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Viewing cable 05TAIPEI3152, MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT TALKS ON TAIWAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TAIPEI3152 2005-07-26 08:12 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003152 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT TALKS ON TAIWAN 
FRUIT 
 
1. Summary: In addition to covering local politics, 
almost all the major Chinese-language Taipei dailies 
reported July 26 on President Chen Shui-bian's remarks 
Monday that China's opening to the sale of Taiwan fruit 
is a "United Front" scheme that is aimed at helping the 
Pan-Blue alliance win the 2008 Taiwan presidential 
election.  The pro-independence "Liberty Times," 
Taiwan's biggest daily, ran a banner headline on its 
front page that read: "Bian criticizes China for 
befriending [Taiwan] farmers and protecting the Pan- 
Blue Camp in order to run its United Front tactics." 
The pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" reported on its 
front page: "Bian: China is helping the Pan-Blue 
alliance to win the presidential election."  The sub- 
headline added: "[China] deliberately bypassed and 
belittled our government and announced the import of 
Taiwan's agricultural products.  [China's] favoring and 
helping Lien Chan and James Soong was one hundred 
percent politically motivated."  The centrist "China 
Times" and pro-unification "United Daily News" also 
carried similar news stories, but they appeared in 
their inside pages. 
 
2. Several newspapers, especially the pro-independence 
ones, editorialized on the cross-Strait talks on 
selling Taiwan fruit to China.  Editorials of the pro- 
independence "Liberty Times," "Taiwan Daily," and the 
limited-circulation, pro-independence, English-language 
"Taipei Times" all echoed President Chen's remarks by 
calling China's move a "United Front" tactic aimed at 
helping the Pan-Blue Camp win Taiwan's future 
presidential election.  An editorial in the limited- 
circulation, conservative, pro-unification, English- 
language "China Post," however, said the Chen 
administration's obstructionist policy toward closer 
cross-Strait ties is frustrating not only opposition 
parties but the administration's core supporters.  End 
summary. 
 
A) "[Taiwan Officials] Must Do More and Work Harder for 
Taiwan" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 
800,000] editorialized (7/26): 
 
". China produces a variety of fruit, which is much 
cheaper than Taiwan's fruit, so the idea of selling 
Taiwan fruit to China is clearly [part of] Beijing's 
`United Front' tactics.  Both [Chinese President] Hu 
Jintao and [Chinese Premier] Wen Jiabao can hardly take 
good care of the 900 million farmers in China, how much 
time will they have to benefit Taiwan farmers?  In a 
nutshell, all Beijing wants is just to cultivate some 
interested partners in central and southern Taiwan in 
an attempt to help the campaigning of the pro-China 
political forces there and to thoroughly carry out its 
scheme of `restraining Taiwan via the Taiwan people. 
.'" 
 
B) "China's Move to Provide Incentives to Importing 
Taiwan Agricultural Products Is in Reality a Secret 
Attempt to Help the Pan-Blue Camp to Win Taiwan's 
Future Presidential Elections" 
 
The pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" [circulation: 
150,000] commented in an editorial (7/26): 
 
". The Beijing government, in the wake of KMT Chairman 
Lien Chan's and PFP Chairman James Soong's visits to 
China, has placed special emphasis on encouraging the 
sale of Taiwan's agricultural products to China and 
persuading southern Taiwan farmers to visit the 
agricultural cooperation experimental zones in China. . 
These moves exactly prove that the Chinese authorities 
in Beijing and the Pan-Blue politicians in Taiwan share 
common interests with regard to the issue of selling 
Taiwan fruit to China.  They also explain the reason 
why President Chen said in public that China's move to 
befriend southern Taiwan farms is an attempt to help 
the Pan-Blue Camp to win future Taiwan presidential 
elections. 
 
"This newspaper agrees with Chen's viewpoint.  Only by 
deepening the mainstream values of `Taiwan first' and 
strengthening the Taiwan-centered identity can the 
island avoid confusion over its national identity and 
pull together the Taiwan people's collective will power 
to further resist China's united-front attacks." 
 
C) "Sweet Fruit, Rotten Tactics" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
[circulation: 30,000] noted in an editorial (7/26): 
 
". Since Taiwan does not place any restrictions on the 
export of agricultural products to China, the main 
focus of negotiations was to be the inspection and 
quarantine of Taiwan's farm products.  But these 
actually fall under the scope of the government. 
 
"Originally, the issue was a matter of reciprocity that 
could be resolved through negotiations by the two 
governments.  But China has set a technical threshold 
and appointed its own negotiating partner.  What kind 
of negotiation is that?  China should not avoid 
officially-authorized Taiwanese representatives if it 
really wants to push for tax-free import of Taiwan's 
fruit. 
 
"Since Taiwan will not send any representatives to the 
proposed talks in China, the duty-free import of 
Taiwan's fruit into China will be impossible over the 
short term.  China may blame this on the government 
here, in keeping with the script written by Beijing and 
the KMT that aims to destroy the Democratic Progressive 
Party's (DPP) rule.  The DPP surely is aware of this 
trick.  The party should clearly explain this to the 
nation's farmers to let them understand the truth, so 
as to reduce the effectiveness of the united-front 
tactics being employed by China and the blue camp." 
 
D) "Fruits Shaking DPP Base" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language 
"China Post" [circulation: 30,000] wrote in an 
editorial (7/26): 
 
". By offering privileges to Taiwan's fruits while at 
the same time refusing to deal with the DPP government, 
Beijing is obviously trying to drive a wedge between 
the government and the farmers, who are the traditional 
electoral support base for the pro-independence ruling 
party. 
 
"For the farmers, their foremost concern is to swiftly 
cash in on their labor and investment.  The government 
can subsidize, buy their harvest, or provide timely 
assistance, but not intervene in marketing.  The Chen 
administration's obstructionist policy toward closer 
mainland ties from direct transport links to fruit 
exports, is frustrating not the opposition but its core 
supporters." 
 
PAAL