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Viewing cable 05TAIPEI2527, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TAIPEI2527 2005-06-09 08:31 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS TAIPEI 002527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ROBERT 
PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
SUMMARY: 1.  Taiwan dailies focused June 9 on a protest by 
Taiwan fishermen scheduled to take place this day in 
response to expulsions of Taiwan fishing boats by the 
Japanese government from an area where both Taiwan's and 
Japan's exclusive economic zones overlap.  The conservative, 
pro-unification "United Daily News" carried a banner- 
headline on its front page that read: "Taiwan Fishing Boats 
Gathered Together Offshore Taiwan Island to Stage A Protest 
Against Japan."  The centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" 
had a similar banner-headline that read: "Around One Hundred 
Taiwan Fishing Boats Will Surround Japanese Patrol Ships." 
 
ΒΆ2. With regard to editorials and commentaries, most of the 
June 9 editorials commented on local issues such as the plan 
for a second stage of constitutional reform, the mortuary 
offerings scandal, and KMT Chairman Lien Chan's decision not 
to remain in the chairman's position.  The pro-independence, 
limited-readership, English-language "Taipei Times" carried 
a commentary, however, regarding the possible impact of the 
visits to China by Taiwan's opposition-party leaders on pro- 
United States feelings in Taiwan. 
 
A) "China Visit Shift Balance in Region" 
 
Chen Hurng-yu, a National Chengchi University's Department 
of History professor, commented in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (6/9): 
 
"Both Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan and 
People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong visited China 
recently. As it is difficult to assess the impact of these 
visits on Taiwan's political situation, it is only 
appropriate that we take a closer look. ... 
 
If reconciliation between the KMT and the PFP on the one 
hand and China on the other merely meant the development of 
exchanges, it would not have much of an effect. If, however, 
it introduces China's influence into Taiwan's party 
politics, then the effects can no longer be ignored. ... 
Since [World War II], only a pro-US force has existed in 
Taiwan, together with a domestic ideology bent on 
unification, and this is what allowed a stable transition to 
democracy. 
For a long time, the anti-KMT forces in Taiwan ... also took 
a pro-US stance. Although the many elections have brought 
competition and clashes, that is what kept the political 
movement on track. 
Although the different political parties have remained pro- 
American, none has been backed by the US, and Washington has 
always been very positive toward democratic competition. 
What's more, the political parties have not relied on US 
support as a way to win voter support. 
The cross-strait relationship is unique because of the 
ethnic ties between people on each side of the Taiwan 
Strait, and the emotional attachment to China held by those 
who moved to Taiwan after 1949. 
This is why the situation will change once a pro-China 
stance appears among political parties in Taiwan. This is 
because the parties will be influenced by Beijing's policies 
on Taiwan. China's policies affecting Taiwan will polarize 
local political opinion, intensifying confrontation. 
One foreseeable negative impact will be that new pro-Western 
and pro-China positions will appear among Taiwan's political 
parties. 
Is Taiwan's democracy mature enough to withstand such a 
challenge? History shows that unification-independence 
issues involving ideological positions aren't easily 
resolved through democratic means. It will not be difficult 
to imagine the serious consequences of political parties 
introducing Chinese forces into Taiwan's political arena. 
We must face up to one thing: Taiwan remains a link in the 
structure of the US-Japanese security alliance. The recent 
reiteration by the two countries that the Strait falls 
within the scope of their security concerns clearly explains 
Taiwan's strategic situation. I don't think this situation 
will change in the short term, and attempts to change it 
will have tragic consequences for Taiwan. 
We will see changes to Taiwan's party politics in the 
foreseeable future. If pro-China parties were to gain voter 
support, would that change the current pro-US direction, or 
even lead to a serious clash? Are the government and voters 
prepared for this?" 
PAAL