This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 002282 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2015 
TAGS: AORC KNNP PARM PREL BR CWC
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: A/S DESUTTER'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS MINISTRY TO DISCUSS COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY 
 
REF: A. STATE 141086 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 002066 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 
(B)(D) 
 
¶1. (U) INTRODUCTION. Assistant Secretary for Verification and 
Compliance Paula A. DeSutter met on 15 August with Foreign 
Ministry Officials for compliance diplomacy discussions, led 
on the Brazilian side by Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro, 
Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs (in 
the MRE structure this includes UN and arms 
control/non-proliferation issues).  A/S DeSutter was 
accompanied by Embassy POL Counselor Dennis Hearne, Thomas 
Yehl, VC Director for Technology and Assessment, Astrid 
Lewis, VC Foreign Affairs Officer, and other Embassy POL 
staff.  A working lunch with GOB officials and a media event 
on compliance diplomacy followed.  The delegation concluded 
the visit with a meeting with Nilson Mourao, Vice President 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, of the Brazilian Congress' 
Chamber of Deputies.  Principal themes are reported below. 
END INTRODUCTION. 
 
COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY 
-------------------- 
¶2. (C) On August 15, A/S DeSutter, along with her team, met 
with Foreign Ministry officials.  In attendance were: 
Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro, Assistant Secretary of 
International Organization Affairs; Santiago Mourao, Division 
Director for Disarmament (DD); Manuel Montenegro da Cruz, 
General Coordinator of Sensitive Items to the Ministry of 
Science and Technology; Everton Frask Lucero, First 
Secretary, International Advisor to the Ministry of Science 
 
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and Technology; Jandyr dos Santos Jr., Third Secretary, DD; 
Claudio Leopoldino, Third Secretary, DD; and Igor Germano, 
Third Secretary, DD.  A/S DeSutter had previously met with 
Ambassador Guerreiro in November 2004 to discuss the 
Verification and Compliance Bureau's approach to compliance 
diplomacy.  Several issues were covered, starting with 
compliance diplomacy.  The A/S explained that verification 
and compliance is an evolving concept.  While the building 
blocks and tools of the past still exist, it is necessary to 
be creative in addressing these problems by adapting these 
tools and creating new ones.  It is especially important that 
the international community grapple with challenge of 
enforcement, which is a key element of verification and 
compliance policy.  The international community is challenged 
in a very clear way )perhaps for the first time in 
multilateral fora such as the NPT ) with the problem of how 
to persuade international violators to come back into 
compliance.  This, she argued, is not just a U.S. problem but 
one with respect to which all parties to agreements share the 
responsibility ) and share a real security interest in 
achieving.  The purpose of our compliance diplomacy effort is 
to explain to other countries how and why we assess 
compliance, and why we place such emphasis on verification, 
compliance, and enforcement.  DeSutter walked through the 
Libya WMD elimination and verification process and some of 
the key elements we hope to adapt. The importance of 
obtaining a clear strategic commitment can't be understated. 
Once this was achieved from the Libyans, we worked with 
international organizations like the IAEA and OPCW, but also 
worked trilaterally with the Libyans and United Kingdom. 
This gave us much more agility, rapidity, and proven results 
than would have been possible working solely through 
multilateral fora.   The A/S contrasted the case of North 
Korea's (DPRK) nuclear program with that of Iran, and noted 
that the former country may not be as susceptible to 
international pressure.  Iran, however, is a different case, 
specifically regarding their nuclear program.  The question 
was raised as to how we can reach out to other countries to 
get their help in this regard.  The A/S pointed to Brazil's 
ideal position ) with its credentials ) to serve as an 
example for other countries and reach out to them to help the 
U.S. in the effort to enforce compliance. 
 
¶3. (U) Brazil explained their National Program for 
Public-Private Sector Collaboration on Sensitive Items 
(PRONABENS), which conducts outreach activities involving 
industries that develop activities related to production of 
sensitive goods and/or dual use technologies.  The program, 
which began in 2004, has thus far worked with the public 
sector on export controls in dual use biological and chemical 
address equipment and items.  Plans are in place for a 
nuclear workshop to address United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1540. 
 
