This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 COLOMBO 000877 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
USAID/W FOR A/AID ANDREW NATSIOS, JBRAUSE 
DCHA/OFDA KISAACS, GGOTTLIEB, MMARX, RTHAYER, 
BDEEMER 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA 
DCHA/FFP FOR LAUREN LANDIS 
DCHA DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR WILLIAM 
GARVELINK 
ANE DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR MARK WARD 
BANGKOK FOR OFDA SENIOR REGIONAL ADVISOR TOM DOLAN 
KATHMANDU FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WILLIAM BERGER 
GENEVA FOR USAID KYLOH 
ROME PASS FODAG 
NSC FOR MELINE 
CDR USPACOM FOR J3/J4/POLAD 
USEU PASS USEC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID AEMR PREL PGOV CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA - EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMIS: 
USAID/DART SITREP #23 - Shelter Assessment of East 
Coast 
 
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Summary 
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1.From May 2 - 9, the USAID/Office of U.S. 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Shelter 
Specialist traveled to Sri Lanka to monitor 
USAID/OFDA shelter partners and assess the 
situation of shelter in Sri Lanka following the 
tsunami.  On May 4 and 5, the USAID/OFDA Shelter 
 
SIPDIS 
Specialist, USAID/Disaster Assistance Response 
Team (DART) Information Officer (IO), and 
USAID/Colombo Project Management Assistant 
traveled to Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Kalmunai 
to monitor USAID/OFDA-funded transitional shelter 
programs and visit tsunami-affected areas.  The 
USAID team met with representatives from Shelter 
for Life (SFL) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
during this field visit to the east.  Logistics, 
lack of supplies, ethnic tensions, low levels of 
development, and local regulations - in particular 
the 200 meter buffer zone - have impeded the 
progress of the transitional shelter sector in 
eastern Sri Lanka.  End summary. 
 
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Meeting with UNHCR 
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¶2.  On May 2, the USAID team met with the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Shelter 
Coordinator in Colombo.  She explained that 
according to the Government of Sri Lanka's (GOSL) 
housing survey, the tsunami destroyed 41,000 
homes.  The GOSL assumes that 25 percent of these 
families will stay with host families until 
permanent housing is built, and therefore 
approximately 30,000 transitional shelters will be 
needed.  However, the UNHCR Shelter Coordinator 
stated that an additional 36,000 houses were 
damaged and explained that since more than one 
family lives in a household, particularly in the 
east, the actual number of shelters needed may be 
as high as 114,000 (using an average household 
size of 1.5 families and 76,000 total damaged or 
destroyed houses).  The GOSL reports that 15,000 
transitional shelters have been constructed to 
date, but UNHCR suspects that the actual number is 
closer to 10,000.  Because the GOSL's Transitional 
Accommodation Project (TAP) believes that only 
30,000 transitional shelters are needed, the TAP 
plans to end operations following the construction 
of these 30,000 shelters. 
 
¶3.  According to the UNCHR Shelter Coordinator, 
many NGOs operating in tsunami-affected areas do 
not have sufficient experience or capacity in 
shelter.  Some of these NGOs are inexperienced in 
general while other larger NGOs have become 
involved in shelter, even though they did not have 
shelter experience.  In addition, some 
international NGOs that received large donations 
following the tsunami and some smaller private 
organizations are not coordinating with UNHCR or 
other NGOs.  The UNHCR Shelter Coordinator 
reported that the USAID/OFDA shelter partners 
(SFL, CRS, GOAL, and CHF) are all progressing and 
coordinating very well. 
 
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Meeting with Shelter Partners 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  On May 3, the USAID team met with USAID/OFDA's 
shelter partners to discuss progress and 
impediments in the shelter sector following the 
tsunami.  According to USAID/OFDA's partners, the 
 
SIPDIS 
lack of consistent decision-making and follow 
through by local authorities has made it difficult 
for shelter projects to progress.  The meeting 
participants explained that the TAP plays an 
advisory role to the government but is unable to 
make decisions.  The Taskforce to Rebuild the 
Nation (TAFREN) only has slightly more decision- 
making power.  As a result, there is a need for 
better oversight and local accountability.  Prior 
to the tsunami, the Urban Development Authority 
(UDA) was responsible for land use issues but is 
currently overwhelmed.  In addition, the UDA can 
not appropriate land.  Due to the difficulties in 
reaching decisions, NGOs and UNHCR are working 
with TAFREN to identify the decision making 
process more clearly. 
 
