This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  BRATISLAVA 000537 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR DRL/IL 
DOL FOR ILAB 
INFO ADDRESSEES FOR LABOR OFFICERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ELAB LO
SUBJECT: UNION LEADERS ON PARTNERSHIP WITH SMER, DECLINING 
POPULARITY, AND DISTRUST OF REFORMS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOT FOR INTERNET 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Slovakia's Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KOZ) has lost nearly half of its membership since 1993, and 
its leadership is both upset and threatened by recent 
government economic reforms.  During a recent meeting with 
Poloffs, KOZ leaders discussed their decision to work 
closely with opposition political party Smer.  KOZ hopes 
that Smer's high polling numbers will translate into 
favorable results in the 2006 parliamentary elections, and 
that having more "friends" in parliament will allow them to 
better protect their interpretation of worker's rights (an 
interpretation at odds in some ways with EU labor 
standards).  Meanwhile, KOZ continues to lose members due to 
its inability to represent their concerns and its alienation 
from the current government.  End Summary. 
 
KOZ LOSES ITS PLACE AT THE TABLE... 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In early June, Poloffs met with KOZ President Ivan 
Saktor, Vice President Eugen Skultety, and office manager 
Pavel Lascek.  Both Saktor and Skultety immediately 
complained about what they consider "right wing" government 
actions, which have had a negative impact on workers and 
people with low incomes.  For instance, they cited 
legislation in 2003 and 2004 that ended KOZ representation 
on the boards of public institutions, such as social 
insurance, the National Labor Office, and general health 
insurance.  In addition, a January 2005 law did away with 
the "Tripartite Commission" (the Economic and Social 
Agreement Council--RHSD).  This body included seven 
representatives from KOZ, employers' organizations, and the 
government and was charged with setting Slovakia's 
employment regulations, including establishing minimum wages 
and standardizing work weeks.  It was replaced with the non- 
binding "Tripartite Council," which Saktor said is only an 
advisory body for the government, based on "gentlemen's 
agreements" and with no real power. 
 
...AND TURNS TO SMER FOR HELP 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Having allied itself closely with then-coalition 
parties SDL (the socialist "Party of the Democratic Left") 
and HZDS ("Movement for a Democratic Slovakia," in the post- 
independence period the party of then-Prime Minister 
Vladimir Meciar), KOZ found itself alienated after the 1998 
elections which removed HZDS from power.  Worried about the 
Dzurinda government's plan to liberalize labor laws if re- 
elected in 2002, KOZ made hectic attempts to mobilize 
workers against the government in the 2002 parliamentary 
elections.  Though it received USAID-funded assistance from 
the AFL-CIO from 1997-2000, specifically in the areas of 
representation, voter education, and membership, the 
organization still found itself "soul searching" in post- 
communist Slovakia. 
 
¶4. (SBU) KOZ told us that it has developed a new strategy 
for September 2006 parliamentary elections: court the 
support of an opposition political party, work behind the 
scenes, and hope the party supports the KOZ agenda after 
elections.  Saktor said the KOZ leadership decided to 
nurture connections with Robert Fico's Smer ("Direction") 
party, with the hope that Smer's high polling numbers would 
translate into election success.  Saktor told poloffs that 
KOZ does not plan to use tactics such as the April 2004 
referendum on early elections, nor mass protests against the 
government, as those previous strategies proved detrimental 
to KOZ's goals.  (Comment: They also directly contributed to 
the government's decision to abolish the Tripartite 
Commission.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Although KOZ leadership has now placed all bets on 
Smer, its general membership decided at the November 2004 
congress not to support Smer exclusively, in part because 
many KOZ members remain loyal supporters of Meciar.  KOZ 
then sent questionnaires to all parliamentary parties to 
discuss potential cooperation. Prime Minister Dzurinda's 
SDKU party responded that it will continue pro-market 
economic reforms.  The communist party KSS was more 
enthusiastic, responding that it was ready to support any 
and all KOZ policy suggestions.  Smer, Saktor said, 
responded with a thorough and well-developed outline of 
potential areas of cooperation with KOZ, and a party 
representative has since been participating in KOZ meetings 
(and vice versa). 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The allegiance to Smer may prove to be problematic 
for KOZ.  There is a strong pro-business wing within Smer, 
which Saktor acknowledged, and many of the party's movers 
and shakers represent exactly the upper management types of 
which KOZ is wary. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The political affiliation and party preferences of 
KOZ's declining membership (currently 570,000 people, down 
from 1.2 million in 1993) generally reflect those of the 
population at large.  KOZ leaders are now trying to motivate 
their members to support Smer by regularly preparing and 
disseminating voting records on important labor topics, and 
their analyses of the impact of recent economic reforms. 
Saktor said KOZ leaders would not run on the candidate lists 
of any party, as their prior experience with this approach 
was "not good." 
 
WARY OF ECONOMIC REFORMS 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) KOZ still plays upon concern, fear, and anger about 
Slovakia's economic situation.  Jobs created through the 
government's economic reforms are not distributed evenly 
through the country, and many regions still suffer from high 
unemployment and general dissatisfaction.  KOZ calculated 
that the 2004/2005 economic reforms (which temporarily 
increased the prices of gas and electricity, and permanently 
raised the cost of transportation, health care, etc.) will 
cost an average Slovak family around USD 500 a year.  KOZ 
plans to use these figures in campaigns targeting their 
members as well as the general population.  On the other 
hand, they are against other "pro-worker" policies.  For 
example, KOZ is fighting the EU's cap on weekly work hours 
(48 working hours in Slovakia), as well as proposals to 
close shops on Saturdays and Sundays, as both proposals are 
extremely unpopular among affected workers (Slovaks argue 
that due to low wages, they should be able to work more than 
one job - and thus more than 48 hours per week - to make 
ends meet). 
 
WHO'S WHO IN THE KOZ LEADERSHIP 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The current leadership of KOZ is:  Ivan Saktor, 
President; Eugen Skultety, Vice President for Labor Policy; 
Vladimir Mojs, Vice President for Economic Policy and Social 
Partnership; Jozef Schmidt, Vice President for Production 
Union Associations; Jan Gasperan, Vice President for Non- 
production Union Associations. 
 
¶10. (SBU) COMMENT: Despite the efforts in the late 1990's of 
both USAID and the AFL-CIO to transform KOZ from a 
mandatory, communist union to one based upon representation, 
KOZ has walked and quacked too much like a political party, 
resulting in its alienation from the current ruling 
coalition and thereby becoming less effective at its 
mission.  As its membership continues to decline and EU 
labor policies become more commonplace, KOZ may eventually 
face a crossroads at which it either drastically changes the 
way it does business, or fades from the scene altogether. 
 
THAYER 
 
 
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