This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002694 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, NEA/PPD, R, PA, INR/NESA 
STATE FOR IIP/G/NEA-SA, 
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPAO OEXC PREL SCUL OIIP XF KU
SUBJECT:  Public Diplomacy in Kuwait -- What "Moves the Needle"? 
 
Ref A: Kuwait 1201 
Ref B: 04 Kuwait 2828 
Ref C: 04 Kuwait 2797 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶1. In the report "Changing Minds and Winning Peace" by the 
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World," 
the authors emphasize the need for our public diplomacy programs 
to be evaluated by their ability to change attitudes towards the 
United States, using the metaphorical measure of "moving the 
needle" in positively influencing Muslim audiences.  This cable 
examines our PD efforts in Kuwait in that context and offers some 
suggestions on what approaches and programs work best and where 
more resources could usefully be applied. 
 
Kuwait a Special Case, for Now 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  In some ways Kuwait is a special case.  Due to the role of the 
United States in Kuwait's survival and the removal of Saddam 
Hussein from power, Kuwaitis are perhaps the most pro-American of 
any national group in the Middle East or the world.  Kuwaitis are 
very receptive to our messages.  We have extremely easy access to 
local media.  Kuwaitis are eager for more contact with Americans, 
with whom they feel a kinship based not only on recent history, 
but also on a perception of the American character as sincere and 
open.  On the other hand, the current generation of high school- 
age Kuwaitis was not personally scarred by the Iraqi occupation 
and we cannot count on them to have the same emotional ties to the 
U.S. as their parents.  In addition, Kuwaitis feel less welcome to 
the United States since 9/11, both in terms of visa difficulties 
and the fear of a poor reception should they go to the U.S.  Thus 
more and more are choosing not to travel or study in the U.S. 
They travel to Spain or Lebanon and they send their children to 
study in local universities (some with U.S. affiliations) or to 
the UK, Canada, or Australia. Thus we have no reason to believe 
that our highly favorable public diplomacy positioning now will be 
automatically replicated in the future.  So what works? 
 
¶3. Key Findings 
--------------- 
 
A)  There is no substitute for visits by senior USG officials. 
The act of visiting a key ally is an extremely important element 
of public diplomacy in itself.  We urge almost every visiting 
official to talk to the local press.  We have very good ability to 
design and place interviews.  On the negative side, it does not go 
unnoticed when a senior official fails to engage with the local 
press. 
 
B)  "Real live Americans" from a variety of fields are easy to 
program in Kuwait and have substantial impact.  Independent 
experts on U.S. foreign policy are welcome, and there is a 
constant demand for other speakers in specialized fields.  Current 
budgets permit one programmed American speaker a year.  It's 
simply not enough to have a sustained impact. 
 
C)  American Corners are great venues.  Over the last year, we 
have opened corners at Kuwait University and at the American 
University of Kuwait.  These small investments provide a 
continuing window into American subjects and can serve as the 
seeds of American studies programs.  The corners are also 
excellent venues for speakers.  Recently we have effectively used 
Embassy staff members to speak on a variety of issues, from visa 
rules to the history of the blues. 
 
D)  There is a continuing demand for exposure to American life. 
Media contacts often ask us for more Washington File Arabic 
translations of cultural, scientific and social stories. 
Especially welcome are stories with an Islamic angle, such as a 
recent story about a Saudi-American woman candidate for local 
office in the U.S.  "Hi" magazine has a strong readership in 
Kuwait and is recognized as effective even by some U.S. critics 
here.  The magazine serves as a valuable resource to Arabs who 
lack a nuanced understanding of American life, and who are 
constantly exposed to violent American films and racy music 
videos. 
 
E)  Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra television are gaining ground in 
Kuwait.  The channels record higher ratings in Kuwait than in most 
other Arab states.  The "Changing Minds and Winning Peace" report 
questions whether Sawa's popular music/"news lite" content "moves 
the needle" of public opinion.  We assess that both Sawa and Al- 
Hurra are growing in effectiveness, and they merit continued 
strong support.  A more news-intensive Arabic language VOA is not 
available to Kuwaiti listeners.  This could be a useful supplement 
to Sawa. 
 
F) English language programs open doors.  Even anti-American 
audiences suspicious of U.S. Embassy activities realize the 
benefits of English-language instruction.  The ACCESS 
microscholarship program, which offers six-month after-school 
English classes for about 100 Kuwaiti non-elite ninth- and tenth- 
grade students, is in its second year and has been a resounding 
success.  The benefits are two-fold: First, the Kuwaiti students 
are exposed to the English language and American culture in a 
positive setting and second, we believe Kuwaitis exposed to 
English-language instruction in this setting at this age are more 
likely to pursue university education in the U.S., a crucial post 
goal and a valuable tool in creating future leaders who view the 
U.S. favorably(see ref A).  We recommend doubling the ACCESS 
program.  The instruction should be doubled from one six-month 
semester to two, and funding should be provided to offer 
substantially more classes.  Post also recommends funding for 
additional after-school English language programs. 
 