NUCLEAR ISSUES 
-------------- 
¶4. (C) The Brazilians then turned the discussion to Iran's 
nuclear program.  A/S DeSutter underscored the importance of 
referring Iran to the Security Council now, lest the 
international community send the wrong message that 
compliance with international obligations is both optional 
and does not much matter.  She noted that Libya was referred 
to the Security Council for its IAEA safeguards violations, 
even after agreeing to give up its program, while Iran has 
yet to be.  Ambassador Guerreiro stated that they had been 
encouraging Iran to cooperate with the UN and to clean their 
record.  He expressed skepticism regarding what the 
international community can do and how to deal with issues of 
non-compliance in general.  Guerreiro also expressed concern 
about: whether UNSC referral would end IAEA activity in Iran; 
whether the U.S. had considered the possibility that Iran 
might respond to referral by withdrawing from the NPT; and 
whether Russia and China would preclude any action on Iran as 
China had with the DPRK.  DeSutter answered that while she 
couldn't predict whether Iran would kick the IAEA out, there 
is a danger that it is dangerous to allow a violator such as 
Iran to use the threat of withdrawal to put all the pressure 
on the international community ) instead of itself facing 
pressure to live up to its obligations.  With regard to the 
UNSC, she said that Ambassador Bolton would work the issue 
for the U.S. in New York, and furthermore that: a) the Six 
Party process came in response to referral of the DRPK to the 
UNSC; b) referral is mandated in the IAEA statute (although 
the European Union (EU-3) process had deferred this); and c) 
the U.S. grappled with whether there should be automatic, 
pre-set responses to noncompliance and decided to leave it to 
decision makers that would confront the issues at the time. 
This would be the diplomatic enforcement challenge facing the 
UNSC on which Brazil sits.  Iran is learning how to evade the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
 
DPRK 
---- 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Guerreiro asked the A/S her thoughts as to 
whether there was cause for optimism in the Six Party Talks 
with the DPRK.  The A/S responded by giving the example of 
Libya's decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)* which shows that a country that has had a difficult 
relationship with the U.S. can still work together with us at 
some point, based on mutual cooperation, by making a genuine 
strategic commitment to eliminate WMD.  The DPRK is a much 
more difficult case than Libya, she said, but nevertheless, 
the Libya case can be used as a model approach. 
 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 
------------------- 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Guerreiro stated that Brazil is committed 
to the NPT and hopes by early next year to resolve the 
signing of the Additional Protocol (AP).  He further stated 
that Brazil was in ongoing discussions with the IAEA on this 
issue.  (Note: The political situation in Brazil, with the 
Lula administration facing corruption charges, was viewed by 
Embassy staff as a distraction from these matters at best.) 
 
CHEMICAL ISSUES 
--------------- 
¶7. (U) The discussion then turned to chemical weapons, 
specifically Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs). 
A/S DeSutter brought up points previously made in the 
December 2004 meeting with Fabio Antibas, Brazil's Second 
Secretary to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
 
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Weapons (OPCW) about the need to increase OCPF inspections. 
She reiterated her concern about under-inspection of OCPFs 
and for the Technical Secretariat (TS) to develop a site 
selection methodology to inspect these facilities to ensure 
proliferation deterrence.  Brazil responded that they have 
not objected to the increase of OCPFs inspections.  Their 
concern remained on the strengthening of the OPCFs selection 
methodology, and further pointed that not all OCPFs threaten 
the Chemicals Weapons Convention (CWC).  Brazil feels that 
the focus of inspections should be directed toward scheduled 
facilities.  Both parties agreed to continue working on this 
issue so that all parties are satisfied on the selection 
methodology. 
 
¶8. (U) The A/S expressed the USG's appreciation to Brazil to 
ensure the readiness of the OPCW TS to carry out a challenge 
inspection, but said that the OPCW may not be quite ready to 
conduct investigations of alleged use. A/S DeSutter noted 
that the VC Bureau is putting together its own "cookbook" on 
how it will pursue such investigations, and that we are 
working closely with the OPCW on how it would conduct such 
inspections, if that option is viewed as needed and useful. 
She cited the example of press allegations of CW use in 
Darfur, Sudan, and Burma.  She reiterated that effective 
tools are necessary to address this issue. 
¶9. (U) A/S DeSutter also encouraged Brazil to continue 
developing a leadership role in the region by continuing to 
assist other States Party on CWC Article VII implementation 
matters.  She also urged them to continue to support 
universal adherence to the CWC.  And finally, her staff 
provided Brazil with a brief status update of the U.S. 
Destruction Program. 
 
