This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 007361 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER ETRD PHUM CO VE BR SP
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETS WITH SENIOR GOC OFFICIALS AND 
FORMER MINDEF 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 B & D. 
 
¶1.  (U) July 26, 2005, 8:00-10:30 pm, Ambassador's Residence, 
Bogota. 
 
¶2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
 
¶R. Nicholas Burns, U/S for Political Affairs 
Ambassador William B. Wood 
DCM Milton K. Drucker 
Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Political Counselor 
Cynthia Echeverria, P Special Assistant 
Brian Walch, POL, notetaker 
 
Colombia 
--------- 
 
Jorge Humberto Botero, Commerce Minister 
Juan Lozano, Presidential Counselor 
Jaime Bermudez, Presidential Communications Director 
Jorge Alberto Uribe, former Minister of Defense. 
 
¶3.  (C) Summary:  U/S Burns and Ambassador met over dinner on 
July 26 with Commerce Minister Jorge Humberto Botero, 
Presidential Counselor Juan Lozano, Presidential 
Communications Director Jaime Bermudez, and former Defense 
Minister Jorge Alberto Uribe.  U/S Burns stressed the 
importance of progress on human rights and timely and 
transparent implementation of the demobilization law.  He 
also noted the Secretary's keen interest in setting a 
positive agenda with democratic nations in Latin America. 
The GOC officials and ex-Minister Uribe expressed concern 
over Venezuelan President Chavez, including the GOV's recent 
arms purchases and potential illegal channeling of money to 
Colombian political campaigns.  Botero expressed concern over 
the delay and the "lack of content" in USTR's most recent 
reply to Colombian concerns on agriculture in the FTA 
context.  With the apparent exception of Botero, all were 
guardedly optimistic about the prospects for a favorable 
Constitutional Court ruling on Presidential reelection.  End 
Summary. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOBILIZATION LAW 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Ambassador hosted a dinner for U/S Burns on July 26 
with Commerce Minister Jorge Humberto Botero, Presidential 
Counselor Juan Lozano, Presidential Communications Director 
Jaime Bermudez, and former Defense Minister Jorge Alberto 
Uribe.  U/S Burns noted the close relationship of Colombia 
and the U.S.  He added that the certification of Colombia's 
human rights record had been held up pending his report to 
the Secretary after this trip.  U/S Burns explained 
Washington's--USG, Congress, and NGOs--keen interest in 
progress on key human rights issues, and in particular the 
cases of San Jose de Apartado, Mapiripan, and Arauca.  He 
stated that for many members of Congress, progress on those 
cases was key as Congress was considering support for a 
successor to Plan Colombia.  Regarding the demobilization law 
(aka Justice and Peace), U/S Burns noted that the GOC had 
gotten off to a slow start in explaining it to relevant 
Washington actors.  He stressed that timely, transparent, and 
rigorous implementation was key.  Uribe passionately 
explained the need for a balance between peace and 
justice/truth, citing his own personal example of the 
paramilitaries' and guerrillas' kidnapping 17 members of his 
extended family, including his son.  Uribe stated his 
personal desire for revenge against those who had been 
involved in the kidnapping of his son, but continued that 
revenge was not in the best interest of the nation.  U/S 
Burns suggested Colombia be more pro-active in explaining 
publicly the complex and compelling public security and 
humanitarian situation it has faced for five decades, in an 
effort to bring more actors around to its cause. 
 
¶5.  (C) In discussing the demobilization law, the Colombians 
explained their view that the law was the best politically 
possible compromise between justice and peace.  The 
demobilization of paramilitaries was urgent, but peace would 
not be achieved without incentives to paramilitaries to 
demobilize their troops.  The Colombians explained the new 
law would not pardon paramilitaries and should apply to the 
FARC and ELN.  Ex-Minister Uribe complained the law was being 
judged by people who lived far from Colombia.  They did not 
have an accurate understanding of the nature and background 
of Colombia's conflict.  U/S Burns urged prompt, vigorous 
application of the law.  He also insisted that paramilitary 
leaders must be prosecuted and jailed for their crimes. 
 
CHAVEZ A PROBLEM 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) U/S Burns told the group that Secretary Rice had 
returned from her March visit to Latin America and meeting 
with President Uribe energized to improve U.S. relations with 
Latin America.  She had welcomed President Uribe's 
observations on the region, in particular the need to deal 
constructively with responsible center-left legitimate 
democracies in the region.  U/S Burns solicited the group's 
views on Venezuelan President Chavez.  Uribe expressed 
concern over Russian and Spanish arms sales--in particular 
rifles--to Venezuela.  He asked rhetorically why Venezuela 
needed the arms and predicted that one day they would 
threaten Colombia.  U/S Burns recounted his recent 
discussions with Spanish officials on the subject, lamenting 
that the Spanish appeared to lack a strategic rationale for 
having made the sales.  U/S Burns noted the only argument 
seemed to be that the manufacture of the weapons generated 
employment and this was an insufficient justification. 
Botero felt that Brazilian President Lula was uncomfortable 
with Chavez's attempts to overplay their close relations. 
Botero cited the Andean Community of Nations Summit as an 
example of Chavez's bizarre behavior: Chavez justified his 
socialist views by claiming that Christ was a socialist, but 
Judas was a capitalist.  Bermudez believed Chavez was 
beginning to channel money to leftist political campaigns in 
Colombia in advance of 2006 Congressional and Presidential 
elections.  All concurred that Chavez's control of 
institutions was total, and that his mental stability is in 
doubt. 
 
MORE THAN JUST PUBLIC SECURITY 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Bermudez outlined "five principles" guiding the GOC's 
approach, and suggested they could be an example for other 
nations in the hemisphere: improved public security, more 
transparent institutions, enhanced individual liberties, 
stronger social cohesion, and a more level playing field for 
political participation (using the term "guarantees," or 
"garantias" in Spanish).  Lozano qualified Uribe 
Administration economic policies as pro-growth, with an eye 
toward bringing economic opportunity to the lower classes, 
which would reduce incentives to traffic narcotics and/or 
enter illegal armed groups (IAGs).  In this context, he 
stressed the large increase in adolescents and young adults 
trained in technical vocations -- some 2.9 million in 2004 
alone.  Botero highlighted expansion of micro-credit 
programs. 
 
CONCERN OVER FTA NEGOTIATIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Botero complained about USTR's written response to 
Colombian agricultural concerns in the context of FTA 
negotiations.  He lamented that after taking five weeks to 
respond, the USTR paper did not address all of Colombia's 
questions, and arrived only a week before the Crawford 
meeting between Presidents Bush and Uribe. 
 
REELECTION STILL A QUESTION MARK 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) In discussing the pending Constitutional Court ruling 
on Presidential reelection, Bermudez and Lozano were the most 
confident, expecting the Court to allow reelection to stand. 
Uribe and Botero were more guarded, however, suggesting that 
a hybrid decision was possible, namely allowing reelection 
but only in a non-consecutive term fashion.  Uribe suggested 
the issue was like the flip of a coin, indicating anything 
was possible with the polemic and activist Court. 
 
¶10.  (U) U/S Burns has cleared this cable. 
DRUCKER