This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV SOCI BR
SUBJECT: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN BRAZIL: GOB AND NGO 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 1325 
     ¶B. SAO PAULO 760 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY.  On July 5 poloffs met with 
Socio-Environmental Institute (ISA) NGO representatives 
Adriana Ramos, Coordinator of the ISA Law and Policy Program, 
and her assistant Fernando Baptista.  ISA specializes in the 
defense of indigenous rights, and the promotion of 
sustainable environmental development.  Participants 
discussed the Indigenous April campaign, the status of 
indigenous land ratification in Brazil, and the healthcare 
situation of indigenous infants and children in Mato Grosso 
do Sul (MS) state.  To get the GOB's take on these and other 
issues, poloffs called on Roberto Lustosa, Vice-President of 
the Brazilian National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) on July 21. 
FUNAI is the Brazilian agency charged with shaping and 
implementing the GOB's indigenous policy.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
------------------------- 
INDIGENOUS APRIL CAMPAIGN 
------------------------- 
¶2. (U) The Forum on the Defense of Indigenous Rights (FDDI), 
in collaboration with NGOs and other institutions throughout 
Brazil, sponsored the "Indigenous April" Indian rights 
awareness campaign throughout the month of April.  The goal 
of this month-long series of meetings, workshops, and rallies 
was to draw national attention to major issues of concern 
affecting indigenous populations, and to hold the GOB 
accountable for policies promised but not delivered to 
indigenous people.  During the month, indigenous leaders, 
human rights activists, and NGOs including ISA, released a 
"Manifesto Against the Indian Policy of the Government" to 
demand that the GOB create a National Council for Indigenous 
Policies (CNPI) and immediately demarcate eleven pending 
claims (ref A).  The manifesto condemned the GOB for granting 
moratoriums on land demarcation in heavily farmed areas in 
states such as Mato Grosso (MT), where soybean producers 
monopolize vast land holdings. 
 
¶3. (U) According to Adriana Ramos and Fernando Baptista at 
ISA, approximately 700 Indian leaders participated in 
Indigenous April events in Brasilia.  Event organizers met 
with GOB representatives including FUNAI President Mercio 
Gomes, Justice Minister Thomaz Bastos, and President Lula's 
former Chief of Staff Jose Dirceu to discuss &April 
Manifesto8 demands.  Ramos and Baptista complained to 
poloffs that the demands presented have been ignored by the 
GOB.  (Note: Some of the proposals outlined in the manifesto 
have, in fact, been addressed by the GOB.  For instance, the 
Raposa Serra do Sol indigenous reservation was ratified as a 
continuous indigenous territory by President Lula on April 
¶15.  Additionally, the creation of a National Council on 
Indigenous Policy (CNPI) is underway.  End Note.) 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Demarcation and Ratification of Indigenous Territories 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶4. (U) Demarcation, or the process to turn land into an 
indigenous reserve, requires that anthropologists and 
surveyors verify that indigenous people have historically 
occupied an area.  The process is laboriously slow and it 
usually takes years, if not decades, to settle a claim. At 
ISA, Ramos and Baptista told poloffs that many indigenous 
lands are floating in legal limbo between the demarcation and 
ratification stages.  Due to insufficient funding, much of 
the anthropological research required to ratify reservations 
remains uncompleted, they said.  Ramos and Baptista also told 
poloffs that the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has played an 
antagonistic role in the demarcation process.  According to 
Ramos and Baptista, the MOJ has purposely delayed decrees 
recognizing indigenous lands due to pressure from local 
politicians. 
 
¶5. (U) FUNAI Vice-President Lustosa dismissed this claim as 
naive, and explained to poloffs that the ratification process 
is not as simple as some imagine.  Instead, it is complicated 
by the intervention of interested parties such as ranchers, 
land owners, and agribusinesses -* some of whom have bona 
fide claims to the land they occupy, he explained.  Because 
of the legal complexities involved, the GOB has adopted a 
cautious approach to ratifying indigenous territories.  The 
GOB considers all legal ramifications before making a 
decision to avoid reversing decisions later due to court 
injunctions, Lustosa said.  Despite the GOB's cautious 
policy, Lustosa maintained that the GOB has not fallen behind 
on land demarcations and ratifications, citing 54 indigenous 
territories that have been officially recognized during 
Lula's Presidency. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
RAPOSA SERRA DO SOL RESERVATION 
------------------------------- 
¶6. (U) Raposa Serra do Sol, an indigenous reserve in Roraima 
state in northern Brazil, is comprised of 1,743 million 
hectares and around 16,000 indigenous people living in 164 
different indigenous villages.  On April 15, President Lula 
ratified Raposa Serra do Sol as an indigenous territory and 
ended one of the most turbulent demarcation processes in 
Brazilian history.  For over 30 years, a number of indigenous 
groups have struggled with local politicians and ranchers for 
rights to the land.  The demarcation process has been delayed 
significantly due to court proceedings, widespread violence, 
and political campaigning from those opposed to the 
demarcation process. The Roraima state government and the 
Brazilian Armed Forces created the Uiramuta municipality, the 
Monte Roraima National Park, and an Army platoon within the 
area.  State representatives allegedly promoted the creation 
of this municipality to slow the Raposa Serra do Sol 
demarcation process. 
 
