This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001130 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015 
TAGS: PARM PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: A/S RADEMAKER'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN 
MINISTRY OFFICIALS ON NPT REVCON, ARTICLE 98 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 
1.4(B)(D) 
 
¶1. (C) Introduction:  Assistant Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and Non-Proliferation Stephen G. Rademaker met on 11 
April with his Brazilian Foreign Ministry counterpart, 
Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro, Assistant Secretary for 
International Organizations (in the MRE structure this 
includes UN and arms control/non-proliferation issues). 
Guerreio was accompanied by senior aides from his UN and arms 
control divisions, but Guerrerio alone spoke to all of the 
issues throughout the meeting.  A/S Rademaker was accompanied 
by Arms Control Bureau Senior Advisor Joan Corbett, WHA/BSC 
Regional Affairs Officer Carolyn Croft, AC/NP Special Advisor 
Carolyn Leddy, NP Bureau Foreign Affairs Specialist Steve 
Adams, DOD/OSD Attorney Advisor Musetta Johnson and Embassy 
PolCouns.  A/S Rademaker and Guerreiro discussed goals for 
the May 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, 
general proliferation issues, and Article 98.  Principal 
themes are reported below.  End introduction. 
 
 
U.S. PRESENTATION ON NPT REVCON AND PROLIFERATION ISSUES: 
 
¶2. (SBU) A/S Rademaker provided Guerreiro with a briefing on 
USG views and goals for the 2005 NPT Revcon, and provided 
slides of the presentation to the GOB interlocutors.  A/S 
Rademaker stressed U.S. commitment to the NPT, and said the 
U.S. views noncompliance as the critical challenge to the 
treaty at present.  Indeed, in the USG view, the treaty is 
"under siege" as evidence increasingly points to some member 
states undercutting their treaty obligations by noncompliance 
with the basic NPT obligations under Article II and III, use 
of Article IV (peaceful nuclear cooperation) as a cover for 
weapons programs, and ineffective prevention of transfer of 
weapons technologies to non-state networks. In this regard, 
A/S Rademaker emphasized the importance of a high standard 
for safeguards among supplier states as a condition of 
supply, including Brazil, and urged adoption of the 
Additional Protocol by Brazil.  Similarly, he stressed the 
importance of broad endorsement of UNSCR 1540 and encouraged 
Brazilian participation in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative. 
 
¶3. (C) A/S Rademaker characterized the situation with Iran as 
"very serious" and said the USG and Europeans will support 
referral of the matter to the UNSC if Iran breaks with any 
aspect of the current IAEA suspension.  A/S Rademaker 
provided a detailed presentation of the USG record on 
disarmament under Article VI, noting the May 2001 statement 
by President Bush that the U.S. nuclear posture is that of 
achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible 
number of nuclear weapons consistent with national security 
needs, including obligations to allies.  He outlined USG 
positions on stockpile reductions, fissile materials, and 
cooperation with Russia, noting that U.S. assistance to 
Russia for nuclear security efforts, together with aid from 
G-8 allies, now totals USD 20 billion.  In response to 
comments by Guerrerio on new U.S. nuclear arms programs and 
the lack of U.S. adherence to the CTBT, A/S Rademaker 
emphasized that the robust nuclear earth penetrator is only a 
conceptual design study -- there are no active R and D 
efforts on these systems.  The U.S. Senate has not ratified 
the CTBT principally because of concerns relating to the 
verifiability of the treaty.  For the United States, it is 
important to be assured that all other countries have given 
up nuclear testing if they are to do so, because for all 
nuclear weapons states it would be useful to retain the 
right, if a need arises in the future, to test nuclear 
weapons.  Nuclear weapons are man-made devices that 
deteriorate over time like all other man-made devices.  He 
also noted that the U.S. has unilaterally observed a 10 year 
moratorium on testing and has no testing planned now or in 
the future. 
 
GOB REACTIONS: 
 
¶4. (C) Guerreio provided the following comments in response 
(organized below thematically): 
 
--Brazil, the AP and Rezende:  Echoing statements made at 
various times over the past several months by FM Amorim and 
other GOB officials, Guerreiro said the GOB had never said it 
would not adhere to the AP, and he "hoped" that Brazil would 
sign the protocol this year, although it would be after the 
May Revcon.  Brazil and the IAEA have also successfully 
completed their agreement on agency inspections of Brazil's 
Rezende facility, Guerreiro said, although some ongoing 
technical questions are still being resolved. 
--Iran:  Guerrerio said the GOB had sternly and repeatedly 
told Iranian delegations that Iran had "messed things up" 
(for other non-weapons nuclear states) and that Iran must 
cooperate fully with IAEA, since non-weapons states must have 
impeccable credentials under all articles of the treaty in 
order to challenge weapons states on disarmament issues.  He 
added that the statutes of the IAEA required that the Board 
of Governors refer Iran's case to the UNSC if the agency 
exhausts all of its authorities and resources but achieves no 
resolution with Iran, and Brazil understands the UNSC would 
then have to "live up to its obligations."  Guerreiro and A/S 
Rademaker agreed on the necessity of taking a "graduated 
approach" -- i.e., not starting immediately with sanctions -- 
in the event Iran is referred to the council. 
 
