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Viewing cable 05TAIPEI2118, POLLING FOR EFFECT: EYE INTO TAIWAN POLITICS AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TAIPEI2118 2005-05-11 03:23 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT:  POLLING FOR EFFECT: EYE INTO TAIWAN POLITICS AND 
CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
REF: A. 2004 TAIPEI 0345 
     B. 2004 TAIPEI 3771 
     C. TAIPEI 2076 
 
1.  Summary.  Lien Chan visited Mainland China April 26-May 
2, and James Soong is currently visiting, both with near 
unanimous endorsement from "Blue" (KMT and PFP) voters and 
considerable support from neutral, and even a slice of 
"Green" (DPP), voters.  Support for Lien,s trip actually 
increased over the course of his visit, reflecting widespread 
support in Taiwan for engagement with Mainland China to 
reduce cross-Strait tensions, even as Taiwan voters remain 
peeved by Beijing,s Anti-Secession Law and threat to use 
&non-peaceful means.8 
 
2.  Taiwan,s vibrant public opinion polling industry, which 
closely tracks cross-Strait and virtally every other public 
issue, is largely media-driven, with most surveys rush jobs 
to create headlines or to persuade readers.  Some, however, 
are more comprehensive, fully cross-tabulated with ethnic and 
party identity, and trace major political trends in Taiwan. 
Among the trends identified in multi-year surveys have been 
the long-term rise of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); 
emerging Taiwan identity, but without an accompanying rise in 
pro-independence sentiment; long-term support for maintaining 
the cross-Strait status quo; and growing support for 
resolving cross-Strait tensions.  End Summary. 
 
3.  When Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan told Beijing 
University students on April 29 that he represented the views 
of &most people8 in Taiwan, Vice President Annette Lu 
countered that &most Taiwanese8 viewed Lien as selling out 
Taiwan to China.  Both claims drew on particular public 
opinion polls the two leaders had selected from the pro-Blue 
and pro-Green press.  Opinion polls play an important roll in 
Taiwan politics, and politicians use them as often to create 
as to understand public opinion.  When he was asked about 
President Chen,s views on Lien,s trip, Deputy Presidential 
SecGen Ma Yung-cheng started his explanation with "according 
to polls and other indications....8  Taiwan's plethora of 
public opinion polls range from the balanced and 
methodologically sound to the politically motivated intended 
to convince.  To the latter end, political parties have their 
own in-house opinion polling operations, which churn out dual 
sets of polls, one for internal use to guide party leaders 
and one for publication to persuade and create political 
momentum. 
 
Lien Chan:  "Journey of Peace" or "Taiwan Sell-Out" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
4.  In recent weeks, public opinion polling in Taiwan has 
focused on the fast moving state of cross-Strait relations 
and, particularly, KMT Chairman Lien Chan,s April 26-May 2 
trip, and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong,s 
May 5-14 trip, to Mainland China.  The &Blue8 (pro- 
unification) &United Daily News8 published a poll on May 2 
showing 56 percent of respondents island-wide believed the 
Lien-Hu talks improved cross-Strait peace and 51 percent 
believed Lien did "an excellent job8 on his trip.  A survey 
in the centrist &China Times8 the same day showed 56 
percent of respondents were pleased with Lien,s trip and 54 
percent believed he did not betray Taiwan,s interests to 
China.  On the other hand, a poll by the "Green" 
(pro-independence) Taiwan ThinkTank published in the 
&Liberty Times8 April 26 proclaimed in headlines that 71% 
of respondents opposed Lien Chan making any agreement with 
Chinese leaders. 
 
5.  None of these published polls, however, explained 
methodology used or released cross-tabulations that would 
have enabled evaluation of the reports.  Rather, readers were 
left to accept or reject the poll results wholly on faith or 
political allegiance.  The Taiwan ThinkTank poll (para 4) 
reported that 67% of respondents opposed Taiwan "accepting 
one China and becoming a local government ruled by Communist 
China,8 suggesting questions in that poll were leading and 
politicized. 
 
6.  The Lien trip itself appears to have raised the public 
assessment of Lien and the KMT.  The centrist (some say 
"light Blue") TVBS Poll Center conducted a poll on May 2, 
immediately after Lien Chan returned to Taipei.  Respondents 
&satisfied8 with Lien,s trip and viewing it as 
"successful" (46% and 53%) outnumbered those who were 
"dissatisfied" and thought it &unsuccessful8 (25% and 21%). 
 As one of the few polling agencies in Taiwan to also publish 
cross-tabulations (party affiliation, residence, age), the 
TVBS survey revealed that, as might be expected, overwhelming 
majorities of KMT and PFP Pan-Blue supporters were in the 
"satisfied" and "successful" columns.  The survey, however, 
also showed that a surprisingly high 34% of ruling-DPP 
supporters judged the Lien trip "successful."  The poll 
further showed a relatively high level of approval in heavily 
"Green" south Taiwan, where approximately half of respondents 
termed the Lien trip "successful."  Similarly, an island-wide 
poll by the centrist ERA (Niandai) Survey Research Center 
found that respondents who believed the Lien visit was 
"helpful" to cross-Strait peace had increased from 46% before 
to 55% after the visit (though the absence of 
cross-tabulations conceals the political identity of this 
shift). 
 
7.  Recent DPP polls show a corresponding decline in the DPP 
approval rating from 37% in mid-April to 24% in early May, 
just after Lien,s return from Mainland China.  Coming just 
before the May 14 National Assembly vote, this finding has 
stimulated considerable angst within the DPP, including 
fingerpointing at the President and his conciliatory 
statements about the KMT and PFP Mainland China trips (Ref 
C). 
 
