This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  ROME 002082 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR IO DAS MILLER, IO/EDA, IO/S 
USDA FOR FAS/ICD 
 
FROM THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UN AGENCIES IN ROME 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC EAGR EAID KUNR FAO
SUBJECT: UN REFORM AND THE FAO INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL 
EVALUATION 
 
REF:  (A) 04 ROME 4624,  (B) 04 ROME 4297, 
      (C) ROME 0239,     (D) ROME 0327 
      (E) STATE 025999   (F) ROME 1123 
 
Sensitive but unclassified - please handle accordingly. 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (SBU)  If properly executed, the new initiative for 
an Independent External Evaluation (IEE) of FAO will 
produce a mechanism through which we can once and for all 
begin restructuring an organization that over time has 
become increasingly unwieldy and out of sync with the 
aspirations of major contributor and beneficiary members, 
alike.  It is a major reform initiative -- one, we are 
told, that has never been carried out with such a broad 
scope within the UN system.  The United States plays a 
leading role in the IEE process at FAO, and both G77 and 
OECD permreps are supportive of our leadership.  There is 
extensive buy-in, with an assortment of countries ranging 
from Pakistan and Iraq, to Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Brazil 
joining the Canadians and Europeans to all play a 
productive part in the dialogue.  Members of the 
Secretariat are already exerting a measured but 
 
SIPDIS 
supportive role in the process. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  We expect to have IEE terms of reference (TOR) 
ready for member state consideration by mid-summer, with 
an eye towards finalizing them and initiating the process 
to select evaluators by the end of the year.  We expect 
the November 2005 Council to adopt a report and to 
formally launch the evaluative process. 
 
¶3.  (U)  This is part I of two cables on the IEE.  The 
second will provide a more detailed update on the 
progress of the ISWG and address outstanding issues as we 
now see them. 
 
End Summary. 
 
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Reform Centerpiece 
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¶4.  (SBU)  The Independent External Evaluation, if 
implemented as envisioned, could be the centerpiece of 
U.S. efforts to reform, strengthen and improve FAO.  The 
status quo is less than acceptable from our point of 
view: the continuation of a rather mediocre Director 
General for a third term, the sprawling, unfocused nature 
of the institution, the lack of fundamental reforms, and 
the polarized impasse among member states on priorities 
all argue for a new approach leading to streamlining and 
prioritization at FAO.  In seizing this opportunity, we 
played the leadership role in the adoption of the IEE 
concept at the 127th Council.  We have also taken an up- 
front position in promoting the progress made thus far in 
the Intersessional Working Group (ISWG) that has been 
working on TOR over the spring.  It came as a surprise to 
find that many other permanent delegations from among 
both G77 and OECD groupings share most or all the 
concerns outlined above.  They are now working closely 
with us, often acknowledging the important leadership 
role the U.S. is playing in moving the process forward. 
 
¶5.  (U)  Many of these partners have contributed to or 
are now contributing to funding, as seen from the 
following list of contributions to the ISWG (in UQ: 
 
     Switzerland         43,000 
     USA                 25,000 
     New Zealand         20,000 
     UK                  27,000 
     Finland             20,000 
     Canada              24,000 
     Sweden              34,000 
     Norway              20,000 
 
*Italy has available $100,000 now for both the ISWG and 
IEE processes.  The Netherlands has just announced a 
meaningful contribution.  Canada and the UK have set 
aside funds of equivalent size to the $225,000 that the 
U.S. still has earmarked for the IEE. 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The United States is not the largest donor on 
the list, although other members realize we have 
additional funds available for contributing to the IEE 
once we are satisfied with the TOR concepts. 
Nevertheless, the level of US participation will 
condition eventual levels of contributions.  No one yet 
appears to be holding us to covering 22% of the overall 
contribution (our share of the assessed budget), but it 
is clear that the size of additional contributions will 
be determined with reference to that of the U.S.  Some 
G77 countries are beginning to commit resources, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and we may wish to attempt once 
again to get G77 contributions via a formal demarche made 
in capitals. 
 
¶7.  (U)  In the past six months the ISWG has reached 
broad consensus on the scope and objectives of the 
proposed evaluation, with substantive work by two hired 
consultants underway on an approach paper outlining the 
IEE.  The inclusive, transparent and generally harmonious 
ISWG process has thus far yielded good results from the 
USG perspective, but progress has been slower than we had 
hoped.  Crucial details of the TOR of the IEE and the 
governance and management of the evaluation remain to be 
worked out, but there is a process, with deadlines, in 
place that aims to deliver a decision on TOR during 
September. 
 
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Next Steps 
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¶8.  (SBU)  The ISWG will seek from the June 2005 Council 
some extra authorities to further expedite selection of 
evaluators, once the TOR are agreed.  The real bottleneck 
preventing an expeditious launch of the actual 
evaluation, however, could be the lack of sufficient 
funding on time to allow contracts (which must be backed 
with funds in the bank) to be signed.  Given that 
countries operate on different fiscal years, the attempt 
to gather the necessary funds promptly will be complex. 
For example, a commitment to a large contribution on the 
UK's part, might not produce available funding until 
April 1, 2006.  We would like to contract with the 
evaluation team in January 2006 in order not to lose 
further time.  Therefore, in a Geneva Group meeting held 
June 13, we emphasized the need for member states to work 
with capitals to have funding available in Rome by the 
end of CY 2005.  They took this on board, but we expect 
the process to require continued follow-through. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The price of as extensive an evaluation as we 
would like may be greater than we expected.  There seems 
to be general agreement among regional groups that an 
evaluation should look at impact, governance, and 
management practices within the organization.  First 
estimates suggest that this may cost as much as $4 to 
5 million.  A concept paper to be ready by the end of 
June should greatly clarify the cost.  If this appears a 
valid estimate, the U.S. will need to at least double its 
now anticipated $250,000 contribution.  A total 
commitment of $500,000 - $750,000 would still remain less 
than our normal share (22%) of overall FAO assessed 
contributions.  It can be seen that the initial response 
from countries, even smaller ones, has been generous so 
far, in relative terms. 
 
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Comment 
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¶10.  (SBU)  The IEE is the best and virtually only thing 
we have going that offers hope of fundamental 
improvements in the FAO.  The irony for those working 
closely with the organization is that FAO is full of good 
people who work hard and who harbor strong expertise and 
have good ideas.  But with another at least six years of 
its current micromanaging Director General, next year's 
loss of some very capable Assistant Directors General, 
and the prospect that the new appointees may be more 
under the DG's thumb than ever before, the likelihood 
that the organization will implement needed reforms on 
its own initiative is low.  The IEE will force a reform 
process especially if it continues to enjoy broad based 
member buy-in. 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  The U.S. will need to continue to exert 
leadership to ensure a successful IEE.  This leadership 
will entail: 
 
(1) carefully articulated diplomatic efforts to prevent 
our fundamentally different view on the overall FAO 
budget from polarizing the IEE process, itself; 
 
(2) keeping the IEE discussion within the rhetorical 
framework of "program" instead of "budget"  -- i.e., our 
statements should not allow the IEE process to produce 
any budget expectations one way or the other, but rather 
the hope of eventually a more effective and well- 
resourced core program; 
 
(3) a continued effort to maintain a process dialogue 
with influential G77 and OECD group permreps; and 
 
(4) a US contribution of funds commensurate with the 
USG's more general role in the organization. 
 
Hall 
 
 
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	2005ROME02082 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED