This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

191755Z Aug 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR BR UNSC US
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER AMORIM 
DISCUSS HAITI AND OTHER ISSUES, 19 AUGUST 2005 
 
REF: STATE 149277 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4(B)(D). 
 
 ¶1. (C) Introduction: Ambassador, accompanied by PolCouns, 
met on 19 August 2005 with Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and 
his chief of staff, to review a range of issues (with focus 
on reftel Haiti demarche) and discuss the Ambassador's 
departure from Brazil later in the year to assume the Chief 
Executive Officer position at the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation.  Amorim congratulated the Ambassador on the MCC 
appointment, while expressing regret at his departure, and 
listened with interest to explanations of the functioning and 
mission of the MCC as envisaged by the USG and congress. 
Amorim said that he is considering a trip to the United 
States on 27 September to address the U.S.-Brazil Business 
Council, but would only go if he could also secure a 
"substantive" meeting on that date with Secretary Rice, where 
he would hope to discuss Haiti and UN reform. (Ambassador 
undertook to follow-up with Department.)  Detailed reporting 
of the meeting, issue by issue, follows below.  End 
introduction.. 
 
HAITI 
----- 
 
¶2. (C) FM Amorim, on his own initiative, raised Haiti with 
Ambassador.  Noting his discussions on Haiti with Secretary 
Rice on the margins of the OAS General Assembly and in a 
subsequent telcon, Amorim said he believed the USG and GOB 
are in substantial agreement on most aspects of the way 
ahead.  Amorim then raised the following concerns and 
questions: 
 
--Brazil and other MINUSTAH contingents had launched 
successful "robust operations" in areas of Port-au-Prince 
over the past several weeks, Amorim said.  In that context, 
he asked about USG funds for civil affairs and humanitarian 
projects that he had been led to understand would follow 
immediately on forceful MINUSTAH suppression actions against 
gangs and violent groups.  Amorim could not cite specific 
information about the funds, but reiterated that the GOB had 
believed targeted assistance efforts would come immediately 
in the wake of military operations, in order to consolidate 
stability and gain public good will. He said reports he was 
receiving did not indicate that such efforts had moved ahead, 
and Amorim stressed their importance. 
 
--A second priority, Amorim opined, was the urgent need to 
reinforce the size and capacity of MINUSTAH's police 
component.  Follow-up actions with the civilian population in 
the wake of military operations, as well as general public 
order efforts and training of local police, are best carried 
out by civilian police contingents, rather than soldiers, 
Amorim opined. 
 
--Thirdly, Amorim asked to work with the USG on broad public 
diplomacy efforts that can increase the international and 
Brazilian publics' understanding and support for MINUSTAH's 
mission in Haiti. Noting the protests and criticism by some 
NGOs that followed MINUSTAH's aggressive recent actions, and 
the risk of "collateral damage" to civilians inherent always 
in such operations, Amorim said there is a need to counter 
negative reactions with a strong message that focuses on the 
assistance and stability that MINUSTAH and the international 
community are trying to bring to Haiti. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador undertook to follow up with Washington on 
the questions and issues raised by Amorim, and then made 
reftel demarche points to Amorim on the importance of 
maintaining a strong MINUSTAH presence in Haiti beyond the 
February 2006 elections. (Note: PolCouns had also provided 
reftel demarche points on 15 August to MRE Assistant 
Secretary for International Organization Affairs Antonio 
 
SIPDIS 
Guerreiro.  End note.)  Amorim said that he agreed with 
reftel's position.  He added that President Lula da Silva has 
also come to believe that a solid international presence over 
a longer term beyond the election and a carefully planned 
draw down are essential for Haiti's stability.  Amorim noted 
that Lula had recently viewed a documentary on the Rwanda 
genocide which had left a strong impression, and the 
president had told Amorim that Brazil must remain committed 
in Haiti and do everything it can to assure the country does 
not face a violent meltdown.  Amorim expressed high 
confidence in Brazil's new ambassador in Port-au-Prince and 
in the new Brazilian MINUSTAH commander, and also expressed 
gratitude for USG support for retaining a Brazilian in 
overall command of the mission.  Amorim did note that 
election year debates and pressures in 2006 may become a 
factor for the GOB in defending its continued commitment in 
MINUSTAH, and hence a public diplomacy effort, per comments 
above, could be helpful.  Amorim also said Brazil continues 
to work on its national assistance projects with Haiti, 
notably a waste treatment facility and a school meals 
program, but that these had moved slowly and were on a 
limited scale in comparison to USG assistance plans. 
 
OAS SOCIAL CHARTER 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador raised USG concerns regarding Venezuelan 
Government efforts to put forward a draft Social Charter for 
the OAS at a GOV-sponsored "ministerial" meeting in Caracas 
on 28 August.  He stressed that the USG will not send a 
ministerial-level representative.  The USG believes, he 
added, that the national proposal coming from Venezuela does 
not merit special consideration.  U.S. and other member 
states also have contributions and views that must be taken 
into account in discussing a charter.  Amorim replied that he 
definitely would not be attending the Caracas meeting, and 
was not aware of plans to attend by any other GOB minister. 
The GOB position is that a social charter, as with other OAS 
documents, must be a product of consensus and appropriate 
institutional discussions among all OAS member states, Amorim 
affirmed. 
 
COMPULSORY LICENSING 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador voiced continued USG concerns about the 
potential for compulsory licensing of U.S. HIV/AIDS 
medications in Brazil.  Amorim replied that he strongly 
prefers a negotiated settlement of the question with U.S. 
companies, and will continue to work with the health ministry 
and others to achieve that outcome.  Amorim did opine that, 
in his view, U.S. companies need to produce more 
forward-leaning proposals for negotiation.  Further, Amorim's 
view is that it is legitimate under the TRIPS mechanism for 
Brazil to implement compulsory licensing given the free, 
public health aspect of its HIV/AIDS programs, if a 
negotiated outcome is not reached.   Ambassador noted that 
this would be a misuse of TRIPS, in the USG's view.  Amorim 
rejoined that he and his ministry seek a negotiated accord. 
 
POSSIBLE POTUS VISIT 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Amorim asked about plans for a POTUS visit later in 
the year, and was assured by Ambassador that planning 
continues apace for a visit and there may be a public 
announcement after in the near future.  Amorim and the 
Ambassador agreed that a two-stop visit, including Brasilia 
and one other destination in Brazil, would be attractive and 
should be further considered.  A visit would be salutary for 
bilateral relations, both agreed, as would further efforts to 
develop joint U.S.-Brazil assistance projects in both Haiti 
and Africa. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment. Amorim was relaxed and amiable in the 
forty-minute meeting, and Haiti was clearly his central 
theme.  His personal commitment appears solid, and we also 
believe that Lula likely considers the Brazilian-led Haiti 
mission as a legacy achievement for his mandate.  Hence the 
GOB appears to be on board with contributing to a continued 
international presence beyond the February 2006 elections, 
but its worries about negative public-relations blowback from 
forceful military operations may continue and intensify as 
Brazil's own 2006 elections approach, and if the corruption 
scandals rocking Lula's government weaken GOB credibility in 
defending a mission that does not enjoy a broad base of 
support in Brazilian society.  On that point, Amorim's 
appeals for a public diplomacy campaign and immediate civil 
affairs and humanitarian projects to consolidate Haitian 
support are real and urgent requests for efforts that may 
reinforce the GOB's position with its own public. 
 
 
DANILOVICH