G)  English-language instruction, while vital, is not enough to 
reach the youth audience.  As post works to expand educational 
opportunities in-country for large numbers of non-elite Kuwaitis, 
so too must exchange opportunities expand. Post pioneered in 
summer 2004 the ChevronTexaco Summer Camp (so named because we 
approached private sponsors for funding), in which 10 
conservative, non-elite Kuwaiti boys, aged 12-16, traveled to an 
international English-language camp in Florida. The program served 
to introduce these conservative young people to other cultures and 
religions, giving them a new view of the world that countered 
extremist misinformation and hostility.  The program also created 
an enormously positive psychological impression of the U.S. and 
American society both in the participants themselves, and within 
their broader family and tribal structure.  We strongly recommend 
increased funding for such exchange programs. 
 
H) Exchange programs such as the YES program to send high school 
age students to the U.S. for one year are having a very positive 
impact.  Post sent six Kuwaitis in 2003, 12 in 2004, and will send 
12 in 2005.  In discussions with program alumni, they express a 
desire to return to the U.S. for higher education and indicate 
that they have become teachers of Kuwaitis, explaining the U.S. 
and describing their overwhelmingly positive experiences to 
family, friends and colleagues. The YES program needs to be 
expanded. 
 
I) We have had less success in Kuwait with the PLUS (Partnerships 
for Learning Undergraduate Studies) program.  Three Kuwaitis who 
were accepted for FY2005 dropped out, saying that stipends were 
too low and too many restrictions were placed on them (prohibition 
on driving, little choice in schools/locations).  We don't know if 
these problems are specific to Kuwaitis, but we offer them to 
those who are charged with managing and evaluating the program. 
 
J)  For reaching young professionals, the most effective PD tool 
is the International Visitor Leadership (IV) Program.  Without 
exception, all post participants, including journalists, 
officials, and youth leaders, return with a more favorable view of 
the United States and American society and values. IV alumni share 
their experiences with friends and family, and professional 
methods and training gained in the U.S. are spread to professional 
colleagues.  More funding for additional programs, particularly 
those aimed at conservative segments of society with unrealistic 
impressions of the U.S., such as Islamic clerics and preachers and 
religion teachers in secondary schools would have a great impact 
on increased Kuwaiti understanding of American society, values, 
and policy.  Embassy Riyadh's pioneering program demonstrated the 
multiplier effect gained from sending such individuals to the U.S. 
for study visits. 
 
K) In a separate message (ref A), post described its efforts to 
break out of the deep slump in the flow of Kuwaiti students to 
U.S. universities since 9/11.  Progress on this strategic goal is 
slow.  Post believes that the USG and U.S. academic institutions 
are going to need to do much more to gain back and retain market 
share in a more and more competitive higher education market. 
Continuing to improve visa and immigration procedures is critical, 
but more attention needs to be given to systems in U.S. 
universities not only to track the presence of foreign students 
(SEVIS), but also to make sure the experience is a full and 
positive exposure to U.S. life and culture.  American institutions 
also need to spend more time in the region recruiting.  We can 
facilitate, but we can't replicate the face-to-face contact with 
prospective students and their parents. 
 
L) U.S. universities abroad are a good idea but they are not the 
same and not enough.  Such institutions are proliferating in 
Kuwait and other locations in the Gulf.  While they do bring 
positive aspects of the U.S. university experience to the region, 
e.g., high standards, more dialogue, greater freedom of inquiry, 
they are not an adequate substitute for a sustained period of 
exposure to the United States.  We need to work with these 
institutions to promote summer studies in the U.S., junior years 
abroad in the U.S., and graduate studies in the U.S. 
 
Resource Implications 
--------------------- 
 
The most important and effective instruments in our current public 
diplomacy toolkit are training and exchange programs, particularly 
those focused on younger audiences.  These are labor-intensive 
programs both at post and in the U.S.  Careful selection and 
preparation of participants is critical to program success.  PD 
staff at Embassy Kuwait and its partners, such as AMIDEAST, are 
stretched very thinly across our programming goals.  They are also 
heavily involved in ambitious expansion of Middle East Partnership 
programming.  The notion of "doing more with less" will produce 
inferior results and does a disservice to the importance of the 
task.  We need at least one additional PD American position at 
post to keep up with our own objectives.  The additional officer 
would have primary responsibility for educational exchanges and 
English language instruction.  Post PD budget should be increased 
to allow up to six American speakers per year, double the number 
of American corners from 2 to 4, expand the number of IV 
recipients, and provide opportunities for local university 
students to spend a summer or junior year in the U.S. 
LEBARON