This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001578 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SENIOR GOB OFFICIALS DISCUSS HAITI WITH 
AMBASSADOR AND WHA DAS FISK 
 
REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 1543 AND 1497 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 1479 
     ¶C. STATE 104247 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4(B)(D). 
 
1.(C) Summary. In separate meetings with President Lula da 
Silva's international affairs advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia on 
8 June (Ambassador and PolCouns with Garcia and his deputy, 
Marcel Biato) and new foreign ministry (MRE) Under Secretary 
for Political Affairs Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Ambassador, 
visiting WHA DAS Fisk and PolCouns with Patriota and MRE UN 
division chief Glivania Oliveira), mission made ref c 
demarche on USG concerns regarding the situation in Haiti. 
In the discussions, the GOB officials made clear continued 
Brazilian resolve to keep Aristide from returning to the 
country or exerting political influence, and reiterated 
Brazil's strategy that security, assistance and political 
dialogue should move in tandem as priorities in the 
international effort.  The GOB officials registered USG 
points on the need to curb spiraling violence and reinforce 
MINUSTAH credibility vice the gangs, but did not clearly 
share the same degree of urgency on this point. They noted 
that public criticisms of MINUSTAH's performance serve to 
further undermine its standing, and said clear signals of 
resolve are needed in the form of decisions asap from the UN 
on both a mandate extension and the naming of a new MINUSTAH 
commander (the Brazilian candidate, General Tella Amaral, is 
available, and current Brazilian MINUSTAH commander Heleno 
can remain in Haiti through the course of the June technical 
rollover.)  End summary. 
 
LULA FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR MARCO AURELIO GARCIA 
 
¶2. (C) Using ref c guidance, Ambassador and PolCouns 
indicated USG appreciation for Brazil's leadership role in 
MINUSTAH, but stressed that the USG is increasingly concerned 
about a major deterioration in security, especially in Port 
au Prince.  Referring candidly to information provided in 
refs a, Ambassador and PolCouns recounted U.S. concerns about 
expansion of gang incursions in the city center and port 
area, the wave of kidnappings, and increasingly audacious 
attacks that are creating a climate of fear and instability. 
They noted the meeting between Secretary Rice and FM Amorim 
in Florida on the margins of the OAS General Assembly in 
which the Secretary cited the need for firm MINUSTAH action 
and the possibility that the U.S. may be asked to send troops 
at some point (to which FM Amorim reportedly replied U.S. 
forces would be welcome under UN authorities).  Ambassador 
and PolCouns also stressed continued USG insistence that all 
efforts must be made to keep Aristide from returning to Haiti 
or influencing the political process, and asked whether the 
GOB also remains firm on that point. 
 
¶3. (C) Garcia visited Haiti for several days in October 2004, 
and reiterated some views he had gleaned from that visit: 
i.e., that security is a critical component, but must move in 
tandem with assistance efforts that create immediate and 
visible benefits for Haitians, and with an inclusive 
political process.  He said that the GOB still believes some 
elements of Lavalas are willing to become involved in a 
constructive dialogue and should be encouraged, but said the 
GOB remains firm in the view that Aristide "does not fit in 
with a democratic political future" in Haiti.  Garcia seemed 
somewhat surprised by USG views on the critical level of 
violence, and also seemed cautious on the issue of 
introduction of U.S. forces, but would not be drawn into 
discussion.   However, his deputy, Marcel Biato, followed up 
with a number of specific questions regarding USG assessments 
of flashpoints and the potential for a broader outbreak of 
violence in the next few weeks.  PolCouns and Biato undertook 
to stay in contact on developments. 
 
¶4. (C) PolCouns asked Garcia whether the GOB is concerned 
that Brazilian casualties could spark popular reaction in 
Brazil that would affect the GOB's ability to maintain forces 
in Haiti.  Garcia replied that Brazil's mission in Haiti "has 
no shortage of critics" in Brazil, and "even one Brazilian 
casualty" killed in violence (as opposed to accident or 
health problems) could cause turbulence.  Garcia said that 
the situation is not unlike the U.S. in Iraq, and he observed 
the USG is not permitting regular release of images of 
returning U.S. casualties/KIAs in the media.  That said, 
Garcia did not indicate any weakening of GOB resolve in 
continuing its presence in MINUSTAH.  Indeed, he said that 
Haiti (along with Bolivia) remains one of Brazil's most 
crucial foreign policy priorities, as it is the textbook case 
of the need for regional powers to work together in an effort 
to stabilize/democratize a potentially failing state. 
 
