This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

070539Z Apr 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001993 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
USDOE FOR CHUCK WASHINGTON 
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/CPD/DDEFALCO 
NSC FOR BRYZA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EPET EWWT SENV TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH STRAITS - TANKERS AND BYPASSES 
 
REF: A. ISTANBUL 412 
 
     ¶B. ANKARA 1306 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶C. 04 STATE 178586 
 
This cable was coordinated with Congen Istanbul.  Sensitive 
But Unclassified. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Turkey is publicly and privately set on 
Samsun-Ceyhan as the winning prospective Bosphorus bypass, 
but next steps are elusive and ambiguous.  All parties 
trumpet the success story of BTC -- as nominally the first 
Bosphorus bypass, expecting first tanker load at Ceyhan late 
autumn 2005.  Recent accidents in the Turkish Straits 
highlight the risks and challenges of increasing and varied 
traffic in the straits.  There is room for USG, GOT, and 
other governments and companies to engage on improving 
maritime safety.  The VTS is a useful monitoring system, but 
it has its limits in preventing accidents.  Turkey receives 
higher marks this winter for actively managing large tanker 
traffic, significantly lowering tanker waiting time over the 
previous winter.  End Summary. 
 
Improvements in Turkish Straits - but Still Accidents 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Oil company representatives tell us that during the 
past winter season the GOT greatly improved its management of 
large tanker (greater than 200 meters) traffic in the Turkish 
Straits.  On the margin of the March 28-29 Caspian-Black Sea 
Oil and Gas Conference in Ankara and in subsequent 
conversations, Chevron Texaco Marine Representative Kjell 
Landin made the following observations to Energy Officer 
(consistent with points made separately by BP officials to 
Embassy and Congen officers): 
 
--WAITING TIME SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED: While total transit 
time (combined Bosphorus and Dardanelles both directions) at 
one point reached 34 days in the winter of 2003/04 and total 
transit time exceeded 15 days for that entire four month 
winter period, total transit time exceeded 15 days for only a 
few days this past winter of 2004/05. 
 
--WHY?: Landin and others give GOT credit for more efficient 
use of the Vessel Traffic System (VTS, which came on line in 
the middle of the winter of 2003/04).   For example, the GOT 
applied measures such as moving to full day unidirectional 
passage and reducing tanker staggering time to 75 minutes, as 
needed when a queue developed.  Although the 03/04 winter 
appeared harsher, total straits closures totalled 5-6 days 
both winters.  The GOT's task this winter was made easier by 
a few other significant factors.  Approximately 1.5 million 
tons less oil were shipped out each month from the Black Sea 
January/February, compared to November/December, partly due 
to less production in Russia and partly due to diversion of 
some crude oil for egress to the Baltic Sea, in response to 
the delays the year before.  In addition, some empty tankers 
were pre-positioned in the Black Sea before the winter. 
 
--WILL IT CONTINUE?: The VTS and advanced methods were better 
employed this winter than the previous year, when there was 
evidence to suggest that there was insufficient political 
will to use the VTS to maximize safe passage, perhaps, Landin 
felt, out of a desire to call attention to the costs and 
risks of Turkish Straits passage.   According to Landin, 
there was room for BOTH increased safety AND increased 
passage, by - for example - reducing staggering time for 
empty northbound tankers (now treated the same as full ones) 
and devoting more attention to smaller and medium tankers. 
 
--BUT STILL ACCIDENTS: 1) The LPG TANK FERRY sinking in 
March, which closed the Bosphorus for a full day, followed by 
two days of unrelated closure due to heavy fog (Ref A), was 
not a weakness of the VTS, but did show the high danger of 
smaller traffic, to which less attention and regulation is 
applied.  According to Landin, there may have been inadequate 
oversight and potential corruption in allowing this old barge 
to be put in use.  2) On April 3 a 244 meter container ship 
and a 85 meter manganese ore cargo ship collided at the 
entrance of the Dardanelles, reportedly resulting in three 
deaths and closure for almost a day of the Dardannelles. 
This highlights that the VTS is an effective monitoring tool, 
but it has its limits in preventing accidents, and that 
straits entrance zones are particularly high risk zones, as 
previously identified.  Investigation of the incident is 
underway, but apparently the ship captains didn't or weren't 
able to react to warnings given by VTS officials. 
 
--The newly approved STRAITS NAVIGATION - ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
INSURANCE LAW (Ref A) appears a good step towards applying 
reasonable international standards, but the test will be 
implementation and reaction of shippers.  The ChevronTexcaco 
mariner said that there was some ambiguity in the drafting 
and intent.  Landin said that almost all big tanker shippers 
(including Russians) take on voluntary pilots, because they 
cannot afford to be perceived as flouting highest safety 
standards. 
 