US/INDIA CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION INITIATIVE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶10. (C) During lunch, Ambassador Guerreiro expressed 
disappointment regarding the US/India Civilian Nuclear 
Cooperation Initiative.  He stated that the announcement came 
as a shock to Brazil.  In 1998, Brazil terminated its Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement with India in the wake of Indian 
nuclear tests.  He further noted that Brazil's history of 
adhering late to the NPT, following much domestic political 
debate, made any recognition of new weapons states 
problematic for the GOB both in terms of Brazilian politics 
and Brazil's commitment to the NPT.  He said that at present, 
Brazil is evaluating the impact of the US/India initiative to 
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and expressed concern about 
the impact to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). DeSutter 
responded by first noting that detailed discussions would 
need to be deferred to her colleague A/S Rademaker and his 
staff, but that the U.S. was not, by this policy, bringing 
India into the NPT as a nuclear weapon state, but rather was 
addressing the challenge of a nation that had remained 
outside the NPT by moving to bring them into the IAEA and AP, 
and that this could be viewed positively.  She further stated 
that the U.S. Congress would review the approach since legal 
changes would be necessary.  NSG issues would also be 
addressed by her colleagues in the Nonproliferation Bureau, 
which the Department is merging with the Arms Control Bureau 
to form a new Bureau of International Security and 
Nonproliferation. 
 
¶11. (C) Guerreiro reiterated Brazil's commitment, along with 
international efforts, to close supply loopholes that permit 
proliferators to operate as defined under UN Resolution 1540. 
 Plans are in place for a nuclear workshop to address United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 through PRONABENS. 
The Foreign Ministry presented its 1540 report to Congress 
and is awaiting a response. 
 
MEDIA EVENT 
----------- 
¶12. (U) A brief media event was held in the afternoon.  In 
attendance were reporters from three top Brazilian daily 
newspapers.  Questions covered various topics including 
Brazil's nuclear nonproliferation efforts, the additional 
protocol, and the IAEA.  The A/S briefly discussed the 
morning's meeting with Ambassador Guerreiro and explained the 
USG's approach to compliance diplomacy. 
 
MEETING WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE VICE CHAIR NILSON 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶13. (U) Concluding the visit was a meeting with Nilson 
Mourao, Vice President of the Foreign Affairs Committee.  A/S 
DeSutter explained VC's legislative mandate and method of 
operations, using Libya as an example of how VC coordinated 
U.S. assistance to eliminate the country's WMD.  The A/S 
further explained about the reorganization of the arms 
control and nonproliferation bureaus to address new areas 
with emphasis on counter-proliferation and addressing the 
nexus between terrorism and WMD.  The A/S stressed Brazil's 
role as a leader in bringing other countries in to 
compliance.  When asked about the bureau's opinion of the 
IAEA's questions about the Rezende Nuclear Power Plant in Rio 
de Janeiro, the A/S responded that they were comfortable with 
the additional protocols laid out by the IAEA and Brazil. 
The Brazil program is a peaceful program, in contrast to the 
Iran program where evidence indicates that their government 
has undertaken covert activities for a number of years.  When 
Mourao suggested that perhaps the U.S. should be more 
cautious in examining Iran given that no nuclear weapons were 
ever found in Iraq, A/S DeSutter first clarified that it was 
not the USG's determination that Iraq had nuclear weapons but 
that they had a program which was not very far along.  Part 
of the concern was the unaccounted materials in the ten years 
following the end of the Gulf War.  In the case of Iran, we 
are not in a situation where other countries need to take the 
USG's word regarding their weapons program.  Rather, they can 
refer to the IAEA Director General's reports to the Board of 
Governors which detailed Iran's noncompliance actions during 
the past two decades.  Mourao concluded the meeting by 
reassuring the A/S that though the Lula administration is 
going through a delicate situation (scandals, etc.), Brazil's 
democracy has succeeded in building its institutions, and 
that the government is committed to disarmament.  Mourao 
promised to draft a brief report of the meeting to be sent to 
the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the National 
Defense for Security Committee. 
 
A/S DeSutter approved this cable. 
 
DANILOVICH