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Viewing cable 05ANKARA4722, TURKEY REJECTS US OFFER TO EXCHANGE HIGH-ENRICHED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ANKARA4722 2005-08-11 13:07 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 004722 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE AND NP/NE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP TRGY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY REJECTS US OFFER TO EXCHANGE HIGH-ENRICHED 
FOR LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM 
 
REF: ANKARA 775 
 
1. Summary: A DOE team, accompanied by the Commercial Manager 
for the French energy company CERCA, visited Ankara from July 
10-13 to discuss with Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEK) 
officials Turkey's participation in the Foreign Research 
Reactor (FRR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Program. 
DOE Reps. outlined the offer to exchange spent 
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) rods for low-enriched uranium 
(LEU) rods procured by the USG from CERCA for Turkey. TAEK 
President Cakiroglu pledged Turkey's desire to work with the 
US on the FRR/SNF project but expressed concern about the 
number of LEU rods offered and questioned whether Turkey's 
DOE Y-12 energy credits could be converted into additional 
LEU rods.  DOE and Embassy reps. explained that the LEU 
offered exceeded the HEU to be swapped and, while agreeing to 
take Cakiroglu's question under advisement, made clear it 
could not be linked to this time-sensitive offer which 
required approval by July 18 to secure Turkish HEU pick up by 
a ship scheduled to traverse the eastern Mediterranean in 
October, 2005.  Cakiroglu deferred to Energy Minister Guler 
for a final decision.  On July 18, Cakiroglu informally 
advised Embassy that Turkey would not/not participate in the 
October shipment.  Formal notification is pending.  He also 
inquired about the status of the ratification of the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement that the U.S. and Turkey 
signed in 2000. A DOE summary report of the discussions is at 
para. 9.  End Summary. 
 
2. Charles Messick of DOE Savannah River Site, Dr. Jim Matos 
of Argonne National Laboratory, CERCA Commercial Manager 
Helios Nadal, and Deputy PolMilCouns met on July 11 with TAEK 
President Okay Cakiroglu, Vice President Erdener Birol, and 
Vice President Ali Alat to discuss the exchange of 8 new LEU 
rods for 30 spent HEU rods at Turkey's Cekmece Research 
Reactor.  Messick emphasized the urgency of an immediate 
decision and laid out the mechanics of the proposed Oct. 1 
pick-up of Turkey's HEU, including DOE's request that Turkey 
transport the HEU rods to a Mediterranean port to save 
shipping time and costs.  He emphasized that, based on the 
low level of unused U-235 contained in Turkey's HEU rods, the 
offer of 8 LEU rods was generous, with the actual equivalent 
closer to 6 rods.  The remaining U-235 in Turkey's HEU rods 
would be used up soon and the 8 additional LEU rods would 
provide Turkey with a fresh core to last for years.  CERCA 
Manager Nadal said the fresh LEU could be deliver to Turkey 
by April 2006 if Turkey immediately agreed to the exchange. 
He laid out the dollar value of the fresh LEU units Turkey 
would receive. 
 
3. TAEK President Cakiroglu disputed the remaining life in 
Turkey's HEU rods, suggesting they would be usable for three 
more years.  He dismissed HEU disposal concerns, joking that 
Turkey intended to enter the spent fuel storage market within 
10-20 years to compete with western countries.  He balked at 
the projected April LEU delivery date, saying Turkey expected 
to receive the fresh LEU before shipping its spent HEU. 
 
4. Cakiroglu continued that TAEK did not want to use its 16 
existing LEU rods to keep the existing reactor operating 
until the fresh LEU arrived in April.  Those rods were 
designated for use in the core of a new reactor that should 
come on line within 3.5 years as part of a program that 
included upgrading the existing reactor. Cakiroglu added that 
Turkey was ready to cash in a 1984 DOE Y-12 credit for 21 
kilograms of LEU (note: the actual credit is for 4.7 kgs of 
HEU which converts to about 21 kgs of LEU) still on the books 
and convert that into completed LEU fuel assemblies to 
supplement 8 LEU on offer to support this project.  According 
to Cakiroglu, TAEK hoped to start talks with Westinghouse and 
a French firm regarding construction of the new reactor.  Ten 
construction sites had been evaluated but TAEK required 
preliminary design parameters from potential site builders to 
make the final decision.  TAEK's current plan calls for 
negotiations with the companies to begin in Fall 2006 and 
builder selection in early 2007. 
 
