This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 001558 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER BG
SUBJECT: CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS UPDATE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Poloff recently visited the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts to meet with military/civilian officials and a broad 
range of civil society leaders.  Eight years after the 
signing of the CHT peace accord, significant dissatisfaction 
persists among both the indigenous tribal groups and the 
surging ethnic Bengali community.  Development is lagging, 
and security remains a key concern, though UNDP is pushing 
for more donor engagement in the area.  End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2. (U) The roots of the problem date to partition, when the 
primarily non-Muslim CHT, which had enjoyed its own laws 
under British rule, wanted to join India but ended up with 
East Pakistan.  Friction increased in the 1950s when 
construction started on the Kaptai dam, which flooded a 
significant part of the area's little arable land and 
displaced a large section of the indigenous population.  In 
the 1990s, successive Bangladesh governments promoted the 
settling of ethnic Bengalis in the CHT and thereby changed 
its demographics from three percent Bengalis in 1940 to 
nearly 50 percent Bengali in 2001. The indigenous peoples, 
composed of 12 tribal groups, saw their traditional 
livelihood, particularly slash-and-burn agriculture, 
threatened by the incoming settlers.  After several years of 
violent conflict, the Sheikh Hasina government in 1997 signed 
the so-called CHT Accords, whose stipulations included: 
re-integrating tribal refugees into the CHT; restructuring 
local government to allow for stronger representation of 
indigeous peoples and increased local authority of land 
management, local police, and tribal law; no new Bengali 
settlers; creation of a land commission to resolve disputed 
land titles; and increased development assistance to the 
three districts of Khagrachhari, Rangamati, and Bandarban 
that comprise the CHT. 
 
¶3. (U) One indigenous group later known as the United Peoples 
Democratic Force, (UPDF) refused to accept the accords 
because they fell short of full autonomy for the CHT. The 
political wing of one of the pro-accords militant groups, the 
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS), was led by 
Jotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, aka, Shantu Larma, who became 
head of the Regional Council of the CHT.  Other former 
guerrilla fighters who joined government ministries include 
Moni Swapan Dewan, who became Deputy Minister of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts.  According to Mike Heyn, UNDP 
Director of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility, 
bitter disagreements between the UDPF and the PCJSS continue, 
with each faction violently targeting the other.  The UPDF 
and some other tribal leaders complain that the BDG has 
failed to implement the accords at virtually any level, 
including the withdrawal of the large military forces still 
in the CHT. 
 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Security remains an issue for many potential donors. 
 In February 2001, foreign engineers working for a Danish NGO 
were abducted and held for a month before being rescued by 
the Bangladesh Army. Bangladeshi NGO staff have also been 
threatened or attacked, usually over money.  In March 2004, 
seven vacationing Peace Corps volunteers were briefly held 
against their will at a hotel during an attempted robbery or 
shakedown of the hotel management.  The UDPF and PCJSS both 
collect "tolls" from trucks and boats passing through their 
territory.  In the name of law and order, the Bangladesh Army 
maintains in the CHT five brigades of at least 6000 men each. 
 The Brigade Commander for Khagachari estimated the numbers 
at under 200 for the UPDF and 400 for the PCJSS, but said 
that capturing them is difficult since "when they have 
weapons, they are insurgents, but if they hide their weapons, 
they are simply farmers."  In Rangamati, the Army has two 
brigades and boats to patrol Kaptai lake.  When asked if the 
area was safe for foreign NGOs and even tourism, every person 
poloff asked, except for an Awami League politician, 
responded that foreigners are safe in the Hill Tracts. 
 
¶5. (U) UNDP argues that security in the CHT is not that bad, 
especially compared to the rest of Bangladesh.  In 2002, it 
conducted a detailed study that concluded that 22 zones pose 
a minimal risk to development activities, four zones require 
enhanced security precautions, and one zone which was too 
dangerous for development activities. 
 
ARGUING OVER RESOURCES 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Indigenous civil society leaders focus on the BDG's 
failure to implement nearly all aspects of the peace accords: 
elections of the regional council have not occurred, land 
disputes between Bengali and indigenous peoples remain 
unresolved, economic assistance has not been forthcoming, the 
Army presence and related Army violence towards indigenous 
peoples have not diminished, ethnic Bengalis continue to 
migrate to CHT, and illegal logging in the CHT has not been 
stopped.  Bengali residents complain that the BDG has not 
fulfilled pledges to give them land, that the infrastructure 
in settler villages is woeful, that Bengalis do not get their 
share of development aid, and that aid agencies do not hire 
ethnic Bengalis.  Politicians, reporters, the local Brigade 
Commanders, and an advocacy group for Bengali rights asserted 
that aid should be divided equally between Bengalis and the 
indigenous groups.  UNDP and the Ministry of the CHT are 
dominated by indigenous peoples, they said, and, therefore, 
Bengalis are systematically excluded from the development 
process. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Indigenous representatives argued that many of the 
Bengali settlers are illegal, arriving in contravention of 
the prohibition against new Bengali immigration, and came 
only for the free rice ration given by the BDG.  Bengalis 
deny immigration continues, and say that the legal status of 
settlers cannot be determined since no land records exist in 
indigenous tribal law. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Experienced CHT observers suggest the reality is 
somewhere in the middle.  Basic education, controlled by 
mostly indigenous district councils, is a success with a 
literacy rate for all students, including Bengalis, 
approaching 80 percent, the highest in Bangladesh.  According 
to UNDP's Heyn, basic sanitation in the region is the best in 
Bangladesh, with every local village, whether Bengali or 
indigenous, having its own well and privies.  Heyn says that 
donors and development bodies deliberately provided for 
shared resources to discourage, largely successfully, 
allegations of favoritism. 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
----------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) After the peace accords, development assistance was 
slow to return to the CHT, in part due to perceived security 
risks, ministerial organizational problems, and continued 
mistrust between Bengalis and indigenous peoples.  However, 
starting in 2003, UNDP began mitigating Bengali-indigenous 
mistrust by initiating projects in 600 remote rural locations 
with $3.2 million in USAID Quick Impact Funds (QIF).  Deputy 
CHT Minister Dewan praised QIF for making a very positive 
impact in 2004 and welcomed additional projects.  The QIF 
projects aimed to develop the economy beyond the traditional 
marketing of surplus crops by promoting large-scale chicken 
production, ginger as a cash crop, cashew nut processing, and 
penned fish acquaculture. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Last March, UNDP sponsored a visit to the southern 
CHT by diplomatic representatives from Norway, Australia, 
Sweden, and the EU.  UNDP says that, as a result, Norway 
plans a $1.4 million donation, the EU $9.2 million, and 
Australia and Japan plan $85,000 towards a planned $50 
million UNDP development program.  UNDP says that on March 
24, Planning Minister Shifar Rahman signed a five-year, $50 
million economic development agreement with UNDP and is 
expected to sign the agreement as Finance Minister in the 
second week of April.  UNDP hopes that this agreement will 
set the stage for increased international involvement in the 
CHT. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The CHT merit careful watching.  While the overall 
situation may not be as grim as some opposition and human 
rights activists contend, the region has a deserved 
reputation for arms and narcotics smuggling, militancy, and 
violence.  Our understanding is that Islamist groups are not 
rpt not active in the Bengali settler community, in part 
because most of the settlers are dirt poor and resistant to 
any type of organization.  However, this situation could 
change if ethnic tensions flare up, the Bengali settlers are 
radicalized, and the resulting violence spills over into the 
rest of Bangladesh. 
THOMAS