This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005203 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER FR
SUBJECT: GOF PROPOSES NEW DOMESTIC C/T POLICIES AFTER 
LONDON BOMBINGS 
 
REF: 04 PARIS 3771 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and comment: In the aftermath of the July 7 
and 21 bombings in London and the July 22 bombings in Sharm 
el-Sheikh, the GOF has proposed a number of new policies to 
combat terrorism, including the expanded use of 
closed-circuit television cameras in public areas, renewed 
efforts to expel radical imams, the inclusion of video as 
evidence in prosecutions, and additional efforts to fight 
document fraud.  The GOF's recent muscular reaction contrasts 
with the post-Madrid bombings period, during which GOF 
leaders assured the public that France was one of the most 
advanced EU countries in C/T work, and no expanded powers 
were needed.  PM Villepin (who had made C/T his most visible 
priority as Interior Minister) and Interior Minister Sarkozy 
have been jousting to appear the most committed and firm in 
fighting terrorism.  Neither have mentioned France's 
oft-cited need to better integrate its Muslim population, 
perhaps because of the backdrop of the London bombings, in 
which the alleged bombers appeared to be well-integrated. 
Rather, they have focused their proposals and public 
statements on security.  The London bombings have also 
provoked a torrent of commentary, including a rare front-page 
editorial by Le Monde editor-in-chief Jean-Marie Colombani 
calling into question European models of integration.  End 
summary and comment. 
 
EXPANDED SECURITY MEASURES FOCUS ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT 
 
¶2. (U) Aside from public statements and the raising of 
France's Vigipirate warning system to "red" (the second 
highest level), the GOF had not otherwise reacted to recent 
terror attacks in the UK and Egypt until July 25, when 
Interior Minister Sarkozy hosted an expanded C/T meeting that 
included police, intelligence and public transport officials. 
 The meeting ended with a decision to advance proposals 
increasing the level of video surveillance in public 
transport, maintaining for a longer period of time cellular 
phone call information and redoubling efforts to issue secure 
identity papers.  The next day, July 26, the Interior 
Security Council (CSI) met.  The CSI is a relatively new 
Cabinet-level body that reports directly to the President, 
and is used to convey the President's wishes on internal 
security issues (reftel).  For the first time ever, the 
issues discussed and the conclusions reached were made 
public.  Key points include: drafting a bill by the end of 
August (to be debated in the fall and passed before 
Christmas) that will reinforce the use of video surveillance 
in public transport and allow its full use as evidence in 
court; mandating that all international trains include ID 
checks; mandating that cellular phone companies conserve for 
a longer period time certain details regarding all SMS and 
phone calls (which implements decisions made in an earlier 
meeting of G-5 Interior Ministers); and reinforcing France's 
work to produce a passport with a microchip that includes a 
person's identity photo.  The CSI also decided to place 
surveillance cameras in all 4000 Paris-area buses and to 
greatly increase the number of cameras in the Paris metro 
system. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The CSI decided to maintain the elevated Vigipirate 
status, which includes deploying an extra 1000 French 
military to guard sensitive sites.  In a July 27 article 
reporting on the CSI meeting, Le Figaro newspaper speculated 
that disclosure of the contents of the meeting was done for 
two reasons: 1) the GOF could demonstrate that it was taking 
very seriously the three recent attacks; and 2) it focused 
attention on the President and the Prime Minister, and so 
demonstrated that Interior Minister Sarkozy is not the sole 
determiner of France's C/T posture.  (Comment: Along these 
lines, it is interesting that the CSI recommendations are 
very similar to those proposed a day earlier in the meeting 
chaired by Sarkozy.  Although Sarkozy's Monday meeting was 
reported in the press, the surprise disclosure of details 
pertaining to the CSI meeting overwhelmed coverage of 
Sarkozy's meeting.  End comment.) 
 
TERRORISM RESONATES AS A SUBJECT OF COMMENTARY 
 
¶4. (U) Major French dailies devoted many columns to analyzing 
the terrorist threat.  In a rare front-page editorial July 
27, Le Monde editor-in-chief Jean-Marie Colombani wrote a 
ten-bullet piece on "Living with terrorism."  His central 
message was that the Islamist terrorism threat was long-term 
and would primarily impact Europe.  He said European models 
of integration (the British "multicultural" model and the 
French "integrationist" model) were called into question 
given the rise of an indigenous terrorism with roots in 
Europe and the Middle East.  Colombani reprised a theme 
raised recently by French intellectual and researcher Bernard 
Henri-Levy, that Pakistan is the "epicenter" of world 
terrorism. 
¶5. (SBU) Gilles Kepel, a noted researcher on Islamic 
extremism, wrote on July 26 in Le Figaro newspaper that the 
London bombings demonstrated the failure of the British 
"multicultural" model, just as the assassination of filmmaker 
Theo Van Gogh did the same for the similar Dutch 
"multicultural" model.  The key problem with the model, said 
Kepel, was that the UK and Dutch governments allowed imams 
and other purveyors of radical discourse to exert social 
control over Muslim communities.  (Comment: Although Kepel 
did not cite the more interventionist French model as a 
counter-example, it was clear from the context that he 
considered the French model to be more successful in 
identifying the first signs of terrorist planning.  With 
their nation-wide network of police and intelligence 
agencies, especially the RG (France's police intelligence 
agency) and the DST (France's internal security service), the 
GOF model focuses heavily on the surveillance and monitoring 
of communities it considers at risk.  However, this aspect of 
the French model is rarely discussed or reported in French 
press.  End comment.) 
STAPLETON