5. Turning to the DOE request for Turkey to ship overland the 
spent HEU rods to a Mediterranean port, Cakiroglu demurred, 
saying Turkish transport regulations were very stringent and, 
given the large number of Aegean ports, Turkey did not want 
to undertake the costs and security risks associated with 
such a movement.  Messick responded that DOE would work with 
Turkey to identify the best port, but requested that Turkey 
consider ports that would reduce shipping time.  The ship 
would arrive in the United States in mid-November. 
 
6. Deputy PolMilCouns explained that the current HEU/LEU 
exchange could not be linked to liquidation of Turkey's Y-12 
credit.  The HEU/LEU exchange was a one-time offer based on 
current DOE funding and the scheduled shipment of HEU from 
other countries through the eastern Mediterranean.  There 
might not be another ship in the region for months or years 
and a second offer would be contingent on DOE funding 
priorities at that time.  She underscored that Turkey could 
not be guaranteed an equivalent offer and urged a decision on 
the merits of this exchange alone.  In response to Messick's 
statement that conversion of Turkey's Y-12 credits would be 
contingent on US ratification of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy Agreement, Cakiroglu suggested that a work-around, 
such as the one identified for the current HEU/LEU swap 
proposal, could be identified.  Deputy PolMilCouns said that 
issues related to the nuclear energy agreement were being 
worked in Washington and offered to take back Turkey's 
request to Washington for consideration. 
 
7.  Cakiroglu deferred decision on the exchange to Minister 
of Energy Hilmi Guler, and said it would take time to get the 
Minister's input but agreed that CERCA could submit a draft 
contract to TAEK for initial review.  Messick emphasized that 
the July 18 deadline was firm and urged Cakiroglu to conduct 
the necessary reviews immediately.  On July 18, Cakiroglu 
notified Deputy PolMilCouns that the MFA will formally notify 
the Embassy that Turkey has decided to "wait for the next 
shipment."  She reiterated that Turkey may have to wait 
months or even years for the next ship to pass by Turkey and 
suggested that any future offer was unlikely to match the 
offer on the table.  Cakiroglu responded that, while Turkey 
wanted to assist the USG, it was happy to continue using its 
HEU until that time came.  Comment:  Post has not received 
MFA notification of Turkey's rejection of this offer, which 
may be a result of MFA summer rotations and vacations, which 
have significantly thinned its ranks in the short term.  End 
Comment. 
 
8. Cakiroglu explained that Turkey wants to cash in its Y-12 
credits to increase the number of LEU units Turkey would 
receive in exchange for its HEU.  He lamented the lack of USG 
ratification of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement 
and looked forward to its ratification in order to facilitate 
Turkey's compensation for the Y-12 credits.  He added that 
TAEK had been investigating the chain of events leading to 
Turkey's agreement to deliver HEU to the USG in 1984 and said 
some documentation suggested that Turkey's credit was with 
Westinghouse, and not the USG.  If that proved to be the 
case, he queried whether agreement ratification was necessary 
for Turkey to be compensated.  Deputy PolMilCouns offered to 
investigate the issue further but suggested it was unlikely 
that the credits were with private industry. 
 
9. Following is the text of the DOE Trip Report prepared by 
DOE Savannah River Site Manager Chuck Messick: 
 
Begin Text of Report: 
 
Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) 
Ankara, Turkey 
Regarding the TR-2 Research Reactor at Cekmece Nuclear 
Research and Training Center (CNAEM) 
 
July 10 - 13, 2005 
VISITING TEAM 
 
Mr. Charles Messick, Department of Energy-Savannah River 
Operations Office 
      (charles.messick@srs.gov); 803-725-9494; 803-725-8856 
(fax) 
Dr. Jim Matos, Argonne National Laboratory 
 
KEY PERSONNEL IN TURKEY 
 
Mr. Okay CAKIROGLU, President TAEK 
      Tel: 90-312-287-5723 
      Fax: 90-312-287-8761 
      Email:  okay@taek.gov.tr 
 
Dr. Erdener BIROL, Vice President TAEK 
      Tel: 90-312-287-6536 
      Fax: 90-312-287-8761 
      Email:  erdener.birol@taek.gov.tr 
 
Mr. Ali ALAT, Vice President TAEK 
      Tel: 90-312-284-0264 
      Fax: 90-312-287-8761 
      Email:  ali.alat@taek.gov.tr 
 
KEY EMBASSY PERSONNEL 
 
Mr. Kevin Lyon, EXBS Advisor 
Political/Military Section 
Tel: 90-312-455-5555 ext. 2525 
Fax: 90-312-468-4775 
Email: LyonK@state.gov 
 
Ms. Maggie Nardi, Deputy Counselor for Political-Military 
Affairs, participated in the meeting for Mr. Lyon. 
NardiMH@state.gov 
 
