This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 002247 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KUNR AORC AU UNSC
SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN VIEWS ON UN REFORM 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 111637 
 
     ¶B. (B) STATE 111657 
     ¶C. (C) STATE 113168 
 
¶1.  Summary:  Austria welcomes U.S. initiatives for UN 
reform.  In conversations with the Foreign Minister and the 
MFA's International Organizations director, we found broad 
Austrian agreement to U.S. objectives regarding reftel 
concepts on development, reform of the Commission on Human 
Rights, democracy initiatives, administrative reform, a 
Peacebuilding Commission, the Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism and Security Council reform.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  The Ambassador presented U.S. views on UN reform to 
Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik on July 1 (reported 
septel).  In preparation for that meeting, EconPolCouns 
discussed UN reform in detail on June 24 with Walter Lichem, 
the Austrian MFA's assistant secretary-level Director for 
International Organizations Affairs.  Lichem has been deeply 
engaged for years in high-level discussions of UN reform, and 
helped create many of the concepts now reaching fruition.  In 
general, he welcomed the initiatives we outlined. 
 
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Development 
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¶3.  Lichem agreed that Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
is not the only component of a development strategy. 
Economic interaction is crucial, he acknowledged.  He added 
that as an Austrian who benefitted from CARE packages, he 
also values private charity.  (Note:  As reported septel, FM 
Plassnik noted that Austria still values agreed targets for 
ODA.  End note.) 
 
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Reform of the Commission on Human Rights 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  Austria agrees with the concept of replacing the 
Commission on Human Rights with a Human Rights Council. 
Austria also agrees that the body should be smaller, that 
membership should be by a 2/3 vote, and that the other 
organizational reforms we suggest should enter into effect. 
 
¶5.  Lichem urged the U.S. to take the lead conceptually.  He 
said only the U.S. understands the concept of integrating 
multiple policy objectives, and, therefore, only the U.S. can 
grasp how to integrate the human rights dimension into 
overall economic, social, environmental and societal policy. 
Lichem acknowledged that the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) is "a disaster."  However, ECOSOC has potential, he 
said, because it is a platform for the integration of the 
various elements of development. 
 
¶6.  In this connectdion, and on a cautionary note, Lichem 
said creation of a Human Rights Council could run counter to 
the goal of integrating human rights objectives into overall 
economic and social policy.  This area "needs a discourse," 
he said. 
 
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Democracy Initiatives and the Democracy Fund 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  Lichem said Austria agrees with the U.S. on the creation 
of the Democracy Fund.  It is important to use it properly, 
he said.  The programs needing support were those which would 
help transform societies into ones in which people could 
assume the responsibilities of democracy.  This was a 
capacity-building exercise, he said. 
 
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Budget, Management and Administrative Reform 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  Lichem agreed with our specific organizational 
recommendations.  As someone who served for years in the UN 
Secretariat and who worked with several American Under 
 
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Secretary Generals for Management, Lichem added that reform 
 
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efforts had to recognize the complexity of the Secretariat. 
He said that a U.S. study of the Secretariat staff many years 
ago had highlighted the fact that the motivations and 
aspirations of international staff members were different 
from those which prevailed in specialized UN agencies, in 
national foreign services or in the corporate world. 
 
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Creation of a Peacebuilding Commission 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  The Peacebuilding Commission could indeed be a 
deliverable for a High-Level Event, Lichem said.  He argued 
that the composition of the Commission should be "mixed" 
among permanent and ad hoc members.  A permanent "core group" 
would consist of the P-5, the chair of the Human Rights 
Council, and perhaps the chair of ECOSOC.  Others, such as 
key contributors to the budget and contributors to 
peacekeeping missions, could participate as the circumstances 
of a particular mission might require. 
 
¶10.  Lichem said the European Union had discussed this issue 
at the expert level.  The emerging consensus was that it was 
necessary to encourage more coordination at the local level 
of crisis management.  It was also important to consider who 
would take the lead at different stages of a peacebuilding 
operation.  If, for instance, the primary focus at a 
particular stage was development, and security forces were 
there to enable development, then perhaps development experts 
should take the lead. 
 
¶11.  Lichem disagreed with our opposition to the 
establishment of a multi-year Standing Fund for 
Peacebuilding.  He argued that it would be important for the 
UN to be able to respond immediately, and not wait weeks or 
months for national governments to make funds available. 
 
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Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶12.  Lichem agreed that the international community should 
not get stuck on agreeing to a "definition" of terrorism. 
Instead, we should "describe" it, and move on. 
 
--------------------------------- 
UN Security Council (UNSC) Reform 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  Lichem said he was pleased that the U.S. was taking a 
"go slow" approach to UNSC reform.  In view of the findings 
of Administrative Science, as developed in the U.S., a body 
with more than 20 members could not manage crises. 
Therefore, it was important to limit UNSC membership to that 
figure, if possible. 
 
¶14.  The Austrian position, he said, is that the Security 
Council has worked well, and that current proposals to expand 
it could kill it.  He expressed grave concern that the "G-4" 
resolution had already garnered support from most African 
members, and could well pass.  He urged the U.S. to take 
leadership for defeating the G-4 proposal. 
 
¶15.  Austria had a proposal which it would deploy as a 
compromise, once the G-4 proposal failed.  It called for 
expanding the Security Council by four (preferably) or no 
more than five non-permanent members.  The non-permanent 
members would be subject to re-election (abolishing Article 
23.2 of the UN Charter, which prohibits re-election). 
Elections would occur two years before countries assumed 
their seats -- permitting capacity building and a "buy in" of 
a larger number of countries into the work of the Security 
Council. 
 
¶16.  Lichem described Austria's guiding principles for UNSC 
reform.  The first is sovereign equality:  aside from the 
historical exception of the P-5, no other countries should 
become permanent members.  The second is effectiveness:  the 
UNSC should be no larger than 20 members.  The third is a 
democratic mandate for UNSC members:  the possibility of 
re-election would make UNSC members accountable, responsible 
and responsive to their "electorate" (i.e., the other member 
states of the UN). 
 
¶17.  Lichem said he very much liked the U.S. view that the UN 
does not have to make a decision on UNSC reform before the 
September HLE.  The issue requires a rational development of 
ideas, he said. 
Brown