FOREIGN MINISTRY U/S FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ANTONIO DE AGUIAR 
PATRIOTA 
 
¶5. (C) WHA DAS Dan Fisk,in Brasilia with the U.S. Global 
Forum IV delegation (see septels) and accompanied by 
Ambassador Danilovich and PolCounselor, called on newly 
appointed Under Secretary for Political Affairs Antonio de 
Aguiar Patriota on 10 June to discuss Haiti. (Note: Patriota 
assumed his new duties on 10 June and was previously chief of 
staff to FM Amorim. End note.)  Using ref c points, Fisk 
emphasized that the USG is grateful for Brazil's leadership 
in MINUSTAH, but expressed USG concern about growing 
violence, saying that the gangs are "losing their fear" of 
international PKO forces, creating violent instability and 
conditions for Aristide to exert his influence. He asked for 
GOB views on how the international community could keep 
Aristide out of Haitian affairs and assist MINUSTAH in 
reestablishing credibility. 
 
¶6. (C) Patriota acknowledged that the situation on the ground 
had become less stable in recent weeks, but opined that 
violence appears to be "cyclical" in Haiti, with spikes and 
lulls.  He understood that there are concerns being expressed 
that MINUSTAH has not been sufficiently robust, but also 
observed -- and repeated -- that such criticisms, when made 
publicly, can further undermine the force's credibility. 
(Note: Ambassador and DAS Fisk replied that there was little 
that could be done about negative media reports on MINUSTAH. 
End note.) Patriota also said it is important to send other 
clear signals of consistency and resolve, and in this context 
the GOB hopes UNSC and UN DPKO can arrive asap on decisions 
and announcements on both a 12 month mandate extension and a 
new MINUSTAH military commander.  On the latter point, 
Patriota noted that FM Amorim had spoken by phone with SG 
Annan in the past few days.  Patriota confirmed Brazil has a 
candidate ready, Brazilian Army three-star General Tella 
Amaral, who currently heads Brazilian army intelligence. 
Current MINUSTAH commander Heleno is available to remain 
throughout the technical rollover of the mandate, Patriota 
affirmed, adding that Brazil, as the main troop contributor, 
would expect to retain overall military command in a new 
mandate. 
 
¶7. (C) On Aristide, Patriota said that the mere fact of 
Aristide's existence will always be problematic in terms of 
his influence on some elements of Haitian society, however 
much the international community works to isolate him.  That 
said, the GOB had been encouraged by recent South African 
Government commitments to Brazil that the GSA would not allow 
Aristide to use his exile there to undertake political 
efforts (NFI).  It always remains important to include in 
political dialogue those elements of Lavalas that are willing 
to "leave Aristide behind them," Patriota said.  Patriota and 
Fisk agreed that accelerating and enhancing assistance 
projects that have direct impact on Haitians remains a key 
priority, and that the GOB and U.S. should work together in 
this.  Patriota observed that Brazil has 10 assistance 
projects underway, in cooperation with IFI's, other countries 
or on its own. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment. Neither Garcia nor Patriota seemed seized 
with the same degree of urgency on the security situation in 
Haiti as the USG, as reflected in refs a and c.  That said, 
we believe they will take our points into careful account and 
weigh them in the context of the Secretary's conversation 
with FM Amorim at the OAS GA and new information being 
brought back to Brasilia from Haiti this weekend by MRE envoy 
Goncalo Mourao.  For now, the GOB seems committed to its 
long-stated strategy: pursuing, in tandem, security, 
assistance and political dialogue as requisites for elections 
and stability, with a Brazilian in command of MINUSTAH. 
 
Danilovich