals. 
 
¶7. (U) In Sao Paulo, Hu met with Sao Paulo State Governor 
Geraldo Alckmin and held in-depth talks on strengthening 
further friendly exchanges and economic and trade cooperation 
(to be reported septel). 
 
¶8. (C) UN Reform:  Chinese officials told the GOB that the 
PRC supports greater participation by developing countries in 
the international arena, including the UN.  The GOB believed 
that this stance implied support for a Brazilian permanent 
UNSC seat, and was surprised when the PRC refused to support 
Brazil publicly earlier this year. 
 
¶9. (C) Human Rights:  According to the MRE, the GOB and the 
PRC have agreed to "not politicize" the human rights issue. 
During UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) meetings in 
Geneva, Brazil is careful not to favor resolutions critical 
of China's human rights record (Note: In general, Brazil 
rarely supports single country resolutions in the UNCHR.  End 
Note).  In support of the GOB's position, Ministry of 
External Relations (MRE) officials claim they are not 
ignorant of China's human rights situation, and believe that 
human rights in China are "serious but improving." 
 
¶10. (C) In 1997, Brazil voted against China on a human rights 
resolution in Geneva.  This vote caused serious bilateral 
problems between the two countries, and led to the 
development of an annual Sino-Brazilian Human Rights 
Commission.  Since the creation of the commission in 1997, 
the two sides have only met twice, but MRE officials claim 
that Brazil and China "theoretically" hold human rights 
discussions every year.  During these "talks," Brazilian 
officials do not raise specific cases or press for specific 
systemic reforms.  Instead, Brazil shares its human rights 
experiences with China. 
¶11. (C) An MRE official opined in late 2004 that the 
Sino-Brazilian Human Rights Commission was all but dead and 
believed that Brazil could not influence China on human 
rights.  Human Rights were not discussed during Hu's visit, 
but the GOB offered China expert assistance in penal, 
judicial, and other areas of reform.  The PRC rebuffed all 
GOB efforts and ignored proposed exchange visits.  In the 
interest of the "strategic partnership" and Brazil's UNSC 
bid, the MRE will likely not vote in favor of a China human 
rights resolution.  Instead, Brazil will continue to abstain 
on any UN effort to criticize China's approach to human 
rights. 
 
¶12. (C) IBSA: There is some speculation that China will join 
the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), 
sometimes called the G-3, however; MRE officials have denied 
speculation claims.  MRE officials believe that IBSA is in 
its infancy and must focus on concrete bi- and tri-lateral 
projects and unify the three countries before adding new 
partners. 
 
-- WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF MILITARY CONTACT AND ASSISTANCE 
BETWEEN CHINA AND THE HOST COUNTRY? 
 
¶13. (C) China recently sent a large multi-service delegation 
to the Latin America Air Defense show held in Rio de Janeiro 
in April 2005 and a senior member of the Chinese delegation 
participated in one of the show's defense panels.  A 
delegation from the Chinese National Defense University 
visited Rio de Janeiro in late July 2005.  Hu visited 
Brazil's National Institute for Space Exploration (INPE) in 
Sao Paulo on November 15, 2004.  China and Brazil have been 
cooperating on the development of Earth observation 
satellites since 1998. 
 
-- WE ALSO WELCOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CHINA'S 
ENGAGEMENT WITH HOST COUNTRY, CULTURAL TIES, EDUCATION 
EXCHANGE, ETC. 
 
¶14. (U) Despite Brazil's multi-ethnic makeup, citizens of 
Chinese descent represent a tiny fraction of Brazil's 
population, compared, for example, to Brazilians of Japanese 
ancestry.  Illegal immigration and extradition may yet become 
an issue between the two countries.  The majority of the 
estimated 50,000 Chinese in Brazil, mostly residing in Sao 
Paulo, are believed to be in-country illegally. 
 
¶15. (C) Our contacts report a lack of understanding among 
Brazilians, even among so-called experts of China.  Within 
Brazilian academia, only a few Chinese Studies programs 
exist, most notably at the University of Sao Paulo and the 
University of Brasilia.  Academic exchanges are very few, due 
in part to the strong desire among the youth in both 
countries to seek English-speaking programs, according to the 
MRE, although interest in exchanges could increase in the 
future. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The Public Affairs Section plans to include 
questions related to China in future polling exercises. 
 
-- HOW DOES BEIJING'S EFFORT TO CONSTRAIN TAIWAN'S 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE PLAY INTO CHINESE LOCAL ACTIVITIES AND 
ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH HOST GOVERNMENT? 
 
¶17. (C) The GOB continues to support a one China policy and 
reaffirmed this position with the Chinese during the November 
2005 visit.  The PRC has kept subtle pressure on the GOB to 
not recognize Taiwan, and Brazil is not prepared to lobby 
another country on China's behalf.  During Lula's May 2004 
visit to China, Brazil reiterated its adherence to the 
one-China policy, and agreed that Taiwan and Tibet are "an 
inseparable part of China."  Moreover, the GOB opposed any 
unilateral action aimed at separating Taiwan from China, 
increasing tensions across the Taiwan Straits, or leading to 
Taiwan independence. 
 
¶18. (U) In a speech before the Brazilian Congress in 
Brasilia, Hu reiterated China's stance on the Taiwan issue 
and hoped that Latin America would continue to "fully support 
the just cause of the Chinese people."  National Congress 
President and Senate President Jose Sarney and Chamber of 
Deputies President Joao Paulo Cunha stated that the Brazilian 
Congress supports the Chinese Government's stance on Taiwan, 
and acknowledged that Taiwan is an inseparable part of 
Chinese territory. 
-- DESCRIBE CHINESE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS AND EFFORTS 
TO SELL WEAPONS IN YOUR HOST COUNTRY. 
 
¶19. (C) During his visit to China, Lula praised GOB/PRC 
cooperation on satellite programs.  Post believes that the 
GOB will continue to explore opportunities to expand military 
to military cooperation.  Military contacts indicate that 
while the military relationship is growing via 
familiarization visits and training exchanges, military sales 
between the two countries are unlikely.  Hence, it appears 
that defense is not a driving force in the relationship. 
Remote sensing application cooperation will expand existing 
achievements and provide third parties with services related 
to satellite programs. 
 
¶20. (C) GOB/PRC satellite cooperation has been described as 
"very successful" by the MRE.  Brazil and China are in a 
joint satellite venture known as China Brazil Earth Resource 
Satellite Program (CBERS).  CBERS I and II have been launched 
from a Chinese facility on Long March Rockets. Brazil will 
finance 30 percent of CBERS IIB, an interim measure between 
CBERS II and III, and the PRC will finance the remaining 70 
percent.  During Hu's visit, the two governments signed an 
agreement to market the CBERS-II satellite images to third 
countries.  The third satellite, CBERS-III has an anticipated 
launch date of 2008 and an expected budget of US $85 million. 
 CBERS-III will be financed in equal parts by Brazil and 
China.  There are plans to launch as many as five CBERS 
satellites.  CBERS-series satellites can capture images from 
Mongolia to Argentina. 
 
¶21. (C) Hu visited Embraer, the Brazilian aircraft 
manufacturer, on November 15 in Sao Paulo.  In 2002, the 
company cooperated with the Chinese Hahang Group to establish 
Harbin Embraer Aircraft Industry Co., LTD.  Embraer recently 
posted 185 Brazilian employees to China to create the 
aircraft manufacturing plant in Harbin.  This plant will 
produce regional jets specifically for the Chinese market and 
not for any other export market. 
 
DANILOVICH