This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN NEWSPAPER COMMENTS ON UPCOMING 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 
 
1) An April 17 editorial in the pro-unification United 
Daily News commented on the drawbacks of the proposed 
constitutional changes to be reviewed by an ad hoc 
National Assembly to convene in May.  The following is 
a full-text translation of the editorial: 
 
2) "Several Ignored Major Shortcomings of this 
Constitutional Revision" 
 
Despite very serious doubts about the constitutionality 
and fairness of its institutional design, the "first 
and last-ever" election for an ad hoc National Assembly 
will nonetheless be held.  And thus far, only medium 
and small political parties and civic groups have 
expressed opposition to the proposed constitutional 
amendments, which means the amendments are very likely 
to be adopted as originally proposed. 
 
However, in addition to the more controversial 
proposals such as cutting Legislative Yuan (LY) seats 
in half, adopting the Japanese single-member district 
and two-vote system, and incorporating the referendum 
system on constitutional amendments, there are, indeed, 
many [constitutional] provisions that will be 
accordingly affected and revised [by the proposed 
changes].  When examined in detail, one can find many 
violations of constitutional principles. 
Unfortunately, these have not attracted much public 
attention.  This is the result of hasty passage of the 
proposed amendments by the LY without comprehensive 
public education and discussion.  Further consideration 
is really necessary. 
 
First, due to the intention to abolish the ad hoc 
National Assembly, Amendment II of the last 
Constitutional change, which stipulates that an 
impeachment of the President is to be proposed by the 
LY and ratified, or rejected, by the ad hoc National 
Assembly, will be revised so that the Grand Justices of 
the Judicial Yuan would review and decide on a 
presidential impeachment.  That is, an impeachment will 
become a lawsuit. 
 
However, the Grand Justices are nominated by the 
President and nominations are not limited to those with 
qualifications of a judge.  It is natural for the 
Justices to be affected by political influence.  That 
their positions will be fair and just cannot be 
trusted.  What's more, those Grand Justices who are not 
former judges lack the practical experience of judicial 
trial.  This is another major drawback for them to 
review impeachments.  A good example is the recent 
problem of judicial review caused by the No. 582 
Constitutional Interpretation that had to be resolved 
by another interpretation, No. 592.  And what should 
the procedures be after impeachment cases become 
judicial lawsuits?  As the plaintiff, what is the LY's 
position in the procedures?  And what are the rights 
and obligations of the President as the "defendant"? 
It is not appropriate for the LY to institute laws to 
[answer these questions], as it is also a party of the 
lawsuit itself.  When an impeachment can only be 
proposed by the high threshold of a two-thirds majority 
in the LY, a lack of proper safeguard measures in the 
institutional design cannot be described as reasonable. 
 
Second, legislative terms will be lengthened to four 
years, while the seats are halved, so that legislative 
elections can be held at the same time with the 
presidential election.  Right now the balance of power 
between the President, the Premier, and the LY are not 
clear.  There are frequent clashes between the 
President and an LY controlled by different political 
parties.  Now, we have to face not only the risk every 
four years of different parties holding the LY majority 
and the Presidency, but also [the problem that] the two 
will both represent the latest public opinions.  This 
may increase difficulty for political mediation.  An 
institutional design with such high risk is indeed not 
appropriate. 
 
In addition, after the ad hoc National Assembly is 
abolished, constitutional amendments and national 
boundary changes will all be decided by referendum. 
The proposed revision this time sets the conditions 
[for referendums] as: proposals for boundary changes 
need be endorsed by one-fourth of legislators, reviewed 
by an LY session attended by three-fourths of the 
legislators, and approved by a three-fourths majority 
of the attendees; and the valid votes cast by the 
voters [during the referendum] should be more than half 
of the total eligible voters.  For amending the 
Constitution, the conditions for an LY proposal and a 
referendum are exactly the same.  Obviously, these 
kinds of rules are not appropriate.  Because the 
importance and political impact of any proposed change 
of national boundaries, the national flag and the 
national designation will be much stronger than the 
general constitutional amendments, taking into account 
current domestic and international situations.  Even if 
the numbers of seats needed for the LY to propose such 
changes are the same, there should be different 
thresholds set for referendum votes [between the 
general amendments and those to change national 
boundaries]. 
 
Further examination shows that the thresholds set for 
the impeachment, recall, and even election of the 
President must be readjusted simultaneously.  The 
current presidential election system only requires a 
relative majority for a candidate to be elected.  But 
when the LY passes a recall of the President, more than 
half of all the eligible voters must vote and more than 
half of the valid votes cast must say yes before the 
move can be ratified.  This means the recall move needs 
to successfully go through two checkpoints and a more 
strict absolute majority system is applied.  This rule 
is obviously not balanced.  Furthermore, when 
legislators want to recall the President, [endorsement 
by] one-fourth of the seats for the proposal and a two- 
thirds majority for its adoption will be needed. 
Meanwhile, a move to impeach the President needs one- 
half of the legislators to endorse and two-thirds of 
them to say yes.  These are very strange provisions. 
For an impeachment is to determine the legal 
accountability while a recall is to determine the 
political accountability [of the President].  The 
conditions for legal accountability are stricter than 
those for political accountability.  Does this mean 
that political confrontations are encouraged and legal 
violations are treated lightly?  In short, any numbers 
set as thresholds in the Constitution should be 
institutionally logical.  A certain line of reasoning 
should be followed. 
 
The Constitution is the cornerstone of any 
constitutionally democratic country.  But the upcoming 
constitutional revision has failed to attract public 
attention. The proposed changes are very likely to be 
hastily adopted under control of the political parties. 
What will happen to the existing Constitution, which 
has effectively lost its function as a regulator of 
national powers, after being distorted again by this 
[upcoming] revision, is yet to be known.  But one thing 
can be sure.  This will definitely not be a 
constitutional reform achievement. 
 
PAAL