--The DARDANELLES (Canakkale) is the more significant 
chokepoint than the Bosphorus, experiencing about 13 % more 
traffic, due to incoming LNG tankers and oil tankers to the 
TUPRAS refinery at Izmit.  Although in principle all tankers 
are treated the same, in effect TUPRAS and Turkish tankers 
are often jumped to the head of the queue.  Fortuitously, the 
closure related to the LPG incident and subsequent fog 
effected only the Bosphorus. 
 
BOSPHORUS BYPASS - WAITING FOR MARKET AND OIL COMMITMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU) CHEVRONTEXACO officials repeated their case for 
making progress simultaneously and separately on improved 
maritime safety in the Straits and on developing the economic 
rationale for bypasses, in contrast to the approach taken in 
the so-called "Voluntary Principles" (Ref C).  They saw a 
role for USG attention and help on both.  ChevronTexaco has 
closely looked at many of the Bosphorus bypass proposals (in 
particular trans-Thrace and Samsun-Ceyhan), but concluded 
that the economic justification for investing in a bypass is 
still not clear cut, although they recognized some value for 
a bypass as an insurance policy. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) WE GOT THE ROUTE: In several speeches and private 
meetings, including with visiting TDA official and 
contractor, GOT and BOTAS (Turkish state pipeline company) 
officials emphasized commitment to a Samsun-Ceyhan bypass 
route.  They stressed the oft-repeated rationale: spare 
capacity at Ceyhan port (even with Iraq pipeline flowing, 
they claim as much as 120 million tons spare capacity); 
one-country solution; and a potential for piggy-backing on 
some of BTC's right-of-way.  Both BOTAS and Turkish firm 
Calik Energy express serious interest and are reportedly both 
carrying out separate feasibility studies.  While GOT 
officials insist the government is united in supporting 
Samsun-Ceyhan, they continue to wait passively for the 
elusive oil throughput guarantee from oil shippers. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) OTHER LINKAGES: GOT officials expressed strong 
support for timely completion of BTC, but called for linkages 
to Kazakhstan.  They equally called for natural gas linkages 
to Europe: 1) First, the Turkey-Greece connector underway, 
with possible extension to Italy, and 2) the prospective and 
larger Nabucco pipeline to central Europe (BOTAS is partner). 
 BOTAS targets providing transit of 15 % of Europe's natural 
gas demand.  Potential supply would come first from Shah 
Deniz/South Caucasus Pipeline which will deliver gas via a 
spur to the Turkish grid by late 2006; development and target 
of a second phase is still up in the air.  Conference 
participants also expressed broad interest in resurrecting 
schemes for potential Turkmenistan gas transit to Europe, but 
lamented the abject failure of realizing the trans-Caspian 
natural gas pipeline in 2001 (moreover, difficult to envision 
success with the current regime).  Energy DDG Mithat Rende 
presented Turkey's energy strategy goals: 1) consolidate role 
as transit country, 2) establish energy hub, 3) facilitate a 
"fourth artery" to Europe, and 4) Protect the environment 
(i.e. the Straits). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) MORE ON BYPASSES: All bypass promoters claim to 
have "imminent" crude oil commitments to fill their 
prospective lines.  Thrace Development Company says it is 
close to agreeing with the Russians.  Calik Energy states 
privately that they have commitments from the Russians and 
French company Total.  Many observers in Turkey are skeptical 
that Russian and TNK-BP interest in the Burgos-Alexandropolos 
project will go anywhere (moreover they regularly raise 
negative issues with respect to that project).  Some skeptics 
and conspiracy theorists think it is a smoke-screen to 
attempt to gain more commitment from governments.  Thrace 
Development, meanwhile, argued that there was a need for two, 
or three, bypass pipelines.  Some creative observers even 
proposed a "peace pipeline" linking the Turkish Thrace Black 
Sea coast and Greek Alexandropolos. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Notably, there was no mention of the controversial 
- but dormant - "Voluntary Principles on the Passage of Oil 
Tankers through the Turkish Straits" (Ref C) at the 
conference, even from DDG Mithat Rende, the successor to the 
author and champion of the Voluntary Principles.  Recent 
accidents in the Straits show that even with improved 
application of maritime navigation management techniques and 
identified goal of maximizing safe passage, accidents can 
still happen.  A Bosphorus bypass would likely displace the 
"safest" oil (carried or contracted by the large oil 
companies), adding to the classic first mover - free rider 
conundrum (who will make the first substantial investment in 
a bypass?) 
EDELMAN