This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

091236Z May 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000449 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DAKAR FOR FAA REP E. JONES, 
ROME FOR TSA J. HALINSKI, 
BRUSSELS FOR FAA P. BARTKO AND T. GRAVELLE, 
NAIROBI FOR TSA K. JONES, 
STATE FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, AND EB, 
STATE ALSO PASS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND FAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR ECON ASEC ETRD DJ
SUBJECT: SAFE SKIES: FAA/TSA EVALUATION VISIT 
 
REF: A. A) 2004 DJIBOUTI 1424 
 
     ¶B. B) 2004 DJIBOUTI 1288 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: A team of Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
officials conducted the first Safe Skies for Africa 
evaluation visit for Djibouti from April 18 - 22. Djibouti's 
Civil Aviation Authority (DCAA) and Airport Management from 
Dubai Ports International (DPI) were positive about the visit 
despite the numerous recommendations for improvement made by 
the team. DPI officials were accepting and appreciative of 
the team's recommendations and are hopeful that Djibouti will 
in fact receive the assistance needed through Safe Skies and 
other programs to correct many of the outstanding issues. The 
team's initial findings showed a great need at the airport 
for training, equipment, sustainable resources, and basic 
written procedures, regulations and laws. The most important 
recommendation made was the creation of a law to grant DCAA 
oversight authority, provide funding and fiscal autonomy, 
regulations and the capability to enforce them. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The team's observations of the DCAA was that though 
it had staff with great enthusiasm and potential, it had very 
little experience, background in civil aviation or knowledge 
of ICAO standards. The airport management, DPI, also had 
little knowledge of International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) standards. DCAA has little in the way of regulatory 
control over DPI management's activities at the airport. As 
an ICAO signatory, Djibouti's civil aviation authority should 
provide oversight of airport management. However, the 
existing law merely creates a Civil Aviation Authority, but 
does not breakdown the regulatory authority of this entity. 
According to conversations with DCAA, its budget is paid by 
DPI. Officials for DPI say that it does not fund DCAA but the 
budget it receives from DPI is money taken from airport 
profits, which go to the Government of Djibouti, and are then 
distributed to DCAA. Recommendations included the immediate 
creation and implementation of a regulatory law, fiscal 
autonomy, establishing a more effective oversight of airport 
operations, and training in ICAO standards. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Cooperation between national intelligence services 
and airport security received a good review from the team, as 
well as some of the security measures for passenger 
screening. However, overall observations of program areas 
indicate they would not meet ICAO standards. Operations 
controls might meet standards, but standardization of 
passenger screening is needed. Recommendations were made to 
create a training plan, establish quality assurance of those 
trained, and the creation of an aviation security council to 
monitor the security needs of the airport. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Firefighting capabilities, runway safety, and 
coordination in the tower between civil and military users 
were other essential areas for improvement. The team observed 
a dangerous shortage of personnel equipment, infrastructure 
and training in the airport's fire department. Of the three 
fire engines owned by the airport, only one is in working 
condition and it is in need of a complete overhaul. While the 
one firetruck functions, it was under repairs to get the 
engine started when the team arrived. If this truck were to 
break, the airport's ability to fight fires would depend on 
the cooperation of American and French military fire 
departments, which do not have a written agreement to provide 
firefighting services - only a verbal understanding that they 
would assist in an emergency if able. The department does not 
have enough proximity gear for its 18 firefighters and all 
are in need of even basic firefighting skills training. 
Recommendations included the immediate pursuit of an 
agreement with the American and French militaries for 
firefighting coverage until the department is up to standard, 
replacement of all three engines with more modern technology, 
procurement of proximity gear for the full department, and 
ground-up training in firefighting skills as well as advanced 
firefighting training for the department. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Runway safety was one area with a need for immediate 
and costly renovations. The current clear area on either side 
of the runway needs to be level with the runway and cleared 
of all brush, mounds and trees. The pavement on the runway 
currently has a six-inch drop-off from the edge to the ground 
adjacent. However, the leveling of the clear area and 
feathering of the runway would necessitate an overhaul of 
drainage and lighting systems that were recently repaired or 
installed. The need for a parallel taxiway that extends the 
full length of the runway was also cited, as the current one 
is only the partial length and has insufficient width for 
large aircraft. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The tower operation currently has 12 controllers, 6 
experienced, 5 newly trained and one in training. The 
experienced controllers were trained in Toulouse, France and 
the newly trained received air traffic training at a school 
in Dubai. The training manager for air traffic controllers 
seemed very knowledgeable in the eyes of the team members 
observing, but assurance of continuity of his programs is 
needed after his retirement. French and American military 
controllers are also present in the tower. French controllers 
only guide the Mirages while in the air and are not in the 
tower at other times. American military controllers have a 
good working relationship with the Djiboutian controllers, 
but act only as a liaison with American aircraft and can step 
in during emergency situations. The team recommended greater 
coordination for tower controllers with their military 
counterparts. Problems such as radar interference could be 
solved by requesting the assistance of American military 
expertise and equipment to find such interference. Radio 
frequencies in the tower need to be controlled by the 
Djiboutians, rather than relying on French control of the VHF 
frequencies. Recommendations included regulations, 
documentation and oversight from DCAA, as well as tower 
grounding and several other infrastructure improvements. 
RAGSDALE