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Viewing cable 05BAGHDAD2969, MEDIA REACTION: IRAQ, AL-JAFARI, IRAN, RESISTANCE;

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BAGHDAD2969 2005-07-17 10:14 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002969 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR/R/MR, NEA/PPD, NEA/PPA, NEA/AGS, INR/IZ, 
INR/P 
E.0. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO IZ
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: IRAQ, AL-JAFARI, IRAN, RESISTANCE; 
BAGHDAD 
 
1. SUMMARY: The major themes in the daily newspapers on 
July 17 were Al-Jafari's visit to Tehran, the 
constitutional committee's preparations for drafting the 
constitution, and the latest developments of the security 
situation. END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
----------------- 
 
A. "Waiting for the fruits" (As-Sabah, 7/17) 
B. "Will the government recognize the resistance?" (Ad- 
Dustoor, 7/17) 
 
---------------------- 
SELECTED COMMENTARIES 
---------------------- 
 
A. "Waiting for the fruits" (As-Sabah, 7/17) 
 
As-Sabah (independent) published a front-page editorial by 
Jum'a Al-Hilfi about Prime Minister Al-Jafari's visit to 
Tehran: 
 
"Accompanied by a delegation of ministers, government 
officials, and journalists, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Jafari has begun 
his visit to Tehran. This visit is very important as it 
comes after a period of relative calm between the two 
countries and coincides with the latest difficulties in the 
Iraqi situation. Not only is Iraq countering local and 
foreign terrorism, but it also faces public crises and 
problems that have persisted for the past two years. 
 
We hope that the discussions in Tehran will focus on mutual 
cooperation concerning security, water, electricity, and 
other vital issues. The results of these meetings should be 
beneficial for both countries. Indeed, we are waiting for 
these discussions to put an end to the pending issues that 
have long existed between our two countries. We want to 
forget the painful past that was caused by Saddam's war. 
 
We want to open a new page of fruitful cooperation that 
will benefit the interests of both countries. We would like 
to establish a relationship that is based on mutual respect 
and non-interference in one another's internal affairs. Al- 
Jafari's visit is also aimed at confirming the legitimacy 
and independence of the Iraqi government and to demonstrate 
its ability to cooperate and deal with its neighbors and 
other countries in the world. However, we must be careful 
to steer clear from submissiveness to any country. We wish 
the Iraqi delegation success and hope that it will achieve 
fruitful results and have a safe return home." 
 
B. "Will the government recognize the resistance?" (Ad- 
Dustoor, 7/17) 
 
Ad-Dustoor (independent) published a front-page editorial 
by Bassem Al-Sheikh about armed groups and their dialogue 
with the Iraqi government: 
 
"Does the Iraqi government have to recognize the 
resistance? What would be the real goal behind such a 
measure? What are the possible benefits from this 
recognition? Does the U.S. government's secret dialogue 
with armed groups imply that the Americans recognize the 
resistance? Will this strategy lead to positive or negative 
results? Without a doubt, the answers to these questions 
will have a significant impact on the current political 
process in Iraq. 
 
Some Iraqis hypothesize that the Iraqi government's 
recognition of the resistance represents an advancement in 
the political process. However, such theories must 
distinguish between the legitimate resistance and those 
terrorists that are killing innocent civilians under 
different pretexts. This represents a very important step 
in making the resistance a part of the Iraqi political 
entity. Such an accomplishment would be considered a 
significant and tangible development in the Iraqi 
situation. In addition, incorporating the resistance into 
the political process will distinguish those terrorist 
groups that refuse all forms of dialogue and participation 
in the new Iraq. Consequently, we will be able to surround 
and eradicate these groups. Once this occurs, the security 
situation will be stabilized, the government will not be 
totalitarian, and basic services will improve. 
 
On the other hand, other Iraqis oppose having a dialogue 
with the resistance. The views of these individuals 
contradict with that of the majority of Iraqi society, 
which accepts dialogue with the resistance as the best 
solution to end the current crisis. It is up to the Iraqi 
government to answer these questions in an objective 
manner. We have heard some officials state that they are 
ready to cooperate with the devil in order to get rid of 
terrorism. The Iraqi people formerly accepted this idea of 
dealing with the devil in order to remove Saddam Hussein 
from power. Therefore, why do we not have that same level 
of readiness when it comes to the security and stability of 
our country?" 
 
SATTERFIELD