Lien Chan,s Trip and the KMT Chairmanship 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. Lien,s highly publicized and -- in the view of most KMT 
supporters -- &successful8 trip, however, encouraged 
speculation that Lien might try to stay on as Chairman. 
Lien Chan's announcement earlier this year that he would step 
down as KMT Chairman in August stimulated a heated campaign 
between Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou and LY Speaker Wang 
Jin-pyng to succeed him and position themselves for the 2008 
presidential race.  PFP LY Caucus Convenor Chen Chi-pin told 
AIT that he and other Pan-Blue LY members expect Lien to 
reverse his decision to step down.  Public opinion polls, 
however, do not show positive popular response to Lien's trip 
converting into support for Lien remaining as Chairman. 
Rather, the May 2 TVBS survey showed KMT voters opposed to 
Lien staying on increased from 43% in February to 48% after 
the trip, compared to a smaller increase in those favoring 
him staying on (36% to 39%).  The poll found, moreover, that 
KMT supporters continue to give top preference to Ma (57%) as 
the next party Chairman, with Lien trailing at 22% and Wang 
at 13%. 
 
Polling Deficiencies 
-------------------- 
 
9.  Opinion survey organizations with which AIT spoke 
typically conduct quick (3-6 hour) evening telephone random 
surveys of approximately 1,000 people based on population 
distribution.  Most public opinion polls, however, report 
only composite, island-wide figures and omit the 
cross-tabulations essential to analyzing survey results. 
ERA, the most prolific polling agency in Taiwan, publishes 
only composite results.  Center Director Tai Li-an would not 
-- or could not -- provide AIT with copies of ERA poll cross 
tabulations.  For example, a question in an ERA poll last 
week about the Lien and Soong China visits found 42% of the 
896 respondents believed the visits would be "helpful" to 
cross-Strait peace and 35% said no.  However, the absence of 
any cross-tabulations, particularly on party affiliation, 
age, and residence, limited the usefulness of the survey for 
understanding Taiwan public opinion on the two visits. 
 
10.  Chengchi University,s Election Study Center (ESC) 
Director You Ching-hsin told AIT that ESC had found party 
affiliation, ethnicity, and nationality to be the most 
significant variables affecting political views in Taiwan. 
TVBS Poll Center Director Wang Yeh-ding separately agreed, 
emphasizing that party affiliation was the single most 
important determinant of Taiwan public opinion. 
 
Polling Trends 
--------------- 
 
11.  Several polling organizations have conducted periodic 
surveys over many years to provide public opinion trends. 
ESC, for example, has run a question packet through 26 
surveys over 11 years, 1994-2005; TVBS through 13 polls over 
five years, 2000-2005.  Among the long-term Taiwan political 
and social trends revealed by these ongoing surveys are: 
 
 (1) Ethnic Identity:  The ESC poll series shows a steady 
rise in Taiwan identity from 17% in 1992 to 44% in April 
2004, compared to a decline in Chinese identity from 26% to 
6% over the same period.  The percentage of people claiming 
to be both Taiwanese and Chinese, however, has remained 
nearly constant at around 45%.  According to ESC Director 
You, the rise in Taiwanese identity has been largely a 
phenomenon among younger people and has not been accompanied 
by a similar rise in pro-independence sentiment.  (Note:  The 
May 2 TVBS poll, however, showed substantially higher 
negative attitudes toward  the Lien visit among respondents 
in the 20-29 age bracket than among any other age bracket.) 
 
(2) National Identity (unification vs independence):  TVBS 
and ESC surveys show a high constant level of support for 
maintaining the cross-Strait status quo.  In the ESC poll 
series, the "maintain status quo" preference averaged a 
fairly constant 59% over the past five years.  Polls 
commissioned by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) show an 
even higher level of support for the status quo, averaging 
around 80%, similar to the level shown in ERA polls (both 
include as status quo supporters of unification and 
independence willing to wait).  On the other hand, the ESC 
series shows that support for unification has declined from 
20% to 12% and support for independence has risen from 11% to 
20% from 1994 to 2005. 
 
(3) Political Parties:  ESC opinion surveys show long-term 
increase in Taiwan voters identifying themselves as DPP 
(i.e., hardcore DPP supporters) from 3% in 1992 to 26%. 
Support for the KMT, on the other hand has declined from 35% 
to 22%.  The swing factor in deciding legislative and 
presidential elections has been the large body of voters who 
classify themselves as "neutral," now around 40%. 
 
12.  TVBS Poll Director Wang also pointed out that his 
surveys revealed a substantial decline in voter support for 
the PFP.  One year ago, he told AIT, PFP regularly polled 
about 15%, which declined to around 10% at the time of the 
December 2004 legislative elections, and now hovers around 5% 
in the aftermath of the Chen-Soong meeting. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.  (SBU) The plethora of public opinion polls in Taiwan is 
a mixed blessing.  Well done, they are an invaluable tool for 
understanding trends and projecting responses by the 
electorate.  Unfiltered and politicized, they are open to 
abuse by politicians and politicized media, all too ready to 
select polls that prove their point or to commission polls 
with questions calibrated to provide desired results. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of  polling agencies, 
including ESC and TVBS, that do make their cross-tabulations 
available, often immediately and on the internet.  While 
ERA,s composite surveys were among the most accurate polling 
in the 2004 presidential campaign (Ref A) and TVBS in the 
December LY election (Ref B), only the latter regularly 
provides the cross-tabs essential for trend analysis and 
discerning the impact of public opinion polls on inter-party 
politics.  However, even the well-documented TVBS polling 
service is viewed with deep suspicion by many after its March 
2004 experimental exit poll produced results wildly different 
from the final result. 
PAAL