¶7. (U) Ramos and Baptista skeptically downplayed the 
presidential decree that ratified the area as a publicity 
stunt designed to sideline the GOB's indigenous policy 
detractors.  Although the reservation was ratified as one 
continuous area, the two believed that not including the 
Uiramuta municipality was a grave error.  Ramos and Baptista 
fear that this settlement will serve as a rallying base for 
all of those that actively seek to block the ratification of 
Raposa Serra do Sol. 
 
¶8. (U) FUNAI Vice-President Lustosa maintained that Uiramuta 
presents no threat to the ratification process of Raposa 
Serra do Sol.  Lustosa conversely contended that the small 
area of Uiramuta, lightly populated mainly by indigenous 
people, will serve as a convenient industrial outpost for the 
region.  He also projected that, as in similar territories, 
Uiramuta will be absorbed by neighboring indigenous 
populations.  When asked when the ratification process for 
Raposa Serra do Sol would be completed, Lustosa could not 
guarantee that it would be finished by the end of President 
Lula's mandate. 
 
 
----------------------- 
INDIGENOUS MALNUTRITION 
----------------------- 
¶9. (U) When questioned about the ongoing problem of 
malnutrition in Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) state (ref B), 
principally amongst infants in the Dourados municipality, 
FUNAI Vice-President Lustosa revealed that the GOB has 
adopted a new plan to combat hunger in MS by creating four 
additional indigenous territories surrounding Dourados. 
Dourados is home to the Guarani-Kaiowa Indians and has the 
most publicized incidence of indigenous infant mortality in 
Brazil.  The GOB hopes that this new plan will provide local 
indigenous populations access to more arable land.  In the 
meantime, FUNAI has partnered with the National Health 
Foundation (FUNASA), the Civil Defense, and the National 
Supply Company (CONAB) to provide food aid to 2,500 native 
Brazilians suffering from malnutrition in MS. 
 
¶10. (U) Dourados is not the only municipality in Brazil that 
has serious problems with indigenous infant mortality.  A 
2005 study conducted by FUNASA cited other areas where 
mortality indices are actually worse.  In indigenous 
communities in the states of Acre, Mato Grosso, and Para, 
indices of infant mortality per 1,000 has reached 115.4, 
133.8, and 101.85 respectively.  The study cites a lack of 
land access as the leading contributor of infant death, 
followed by poor sanitation.  Despite the alarming 
statistics, the Director of FUNASA's Indigenous Health 
Department, Alexandre Padilha, believes that the national 
indices of indigenous infant mortality have been steadily 
declining in the last few years.  The ratio has fallen from 
74.6 in 2000 to 47.4 in 2004. 
 
 
------------- 
FUNAI IN FLUX 
------------- 
¶11. (U) FUNAI Vice-President Lustosa openly described the 
various GOB initiatives underway to improve indigenous policy 
management and delivery.  As part of its push to 
&restructure,8 FUNAI is promoting the creation of a 
National Council of Indigenous Policy (CNPI) which would 
serve as an independent GOB agency to oversee and coordinate 
the myriad of indigenous governmental programs.  If 
implemented, CNPI could transform indigenous policy making 
into a more inclusive process by uniting indigenous leaders 
and civil society organizations under the leadership umbrella 
of FUNAI.  Creation of the CNPI is well underway with 
regional forums that are being held across Brazil to nominate 
representatives for a national conference to be hosted in 
Brasilia in April 2006.  It is expected that some 800 Indian 
leaders will gather at this event to deliberate on the 
formation of the CNPI. 
 
 
------------------------ 
WHAT,S WRONG WITH FUNAI? 
------------------------ 
¶12. (U) FUNAI has a troubled history that predates its 1967 
inception.  FUNAI was created in 1967 to replace the Indian 
Protection Service (SPI) which was dissolved due to 
institutional corruption.  Throughout the years FUNAI has 
been loudly criticized, and has subsequently had many of its 
duties expropriated.  For example, in 1999 FUNAI relinquished 
its responsibilities for indigenous health to the National 
Health Foundation (FUNASA), in the Brazilian Ministry of 
Health.  To provide better educational resources to Indian 
communities, responsibilities were likewise transferred from 
FUNAI to the Brazilian Ministry of Education (MOE). 
 
¶13. (U) When asked about FUNAI's troubles, FUNAI 
Vice-President Lustosa spoke candidly and listed FUNAI's 
three main problems.  Lustosa cited budgetary constraints as 
the number one concern.  FUNAI's policy latitude is severely 
constrained by its meager annual budget of R$107 million 
(Note: One can observe firsthand FUNAI's budgetary malaise 
reflected in the poor upkeep of its headquarters.  Poloffs 
played &guess the floor8 on the elevator ride up to the 
executive suite because half of the buttons were not marked. 
Although cosmetically peppered with works of art, the drab 
walls of FUNAI also spoke of years of institutional neglect. 
End Note.).  To make matters worse, a number of FUNAI 
employees went on strike recently to demand better employment 
benefits.  FUNAI employees are now advocating the 
implementation of the FUNAI Careers and Appointments Plan 
(PCCS), which seeks foremost to provide FUNAI professionals 
with an organized career track.  Lustosa cited FUNAI's 
sometimes nebulous role in the indigenous policy making 
network as the third problem area.  To combat this ambiguity, 
FUNAI is being restructured to consolidate its lead 
authoritative position vis-a-vis indigenous policy.  The 
creation of the National Council of Indigenous Policy (CNPI) 
will not dilute its power, but enhance its overarching 
governability, contends Lustosa. 
 
LINEHAN