This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271431Z Jun 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 004875 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID PHUM SU EG
SUBJECT: SUDAN:  NDA OFFICIALS IN CAIRO SAY JUNE 18 
AGREEMENT POSITIVE YET NOT COMPLETE 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 4681 
 
     ¶B. CAIRO 4360 
 
Sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  On June 23, Cairo-based representatives 
of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) shared with the 
diplomatic corps their perspectives on the June 18 Cairo 
agreement.  The tone of the briefing was hopeful, as the NDA 
highlighted increased NDA participation in Sudan's democratic 
future.  The briefers also called for continued international 
support as the NDA and the GOS coordinated "implementation 
modalities" agreed to in Cairo.  The NDA representatives 
highlighted the status of military forces and power sharing 
arrangements as key issues left unresolved.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On June 23, NDA officials briefed the diplomatic 
corps on the Cairo agreement of June 18th.  Deputy Chairman 
and lead negotiator for the NDA, General Abdel Rahman Saeed, 
kicked off a briefing at which Mr. Farouk Abou Eissa 
clarified details of the agreement and noted many unresolved 
issues.  Citing the Cairo agreement as "a step for bringing 
the NDA on board" and influencing a political settlement in 
Sudan, Abou Eissa outlined the agreement's goals as: 1) 
removing the state of emergency after the adoption of an 
interim constitution, 2) solidifying NDA participation in the 
National Constitutional Review Commission, 3) inserting NDA 
views into early drafts of the constitution (effectively 
giving the NDA a voice in discussions which pre-dated its 
participation), 4) consulting on "commissions" stipulated in 
the Naivasha accords and interim constitution, and 5) 
reinforcing the role of women in Sudanese politics. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Abou Eissa candidly discussed the issues that 
could not be resolved at the Cairo talks, particularly power 
sharing (the ratio of NDA seats in a unified government) and 
the status of the armed forces in eastern Sudan.  He 
nonetheless highlighted the current NDA delegation of 27 
participants in the constitution-drafting process (nine 
voting delegates and 18 experts as "alternates") as an early 
benefit of the agreement and stressed the NDA's role in 
ensuring a more democratic outcome.  He said a "modalities 
committee" would ensure continued negotiations on outstanding 
issues, describing the three committees (political, legal, 
and reconciliation) that were established as a follow-up 
mechanism.  Abou Eissa noted that he co-chaired the political 
panel. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  On the complex issue of NDA military status, the 
briefers called for a national non-partisan military force. 
Abou Eissa argued that military forces should not be allied 
to any political party, but answer to the nation as a whole. 
Abou Eissa argued that the judiciary was similarly a national 
asset that should be independent of the Congress Party.  He 
discussed the need for a new and more democratic approach to 
the "administration of justice" and called for many "new 
laws."  Power sharing is a similarly complicated issue, but 
Abou Eissa made it clear that the NDA would not settle for 
14% of the seats in a new 60-member cabinet and would remain 
"in opposition to GOS" unless given sufficient 
representation.  He proclaimed that the NDA did not have to 
infringe upon the seats promised to the SPLM or other 
southern political forces, but could share some of the 52% 
held by the Congress party.  The NDA briefers stressed that 
NDA participation in the constitutional commission had 
exceeded the original percentage (totaling "over 17%" when 
only 14% had been promised).  This precedent made a similar 
concession in the unified government "logical," they stressed. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  All committees would start work immediately, 
according to Abou Eissa, with the intent of ensuring NDA 
participation at all levels of the government.  Summarizing 
the haste leading to the June 18 agreement, he said that 
discussions had continued until 3:00 a.m., with Egyptian 
President Mubarak slated to host an event at around noon that 
same day.  Agreement was reached to sign a limited accord and 
to continue working toward resolution of outstanding issues. 
After initially agreeing to delay implementation of this 
limited accord until all issues were resolved (according to 
"Annex B" to the agreement dated June 18), Abou Eissa said a 
second Annex ("Annex C") dated June 20 set in motion NDA 
participation in the constitutional review commission 
immediately. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  The NDA, according to Abou Eissa and his 
colleagues, was "satisfied partly with this agreement."  They 
hoped it would lead to a more democratic transition -- and 
were encouraged that the agreement represented "specific 
modalities signed publicly" by the government in Khartoum. 
Egypt's role in reaching the accord also gave the GOE an 
incentive to help ensure implementation; the GOE has an 
interest in "realizing what was agreed to under Mubarak's 
auspices," Abou Eissa noted. 
¶7. (SBU)  Abou Eissa called on the international community to 
assist in Sudan's democratic transition.  "It is all of our 
jobs to push for what was agreed to in Cairo."  Clearly 
acknowledging the limits of the Cairo agreement, the NDA 
emphasized in this briefing the positive direction indicated 
by the accord. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Hesham Afifi, member of the minister's cabinet at 
the Egyptian MFA, told PolOff June 26 that the NDA's input in 
the draft constitution had been submitted June 25 for 
consideration by the Sudanese president and then the 
parliament.  He said the June 18 agreement which initiated 
the NDA's participation in that drafting exercise was very 
positive in spite of many issues left unresolved.  Now that 
this "important step" has been taken, he said, the NDA's 
views would need to be taken into consideration; the 
resulting inclusion was positive, in his analysis. 
 
¶9.  (U)  Khartoum minimize considered. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
CORBIN