Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05BAGHDAD3110, MEDIA REACTION: IRAQ SECURITY, U.S. AMBASSADOR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05BAGHDAD3110.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BAGHDAD3110 2005-07-27 12:46 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003110 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR/R/MR, NEA/PPD, NEA/PPA, NEA/AGS, INR/IZ, INR/P 
 
E.0. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO IZ
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: IRAQ SECURITY, U.S. AMBASSADOR 
POLITICS; BAGHDAD 
 
 
1. SUMMARY: The major themes in the daily newspapers on July 
27 were the new security plan, drafting the constitution, 
the constitutional committee's preparations for the 
referendum, and the developments of the security situation. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
----------------- 
 
A. "Notes for Zalmay Khalilzad" (Al-Ittihad, 7/27) 
B. "New security plan. but" (Ad-Dustoor, 7/27) 
 
---------------------- 
SELECTED COMMENTARIES 
---------------------- 
 
A. "Notes for Zalmay Khalilzad" (7/27) 
 
Al-Ittihad (affiliated with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led 
by Jalal Talabani) published a fifth-page editorial by 
Faryad Rawanduzi about the new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq: 
 
"When President Bush sent Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to 
Iraq to run one of the largest embassies in the world, he 
did a very good thing for the Iraqi people.  This 
Ambassador, unlike the last one Bush sent to us, is equal to 
the task.  This Ambassador has a huge job ahead of him.  He 
must help the Iraq people rebuild their country and their 
souls.  Plus, he must help his own countrymen clean up the 
mess they have made out of their Middle Eastern project - 
Iraq. 
 
Although Negroponte was seen by many as at least qualified 
to deal with the problems of Iraq - Khalilzad is like us. 
He is an American man with Eastern features and Eastern 
blood.  One can only hope that his mother gave him enough 
Eastern sensibility to carry him through his time here. 
He will need it. 
 
There are other differences between Khalilzad and 
Negroponte.  Ambassador Khalilzad knows many Iraqi leaders, 
including President Jalal Al-Talabani and he knows them 
well.  Most importantly, he knew them when they were 
opposition leaders working against despot president Saddam 
Hussein. He understands their problems because he talked to 
them personally.  Negroponte only knows the issues because 
he talked to the CIA and the State Department and read their 
reports. 
 
How can the new Ambassador succeed in Iraq?  First he must 
identify all of his predecessor's mistakes. Then he 
shoulddevelop two plans - one for reconstruction, and one 
for security.  The reconstruction plan should be a 
reasonable road map for rebuilding the country.  It should 
also guarantee that reconstruction money is spent wisely. 
Spending the money wisely will help restore the good 
reputation of the United States with the Iraqi people. 
 
The other plan must deal with security.  The Ambassador's 
new plan should not be like other plans that were designed 
to save Iraqi citizens from terrorists by pretending to be 
terrorists themselves.  Capable people who have the strength 
to rid Iraq of terrorists should write this plan. 
 
The current American plan for dealing with security involves 
a mixture of military and civilian administration.  It is 
not working.  The Americans do not understand the situation 
in Iraq and I think Paul Bremer is responsible for this 
American confusion.  Iraqis have lost confidence in American 
policies because of the inconsistent way Americans have 
dealt with their friends and enemies. 
 
The military style in addressing the security situation 
involves a heavy-handed approach, and it is this approach 
that has turned Iraqi friendship into hatred toward 
Americans. 
 
As long as the U.S. Administration maintains its forces in 
Iraq, Khalilzad has another mission.  He must consider how 
to redistribute the military throughout the country and how 
to improve their behavior.  For example, he might decide to 
keep the soldiers out of the cities and order them to treat 
innocent civilians with more respect. 
 
The United States government with the help of Ambassador 
Khalilzad needs to restore mutual trust between the Iraqi 
people and U.S. forces.  This trust needs to be earned.  It 
will be very difficult to achieve until there is a new 
strategy for the U.S. forces to leave Iraq." 
 
B. "New security plan. but" (7/27) 
 
Ad-Dustoor (independent) published a front-page editorial by 
Bassem Al-Sheikh about the new security plan: 
 
"The new security plan, written by the Ministries of Defense 
and the Interior, has been approved by the Presidency 
Council, headed by President Jalal Al-Talabani. 
After it was approved, the National Assembly, the 
Presidential Council, and the cabinet, led by Prime Minister 
Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, met to discuss the new plan.  It seems 
like the only people left out of this process were the Iraqi 
people themselves.  We know nothing about this new security 
plan. 
 
This entire process occurred right before the Constitutional 
Committee's final deadline for submitting the draft of the 
permanent constitution.  The fact that there is a new 
security plan confirms our suspicions that the former 
security plan was not working.  Its programs did not cut 
down on the amount of terrorist attacks targeting the Iraqi 
people, let alone end the attacks all together.  Perhaps the 
new plan will be better.  We, the Iraqi people, don't know 
because no one has bothered talk to us. 
 
The existence of the new plan does say one thing loud and 
clear.  It tells us that the Prime Minister was not able to 
protect his people.  This is why the President's council had 
to get involved. This sounds like a good idea. However, such 
involvement will only work if all parties involved are truly 
interested in protecting the people and not just furthering 
their own careers. 
 
We don't believe that the people involved have ever been 
truly committed to re-establishing peace.  Perhaps if they 
had committed themselves to this cause Iraqis would not 
still be dying in terrorist attacks. 
 
However, what people did or did not intend to do is not our 
concern.  Our concern is whether or not we get to live 
another day or whether or not a terrorist will kill us. 
 
The former security plan was a piece of propaganda.  It was 
not practical nor did it end terrorism.  We hope this new 
plan includes information as to how patrols, checkpoints and 
central police headquarters are going to communicate with 
each other.  Not to mention, how the government is going to 
end terrorist attacks. 
 
We hope the new security plan is not just another piece of 
propaganda designed to keep the Iraqi people quiet about the 
security situation.  The Iraqi people are tired of terrorist 
attacks and governmental betrayals, they will not stand for 
any more disappointments." 
 
 
KHALILZAD