OTHER KEY PERSONNEL 
 
Mr. Helios Nadal, Commercial Manager for CERCA 
Tel: 33-(0)1-47-96 58 86 
      Fax: 33-(0)1-47 96 58 92 
      Email:  helios.nadal@framatome-anp.com 
 
PURPOSE OF THE VISIT 
 
To discuss U. S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy and 
program issues concerning TAEK,s participation in the 
Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) 
Acceptance Program near-term shipment involving the TR-2 
Research Reactor.  Immediate consideration and determination 
is required if TAEK will participate in this shipment. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Turkish Atomic Energy Commission was founded in 1956 as a 
first step in the recognition of peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy in Turkey.  The first task of this Commission was the 
establishment of the ekmece Nuclear Research and Training 
Center (CNAEM) in 1962 in Istanbul.  The first Turkish 
Research Reactor, TR-1 (1 MW), was also installed and 
operated in the same year at CNAEM.  TR-1 was operated 
continuously for fifteen years from May 27, 1962 to September 
13, 1977.   The 32 fuel assemblies from TR-1 were sent to 
Idaho in 1984.  The TR-1 reactor was functionally replaced by 
the 5 MW TR-2 reactor in 1982 to meet the increasing demand 
for radioisotopes.  The TR-1 reactor components still exist 
at CNAEM. 
 
At the time of this visit, the reactor is operated briefly 
approximately once per week, if at all.  TAEK indicated they 
have plans to increase power from 5 MW to 10 MW in the 
future.  Currently, 18 HEU fuel assemblies and three LEU fuel 
assemblies are in the core. 
 
FUEL INVENTORY 
 
The TR-2 fuel assemblies are MTR type assemblies. 
Characteristics of TR-2 fuel and control assemblies that may 
be returned to the U.S. are provided below. 
 
HEU 
Nominal Number at Facility      30  Consisting of: 
                                 18 standard (23 plates), 
                                  1 fresh control 
instrumented assembly 
                                  2 irradiation (12 plates) 
                                  1 standard instrumented 
assembly 
                                  8 control (17 plates)) 
 
Enrichment                   93.3 % 
Fuel Meat                    U-Al alloy 
Clad                         Al 
Initial U-235(g) /assembly   281 standard 
                             (2 irradiation@146; 1 std 
instrumented@281; 
                              and 1 control instrumented @ 
208 ) 
                              8 control @208 
Burn-up                       40% average 
 
 
LEU (Non-US origin/Not returnable to the US) 
 
Nominal Number at Facility        16  Consisting of: 
                                  10 standard (23 plates) 
                                   2 irradiation (12 plates) 
                                   4 control (17 plates) 
Enrichment                        19.8% 
Fuel Meat                         U3Si Dispersion in Al 
Clad                              Al 
Initial U-235 (g) / assembly     406 standard (300 control, 
212 irradiation) 
Burnup                           (see below) 
 
Only two standard LEU assemblies and one irradiation assembly 
are in the core at present.  The standard elements have a 
burnup of about 7.5% and the irradiation assembly 12.5%. 
 
Note 1: One of the irradiation assemblies is a fresh LEU 
assembly.  The irradiation assemblies have 12 plates (TR2 
1004) with tubes in the center for irradiation activities. 
The assembly construction is slightly different from the 
standard assembly. 
 
Note 2:  The instrumented assemblies are both HEU, one with 
little burnup and the other unirradiated. 
 
Note 3:  It was identified during this trip that the TR-2 LEU 
fuel assemblies does not have uranium enriched in the United 
States making this material ineligible for shipment to the US 
under the FRR SNF Acceptance Program.  However, it is noted 
that the FRR SNF Acceptance Program,s EIS is incorrect. 
 
CONDITION OF FUEL 
 
The team did not visit the reactor facility, nor view the 
potential fuel that may be shipped.  From the previous 
assessment conducted in January 2005, all spent fuel is 
stored in the large part of the TR-2 pool.  Most of the fuel 
is stored in two baskets located on the floor of the pool. 
The assemblies in the core are located in the TR-2 side of 
the pool.  The reactor pool is stainless steel lined.  All 
spent fuel is stored in aluminum racks.  Fresh fuel is stored 
in a vault located one floor below the reactor. 
 
An evaluation of fuel was previously conducted by WSRC. 
 
FACILITIES RELATED TO PACKAGING 
 
 
Not conducted during this visit 
 
POTENTIAL TRANSPORTATION ROUTE FROM THE REACTOR TO THE PORT 
OF EXPORT 
 
Not discussed during this visit 
 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
 
The TR-2 at the ekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center 
is part of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority.  There is no 
separate nuclear regulatory authority in Turkey at the 
present time. 
 
POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS 
 
An agreement in principal must be made by Monday, July 18 
2005, to allow inclusion of the TR-2 fuel in this planned 
shipment. Immediate follow-through on allow pre-shipment 
activities must occur to meet the planned shipment schedule 
noting that the shipment has already been delayed to the 
point that severe problems will occur if the shipment is 
further delayed. 
 
DISCUSSIONS, AGREEMENTS, AND ACTIONS 
 
1.    The participants discussed the urgent need to reach an 
agreement in principal and, if approved, actively work toward 
all pre-shipment actions required to initiate the shipment. 
The three primary issues discussed involved the applicability 
of the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation between the GOT and 
the USG, consideration for unused U-235 still contained in 
the HEU that would be shipped, and the schedule for delivery 
of additional replacement LEU fuel from a fuel fabricator. 
TAEK understood that TAEK,s decision deadline is the close 
of business Monday, July 18, 2005.  An agreement in principal 
is expected to be in the form of an email message from TAEK 
to DOE. 
 
2.    Previous discussions, agreements, and actions were 
documented in the DOE Trip Report from October 12, 1999, 
January 14, 2005, and NAC Internationals, trip report dated 
March 14, 2005. 
 
3.    TAEK understands that DOE has an urgent need to reach 
an agreement in principal to establish a shipment of FRR SNF 
from the eastern Mediterranean area to include the TR-2 HEU 
fuel to arrive in the United States in the calendar year 
2005.  If the agreement in principal is reached, DOE will 
prepare a proposed contract and issue to TAEK the week of 
July 18, 2005. 
 
4.    DOE and the US Embassy in Ankara explained that the 
Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation (hereafter referred to as 
Agreement) is being worked between the GOT and the USG 
separately and is not part of the discussions or proposals 
made under the proposal made by DOE. 
 
5.    TAEK and DOE agreed that a shipment may be possible if 
an agreement in principal can be reached, particularly 
regarding an agreement for consideration for TAEK,s unused 
U-235 in the existing HEU fuel. Previous DOE proposals 
considered the unused U-235 contained in the HEU fuel which 
was rejected noting the lack of an Agreement.  TAEK 
understood that the current proposal is not contingent on an 
Agreement being in place and that appropriate authorizations 
have been obtained.  Discussions included Dr. Matos, 
presentation of justification of the quantity of usable U-235 
remaining in the HEU.  Although, it is believed that TAEK 
understands this point, TAEK desires an exact number of fuel 
assembly exchange which is not being offered by DOE. 
 
6.    TAEK, DOE, and Mr. Nadal discussed the fuel fabrication 
schedule of the proposed 8 LEU fuel assemblies with non-US 
origin uranium.  Mr. Nadal explained the estimated cost 
breakdown for 6 LEU standard assemblies, 2 LEU control 
assemblies, the supply of non-US origin uranium for fuel 
fabrication, and delivery and logistical cost for the 
proposed supply of LEU fuel in consideration for the shipment 
of the 30 HEU fuel assemblies to be shipped in the calendar 
year 2005 in a accordance with a joint schedule with other 
reactor operators.  Mr. Nadal also indicated that if a 
contract was made with CERCA prior to the end of July, the 
fuel might be able to be delivered in February 2006, but also 
indicated that April 2006 was more possible.  DOE described 
that if an agreement in principal is reached, DOE would 
provide funding to TAEK to enter into a contract with a fuel 
fabricator for fuel fabrication.  Mr. Nadal will send a draft 
contract to TAEK the week of July 18, 2005 and is considered 
almost identical to the contract used to provide the previous 
16 LEU fuel assemblies in the early 1990,s.  Note: Mr. Nadal 
was subsequently able to confirm the transportation mechanism 
on commercial aircraft providing a better cost estimate. 
 
7.    Mr. Okay CAKIROGLU again raised the issue to keep the 
one fresh HEU fuel assembly with an agreement that TAEK would 
not use the assembly if an agreement to participate is made. 
DOE responded that that was not possible and not in DOE,s 
proposal. 
 
8.    TAEK and DOE discussed that TAEK currently has uranium 
credit at DOE,s Y-12 Facility.  According to Y-12 the credit 
is for 4.703 Kg at 85.6%, which translates to approximately 
21 Kgs of LEU at 19.75% enrichment.  Exact amounts must be 
verified and is understood that this material is not 
available to TAEK until the Agreement is in place and is not 
part of this proposal. 
 
9.    TAEK, CERCA, and DOE discussed that TAEK currently has 
1.7 Kgs non-US origin uranium credit at CERCA which is 
available for TAEK,s use, but is not considered in DOE,s 
proposal. 
 
End Text. 
MCELDOWNEY