This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000650 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KCOR EC
SUBJECT: UN ENVOY'S VISIT:  ALL POTATOES, NO MEAT 
 
REF: QUITO 585 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  Attempting to spur dialog toward an eventual 
solution to Ecuador's ongoing court crisis, UN Rapporteur 
Leandro Despouy visited Quito March 13-18 for a series of 
meetings with pro-government forces, political opposition, 
and third-party actors.  Great expectations surrounded 
Despouy's visit, and political bickering between President 
Lucio Gutierrez and his enemies dropped precipitously during 
the envoy's stay.  Initial readouts showed Despouy 
identifying problems, but offering few fixes.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  Despouy, the UN's Geneva-based rapporteur for judicial 
independence, arrived in Quito March 13 with the conflict 
over Ecuador's Supreme Court in full-swing (Reftel). 
Opposition forces were clamoring for the immediate dismissal 
of the current tribunal and its replacement with a less 
"politicized" body, although they differed on specifics. 
President Gutierrez continued to push his referendum 
solution, although he introduced an altered text in response 
to criticism over the original's complexity.  Government 
allies PRIAN and PRE, both benefiting from the current 
judicial lineup, favored the status quo.  Even Ecuadorian 
civil society and NGOs lay divided; although most called the 
current Court illegitimate, others, like Zero Corruption, 
defended it to the hilt. 
 
¶3.  All welcomed Despouy's visit, at least publicly (the GoE 
had tried to delay it until April or May, but eventually 
accepted the March date).  The opposition and most media 
outlets claimed the former Argentinean diplomat would, after 
analyzing events of the last four months, declare 
unconstitutional and illegal Congress's actions in revamping 
Ecuador's Supreme, Constitutional, and Electoral Courts.  GoE 
and pro-government forces sought the opposite, of course; 
that Despouy would agree that Ecuador's judiciary had been 
hopelessly politicized, corrupt, and in need of overhaul. 
 
¶4.  On behalf of the Ambassador, Poloff attended a UN Mission 
Ecuador-hosted March 16 dinner honoring the visiting 
rapporteur.  Despouy was pleased with the welcome he had 
received from opposition and government alike.  He offered 
that, while Gutierrez initially had fought the visit, he had 
"seen the light" as opposition to the Court mounted -- the UN 
rep might be an ally in the president's bid to remain in 
office, the theory went, not an enemy. 
 
¶5.  Complicating his work immensely, Despouy noted there were 
no real "victims" from the recent judicial shenanigans in 
Ecuador, no clearly wronged group.  None of his interlocutors 
(save the ex-jurists themselves) had demanded the old Court's 
return, for example.  Yet new members could only offer 
political justifications, not persuasive legal arguments, for 
the judicial putsch.  Gutierrez and allies deserved blame for 
their quasi-constitutional sackings of Ecuador's highest 
tribunals, Despouy reasoned.  But so did the opposition; the 
envoy believed the court crisis's roots lay in the November 
attempt in Congress, led by former President Leon 
Febres-Cordero, to impeach the president. 
 
¶6.  A similar conflict occurring in neighboring nations might 
have spawned violence, Despouy ventured, a compliment to 
Ecuadorians' peaceful natures.  But even Ecuadorians had 
their limits.  Sooner, not later, the nation needed an 
independent, respected judiciary.  Although he favored a 
limited Congressional role and "cooptacion" -- in which the 
Court itself fills any vacancies -- Despouy tabled no 
specific proposals for overcoming the current crisis. 
 
¶7.  The rapporteur was similarly vague the following evening. 
 Via UN Mission Director Mauricio Valdes, he had sought an 
urgent private meeting with the Ambassador to discuss his 
visit and observation.  Appearing drained, perhaps the 
product of four hours with Gutierrez that morning, Despouy 
downed two scotches in succession and lamented the 
president's weaknesses.  Poor advisors topped the list; 
Gutierrez, himself desiring an amicable compromise, was 
surrounded (and influenced) by cronies who sought 
unconditional surrender.  Congress too was a problem, Despouy 
believed, and the president was correct in fearing 
additional, politically motivated impeachment attempts. 
 
¶8.  Despite continuing conflict, the UN envoy believed a 
solution to the court crisis lay ahead, although how far he 
did not mention.  Nor did he reveal details of his action 
plan to the Ambassador.  What would he tell the press upon 
departure, she questioned.  Despouy looked perplexed, as if 
he had not thought so far (12 hours) in advance. 
 
¶9.  Speaking before media March 18, the judicial rapporteur 
raised problems, not roadmaps.  He had identified "various 
irregularities, both in dismissing the old Court and naming 
the new."  The Court's most recent, controversial maneuver, 
wresting administrative and disciplinary authorities from the 
National Judiciary Council, also seemed a troubling power 
grab.  And Ecuador's Electoral Tribunal, composed of 
representatives of the nation's largest parties, appeared 
less the electoral watchdog, and more a political pork 
disbursor. 
 
¶10.  It was imperative that Ecuador establish rule of law, 
Despouy urged; a critical prerequisite was an independent 
judiciary.  The current Court enjoyed no respect, with even 
Gutierrez calling it temporary.  Any process to replace it 
must be constitutional and transparent, however.  He would 
present his findings to the UN Human Rights Commission upon 
return to Geneva, and would follow up on its findings.  UN 
Mission Quito sources subsequently told the media that 
Despouy soon would present his preliminary report. It 
represented a "warning shot" to the GoE to resolve the 
impasse, fast. 
 
¶11.  COMMENT:  We are left believing that Despouy's visit 
mattered not for its concrete advances -- which seem 
nonexistent -- but for its mere occurrence and catalytic 
effects.  Summing our views perfectly was administration 
critic (and regular US-basher) Carlos Vera, who titled his 
March 16 editorial "Stay, Mr. Despouy."  Vera attributed the 
drop in bickering and Gutierrez's call for dialog to the 
rapporteur's attention.  Third-country diplomats attending 
the Despouy dinner March 16 shared Vera's views.  Only the 
United Nations, they believed, could save Ecuador from its 
current mess, like some deus ex machina from an ancient Greek 
drama.  In other words, that the "Emperor wore no clothes" 
mattered nil to a blind (but wishing to see) public.  END 
COMMENT. 
KENNEY