--NPT Revcon:  Noting that Brazilian Revcon President Duarte 
has "a tough job ahead of him,"  Guerreiro said the GOB 
thinks there should be a strong effort at an agreed agenda at 
the meeting's outset, and will seek USG cooperation in this 
effort.  He also noted GOB agreement with an emphasis on 
compliance but said the Revcon should aim at producing a 
"balanced agreement" that addresses all pillars of the treaty 
(i.e., disarmament as well as nonproliferation).  Brazil will 
not oppose consecration of adherence to the Additional 
Protocol as a condition of supply, "but that cannot be the 
only proposal," he said. Discussion of regional issues will 
be important during the conference, and it is "unavoidable" 
that Israel will come up in the Middle East-Iran context, 
Guerreiro opined.  In other potential problem areas, 
Guerreiro saw little prospect for a robust agreement on 
restrictions on enrichment and processing technologies. 
Guerreiro expected the Revcon would endorse UNSCR 1540 as "a 
good step" in stemming technology flows to non-state actors. 
 
--Proliferation:  While agreeing that compliance is a major 
challenge for the NPT, Guerreiro did not agree with the 
statement that the treaty is "under siege" -- rather he 
posited rather that the NPT has been a success, witness the 
fact that the number of weapons states is still fairly small, 
despite the worried predictions of John F. Kennedy and others 
that as many as thirty countries would some day have nuclear 
arms.  However, on a related point, Guerreiro said the GOB 
believes it is critical that the NPT Revcon not inadvertently 
give recognized weapons state status to non-treaty-party 
countries with declared or suspected arms programs.  This is 
"a highly sensitive issue" for Brazil, South Africa and other 
countries that have voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons 
programs only to see others who have flouted 
non-proliferation principles achieve de facto status 
(bordering on acceptance) as military nuclear powers. 
 
--PSI:  Guerrerio called the Proliferation Security 
Initiative a "fair exercise," but not one that Brazil had 
studied in depth or considered joining until now.  However, 
Brazil will send a military observer to an upcoming PSI 
exercise in Portugal, and may then look more carefully at the 
possibility of participation. 
 
 
ARTICLE 98: 
 
¶5. (C) A/S Rademaker outlined USG motives for seeking Article 
98 agreements to provide protection for American citizens 
from extradition to face trial at the International Criminal 
Court.  He explained how U.S. national experience with 
independent prosecutors had left negative views in American 
society about unaccountable prosecutors with broad mandates, 
and related fears that Americans -- given the U.S. leadership 
role in international affairs -- could be frequent targets 
for specious and politically-driven indictments.  The U.S. 
wants to find a way to be a "good neighbor" to the ICC, 
perhaps in time able to offer some degree support that 
approximates the critical legal, technical and investigative 
assistance offered by the USG to the ICTY and ICTR over the 
years.  But that can only come about if the U.S. has a 
"comfort level"  with the direction and activities undertaken 
by the court, and if U.S. personnel are protected by Article 
98 agreements with a wide range of states. 
 
¶6. (C) Guerreiro politely but unequivocally stated that 
Brazil would not sign an Article 98 agreement with the U.S., 
and views the idea as a "non-starter."  Brazil is a strong 
supporter of the ICC and believes the necessary checks and 
balances are in place to deter the kinds of concerns outlined 
by A/S Rademaker.  Brazil remains convinced that it is better 
to have a permanent criminal court than ad hoc tribunals. 
Noting the abstention by Brazil on 31 March on the UN 
resolution that indicated the ICC for accountability and 
investigations into the Sudan-Darfur atrocity allegations, 
but with special protections carved out at U.S. insistence, 
Guerreiro said FM Amorim himself had issued instructions for 
abstention and considered a resolution with special 
protections from ICC authorities to be a "dangerous 
precedent." 
 
¶7. (C) Comment.  A/S Rademaker's visit provided a valuable 
opportunity to consult at a senior level with the GOB on a 
wide range of issues.  Guerreiro's comments on likely 
Brazilian adherence to the Additional Protocol this year and 
support for the AP as a condition of supply at the May Revcon 
are encouraging.  Less promising was Guerreiro's categorical 
rejection of discussing an Article 98 agreement with the U.S. 
 
¶8. (U) The Assistant Secretary cleared this cable. 
DANILOVICH