¶5.  In response to participants' statements that 
there is not enough suitable land for transitional 
and permanent housing, the USAID/OFDA Shelter 
Specialist recommended that a parcel-level land 
survey be conducted in the buffer zone.  The GOSL 
has designated buffer zones of 200 meters in the 
east and 100 meters in the south where new 
construction will not be allowed without the 
consent of the government and residents will be 
unable to repair their homes.  (Note: It remains 
unclear what kind of construction will be allowed 
within the buffer zone).  A land use survey would 
allow the humanitarian community to demonstrate 
how the buffer zone will impact human settlement 
and the economy as people are unable to pursue 
their livelihoods. 
 
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Trincomalee - Progress impeded by uncertainty 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  On May 4, the USAID team met with 
representatives from SFL to discuss SFL's 
transitional shelter program in Kinniya Division 
of Trincomalee District.  USAID/OFDA has provided 
$1,026,185 to support SFL with the construction of 
transitional shelters, repair of homes, and 
construction of latrines in Trincomalee.  SFL's 
activities are focused in the village of Kinniya 
which is a Muslim community.  According to UNHCR, 
as of May 2, the tsunami displaced 72,986 persons 
in Trincomalee District, of which more than two- 
thirds are staying with relatives and friends. 
 
¶7.  Trincomalee District has substantial Muslim, 
Tamil, and Sinhalese populations and assistance 
programs must keep this ethnic balance in mind in 
program designs.  For example, Tamil beneficiaries 
should be relocated to Tamil-owned land and Tamil 
laborers need to work on the project otherwise 
protests may result.  An additional complication 
to tsunami assistance programs is the need to 
consider those persons displaced by the civil 
conflict.  According to UNHCR, there are 
approximately 35,000 people displaced by the civil 
conflict in Trincomalee and 27,000 in Batticaloa. 
 
¶8.  Bureaucratic obstacles have greatly impeded 
SFL's progress.  For example, SFL did not receive 
the list of beneficiaries for transitional 
shelters until the end of February and is still 
working on finalizing a memorandum of 
understanding with the local government.  In 
addition, there have been six Divisional 
Secretaries (DS) since the tsunami making 
 
SIPDIS 
consistent decision-making difficult.  Since 
receiving the beneficiary list, SFL conducted an 
assessment of the community, including information 
on vulnerable populations such as widows, elderly, 
disabled, orphans, or pregnant women and cleared 
land for shelters through cash-for-work programs. 
 
¶9.  The imposition of the VAT on SFL's supplies 
caused an additional delay for SFL.  USAID 
partners are not required to pay VAT in accordance 
with a bilateral agreement between the U.S. 
Government and GOSL.  SFL waited for VAT clearance 
while SFL, USAID/Colombo, and the U.S. Embassy 
sought to address this issue with the GOSL but in 
the end, SFL paid more than $100,000 in VAT in 
order to receive their shelter materials. 
 
¶10.  At the time of the USAID team's visit, 
materials had just arrived for the SFL 
transitional shelters.  Prior to the arrival of 
the materials, SFL worked with 200 families to 
prepare them to move to transitional shelter sites 
through a cash-for-work site clearance project. 
SFL predicts that as many as 50 shelters can be 
built in a day once all the supplies are in place. 
There are 20 masons among the beneficiary 
population so SFL will employ these masons through 
cash-for-work and hire additional masons as 
needed.  The structures are made of plastic 
sheeting, tin roofs, and metal poles for the 
frames so the materials are both reusable and 
easily transportable.  As of May 7, SFL had 
completed 40 shelters. 
 
¶11.  The USAID team visited two sites where SFL 
beneficiaries are currently staying in tent camps. 
In the first site, as many as 150-200 families 
were sharing low-quality tents, sometimes with as 
many as 2-3 families per tent.  At the second 
site, approximately 100 families were staying in 
very high-quality tents donated by the Italian 
government on the grounds of a school.  The 
difference between the two sites was remarkable. 
At the first site, the atmosphere was markedly 
tense and gloomy and residents did not want to 
talk to the USAID team.  In the second site 
however, residents talked with the USAID team and 
invited the team to examine their tents. 
 
¶12.  According to the USAID/Office of Transition 
Initiatives (OTI) representative in Trincomalee, 
many organizations, including SFL, have had 
difficulties with payment of the VAT.  In 
addition, only tourist hotels registered with the 
tourist board will be allowed to rebuild, leaving 
out many smaller, family-run guest houses.  The 
local government is considering plans to build a 
lagoon and a mangrove forest in the 200 meter 
buffer zone.  In Mutur town, the GOSL is building 
a navy base in the buffer zone. 
 
