This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271335Z Apr 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002389 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ETRD IZ PREL SENV SY TU
SUBJECT: NEA WATER ADVISOR CHARLES LAWSON DISCUSSES 
TIGRIS-EUPHRATES COOPERATION WITH TURKISH OFFICIALS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 55035 
 
     ¶B. ANKARA 1230 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  NEA Senior Advisor for Science and 
Technology Issues Charles Lawson visited Turkey April 18-21 
to explore GOT interest in cooperation on the 
Tigris-Euphrates basin.  Lawson visited water infrastructure 
programs in the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), which 
encompasses the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers, and met with Turkey's water policy officials in the 
Foreign Ministry, State Hydraulics Works (DSI) and GAP 
Administration.  In the GAP region, officials and local 
farmers admitted that the current irrigation infrastructure 
is wasteful and leads to soil salinization, but DSI said it 
will eliminate those problems in upcoming irrigation projects 
by employing better technology.  The officials emphasized the 
Tigris-Euphrates basin (which includes Turkey, Syria and 
Iraq) could be a basis for building peace and stability in 
the region, but pointed out that deep-seated suspicions 
remain among the riparian countries.  They agreed that the 
time was right to explore initial steps of cooperation to 
build confidence among the parties and were interested in 
ways the US could help that process.  End Summary. 
 
GAP -- Southeast Anatolia Project 
 
¶2.  (U)  NEA Senior Advisor for Science and Technology Issues 
Charles Lawson visited Turkey April 18-21.  He traveled to 
the GAP region with Ankara Econ Counselor and Science 
Specialist to learn more about the GAP, Turkey's ambitious 
plan to harness the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers for hydroelectric power, irrigation and economic 
development in the impoverished southeast region of Turkey. 
Begun in 1976, the GAP has spent $17 billion of a projected 
$32 billion to build 9 dams along the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers that produce 7,476 MW and provide irrigation for an 
estimated 210,000 hectares in the arid southeast.  The GAP 
Master Plan calls for 22 dams in all to provide irrigation 
for 1.7 million hectares, an area about 75% the size of New 
Jersey. 
 
¶3.  (U) Officials at DSI's regional office in the southeast 
identified several problems with the way farmers use the 
irrigation water provided by the GAP project.  Most farmers 
are uneducated and rent their fields and are not aware of or 
do not care about the effect on the land of overusing water. 
Before the GAP irrigation projects came to this water-scarce 
region, any marginal increase in water applied to the fields 
meant much higher yields.  With the cheap water provided by 
the GAP project, farmers tend to over-irrigate their fields, 
leading to wasted water and salinization of the soil.  And 
the cheap water allowed the farmers to grow cotton, which 
requires large volumes of water and damages the soil.  The 
irrigation system that was first introduced by the GAP is 
very low-tech, using open channels and gravity irrigation. 
As a result, a large percentage of the water in the early 
irrigation projects is lost to evaporation and drainage is 
very poor.  GAP and DSI officials recognize this mistake and 
for upcoming irrigation projects plan to use pressurized pipe 
systems that are 50% more costly but should significantly 
reduce salinity build-up in the soil. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The largest GAP irrigation project is just north of 
the Syrian border in the Harran plain, which gets its water 
from the Ataturk dam via two 23 foot high tunnels that run 
for 26 kilometers.  Local farmers pay DSI nothing for the 
water and its transportation to Harran.  The only charge is 
levied by the 22 water user associations that collect water 
fees to maintain the local irrigation infrastructure.  The 
president of one association explained that the associations 
do not charge by the volume of water farmers use but by the 
number of hectares they are farming.  (Comment:  This water 
price scheme represents an enormous state subsidy to the 
Harran farmers and encourages individual farmers to use 
excessive water.)  The president said his association 
recognizes the flaw in the pricing system and plans to begin 
charging by the volume of water used.  He said his farmers 
have recently received training and are making better 
decisions.  For example, he claimed that in his area, until 
2003, 95% of the land was used to grow cotton; in just two 
years that percentage has declined to 30%. 
 
The Politics of Water 
 
¶5.  (SBU) MFA DDG Mithat Rende, who coordinates Turkey's 
transnational water policy, told Lawson that Turkey is 
looking for ways to encourage cooperation among the 
Tigris-Euphrates riparian countries.  However, he emphasized 
that the process must start slowly since "there is no trust 
among the countries."  He raised again Turkey's frustration 
that Iraq had ignored an MFA request for water data.  (Note: 
Turkey requested data in 2001 and repeated the request in 
¶2004.  End Note.)  Lawson informed Rende that recently 
Embassy Baghdad personnel had discussed this with Iraqi Water 
Minister al-Rashid, who had been unaware of the request but 
promised to respond immediately.  Rende said that once a 
reply was received, the MFA would then be prepared to 
consider Rashid's request for a bilateral technical meeting 
(ref a).  Lawson added that the U.S. could play a helpful 
role in building cooperation if Turkey and Iraq are 
interested.  Rende said Turkey would appreciate U.S. help as 
a facilitator of cooperation, and he was eager to receive any 
U.S. proposals for technical activities that could serve to 
build confidence among the parties. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Faruk Demir, a former national security advisor to 
PM Erdogan, explained that water policy has long been a chief 
foreign policy concern for Turkey.  In the past, Turkey has 
viewed water (especially Turkey's control of the 
Tigris-Euphrates headwaters) as a weapon to deter hostile 
policies in Iraq and Syria, and it has explored ways to use 
Turkey's water resources commercially.  According to Demir, 
Turkey's water policy has not been successful in the past 
because of Turkey's insecurity -- the fear that any change to 
the status quo would open Turkey up to losing its current 
advantage.  He was especially critical of the Erdogan 
government, which does not consider water a national security 
priority and has no clearly articulated policy.  And the MFA 
is concerned mainly with preserving the status quo -- "the 
MFA never says no, but rarely implements its yes's." 
Therefore, any change in Turkey's conservative policy will 
have to come from the Prime Minister, he concluded. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In a lunch, Former DSI president Dogan Altinbilek 
and academics Aysegul Kibarioglu and Huseyn Bagci from Middle 
East Technical University told us that conditions for 
cooperation on the Tigris-Euphrates are better than they have 
been in decades.  During the Saddam regime, Iraq claimed that 
100% of its territory was suitable for irrigation and 
therefore Iraq had a right to a much larger share of the 
Tigris-Euphrates water.  When Altinbilek was president of 
DSI, then Turkish President Demirel was a hard-liner on water 
issues and considered the MFA too soft.  At one point, 
Demirel asked Altinbilek if DSI could divert the Euphrates 
river to supply water to central Turkey and thereby 
demonstrate Turkey's ability to cut off water to Syria and 
Iraq.  Altinbilek agreed that confidence-building steps were 
necessary before real cooperation and joint management of the 
basin could be accomplished.  Once that happens, the three 
countries can realize tremendous benefits and efficiencies 
from jointly managing their shared water resources, he added. 
 
 
Comment 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Turkish officials understand the importance of 
cooperation among the riparian countries of the 
Tigris-Euphrates basin.  However, the lack of mutual trust 
and the cautious approach of Turkish officials means that 
cooperation will have to start slowly.  A prompt and detailed 
response by the Iraqi side to the Turkish request for Iraqi 
water data would be a first small step in a long process of 
easing suspicion and frustration.  Both Iraq and Turkey have 
expressed their interest in cooperation, and Turkey has 
indicated recently a desire to be more supportive of U.S. 
objectives in Iraq.  It therefore appears to be a good time 
to test whether Turkey is serious about cooperation and 
propose one or two USG-funded confidence-building projects 
(see ref b). 
EDELMAN