¶13.  The USAID team attended a meeting led by 
UNHCR of designated shelter heads of the divisions 
in Trincomalee District.  Oxfam, ZOA, Caritas/CRS, 
and the Norwegian Refugee Council attended the 
meeting.  The participants discussed the need to 
ensure that water and sanitation services are 
provided at sites before moving people.  In 
addition, the participants described competition 
between NGOs and the lack of coordination.  Some 
NGOs are not waiting for the local government's 
designated beneficiary lists and are trying to 
convince local communities to accept transitional 
shelters from them instead of the NGO designated 
to provide transitional shelters.  ZOA reported 
that in Mutur, the government allocated land but 
the private land owner is now asking for rent. 
The government has agreed to pay for up to six 
months but it's unclear what will happen next. 
NRC reported that some people are refusing to move 
to sites because the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) has been building larger, more 
expensive shelters, in violation of the agreed 
upon standards for transitional shelters.  In 
addition, IOM is paying beneficiaries more than 
the going rate for cash-for-work in the 
construction of shelters. 
 
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Batticaloa and Kalmunai - CRS Shelters Progressing 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶14.  In Batticaloa, the USAID team met with CRS 
and their local partner Eastern Human Economic 
Development (EHED) to evaluate the progress of 
their transitional shelter activities and the 
sector on the whole.  USAID/OFDA has provided 
$3,048,000 to CRS for transitional shelter, home 
repair and latrine construction in Batticaloa and 
Ampara districts. 
 
¶15.  According to UNHCR, as of May 2, 
approximately two-thirds of the 54,817 displaced 
in Batticaloa District were staying with friends 
and relatives.  According to the TAP, as of May 2, 
3,494 transitional shelters had been built in 
Batticaloa District out of a required total of 
11,725 (30 percent).  Currently, approximately 80 
percent of the completed shelters are occupied. 
Families still need to be allocated to the 
remaining 20 percent. 
 
¶16.  CRS reported that they have completed 433 of 
a planned 1,533 transitional shelters (28 percent) 
to date in Batticaloa District.  According to CRS, 
the delay in the supply chain has been the biggest 
impediment to progress to date.  For example, 
supplies have been delayed in customs due to 
issues with the VAT and it is difficult to procure 
supplies locally.  CRS estimates that 
approximately 80 percent of CRS beneficiaries will 
be able to remain on their own land. 
 
¶17.  The USAID team visited a CRS transitional 
shelter settlement of 151 shelters in Arayampathy 
Division.  The beneficiaries cleared the land 
through cash-for-work and CRS gave them their 
tools upon completion.  The residents receive 
USAID-donated food rations every fifteen days 
through the GOSL.  The shelters were constructed 
with palm fronds, wooden frames, and tiles for the 
roofs. 
 
¶18.  The USAID team met one beneficiary who made 
candy for sale prior to the tsunami and is now 
gathering scrap iron for sale.  This man's 
residence showed how beneficiaries frequently 
jumpstart the reconstruction process.  Since 
moving into his shelter, he has increased the size 
of his shelter by almost 50 percent with materials 
he purchased. 
 
¶19.  In Kalmunai, CRS has completed 500 of a 
planned 2,000 transitional shelters and the first 
shelters were completed in mid February.  CRS 
explained that three NGOs (Samaritans' Purse, ZOA, 
and CRS) divided responsibility for transitional 
shelters in the Kalmunai area.  The shelters 
consist of plastic sheeting, tin roofs with 
thermal insulation to reduce heat, and timber 
frames.  CRS has developed a carpentry shop on the 
site to repair latrines as part of its cash-for- 
work activities. 
 
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Comment 
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¶20.  The 200 meter buffer zone appears to have 
greatly increased the difficulty of successfully 
completing transitional shelter projects on the 
eastern coast.  Due to the scarcity of land, NGOs 
are struggling to find acceptable locations for 
transitional shelters.  The difficulty in 
receiving clear directions and decisions from 
local officials' decisions regarding transitional 
shelters does not bode well for the much more 
complicated process of determining permanent 
settlements.  Furthermore, since the tsunami 
inundation zone extends far beyond the 200 meter 
buffer zone in many areas, justification for the 
buffer zone as a safety precaution remains weak. 
 
LUNSTEAD